SURVEY

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a journal of
Soviet and East European studies

Germany: today and tomorrow

The German Scene
Bonn's Ostpolitik
Party Politics and the Wall
The Hallstein Doctrine
Foreign Policy of the DDR
The Oder-Neisse Line
Ulbricht and After
Writers in the DDR

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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 61 **October 1966**

Editors: Walter Laqueur, Leo Labedz

Germany: Today and Tomorrow

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GERMANY: TODAY AND TOMORROW

RUSSIA AND GERMANY *was the subject of one of our special issues published exactly four years ago. Most of the political problems discussed then are still with us even though some of the principal actors have disappeared from the political scene. German reunification seems as distant as in* 1962. *If there has been some fresh thinking and some new political moves, opposition to any new initiatives on the subject in Russia, and to a lesser extent among other powers, has on the whole hardened. There have been new developments in relations between Germany and some east European countries, but only the future can tell whether these trends will have a cumulative political impact.*

The focus of the present special issue is therefore different in some respects. GERMANY: TODAY AND TOMORROW *deals mainly with the internal affairs and the foreign policies of the Bundesrepublik and the DDR, with the emphasis on the division of Germany and the political and social problems that have resulted from this division.* SURVEY *has traditionally provided a platform for the expression of various, often conflicting, opinions. That the views published in this issue do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors need therefore hardly be stressed. In* 1962 *Germany was one of the major focal points of international tension; while none of the unresolved questions has been settled, the centre of world tension has moved elsewhere. But the German problem remains of importance and its various present aspects and implications are not so widely known as they should be. We hope that the present special issue of* SURVEY *makes a contribution, however small, towards a clarification of some of these disputed issues.*

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THE GERMAN SCENE

Karl Robson

ONE day early in May 1945, when the Fuehrer was dead and the Third Reich's unconditional surrender a matter of hours, an anonymous broadcaster advised the German people at large how the individual patriot might help the nation survive the coming years of occupation by unforgiving foreigners from east and west. Whoever he may have been the speaker was not a last-ditch Nazi. He spoke not at all of those packs of werewolves, conceived by Goebbels, that were to sally from dark corners to harass the invaders. To the contrary, he recommended submission and cooperation. And yet, in spite of everything that had happened, also a quietly continuing pride in being German. Whatever repression might be in store for the nation there was one constructive way, he suggested, in which every man, woman, and child could help to preserve the essence of their national heritage. They must keep alive the German language. Should its use be discouraged in public, or even proscribed, then it must be fostered piously in every home.

This modest piece of counsel in a dark hour has come to my mind several times lately while following public and private discussions among Germans about the *raison d'être* of Germany and things German. Such bouts of introspection are a natural consequence of defeat, and of the frustrated nationalism and supra-nationalism troubling many Germans twenty years later. They are a consequence, too, of the gradual taking over of authority in all walks of life by middle-aged citizens who were in their teens when the Third Reich collapsed. Every nation is uneasy, if not resentful, at the loss or the adulteration of any of the properties of its sovereignty. Hitherto the Germans have coped equanimously not only with this general adjustment to the exigencies of the times but also with the particular national penalty of partition. But now a more questioning mood is emerging. It is being asked openly, for example, whether Germany may not have gone too far in trying to ingratiate itself with the neighbours; are not Germany's professed partners inclined to pursue their own national interests at Germany's expense; do the German people deserve to be deemed so incorrigibly wayward as to require to be kept divided and otherwise weakened; might it not be proper for Germany now to raise its own breed of de Gaulle? Or are such questions altogether irrelevant today; would it really matter were east Germany to develop into a permanently separated German-speaking state, into a near kinsfolk something like the Austrians; what is there distinctively German that is worth assertively preserving in a willy-nilly integrating world?

I HAVE lately been trying to elicit from German friends and acquaintances, both young and old, what they consider it is in the business of being German that is so dear to them that they

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would not exchange their nationality for any other. The replies have been as confusedly mystical and earthy as undoubtedly they would have been had the same question been put to Englishmen or Frenchmen. Yet it is notable that sooner or later in the discussion it is invariably the German language that crystallises as the most precious of Germany's distinctive assets. In contemplating these matters the Germans do not speak ineffably, like the Anglo-Saxon, of their 'way of life'. Usually there is loose appreciation at first of German industriousness and discipline (especially from the womenfolk, who seem to be thinking mainly of tidy rooms, clean clothes, daily-aired bedding, bottled fruit, fresh rolls for breakfast, and like adornments of the well-ordered household); for German skilled work (visions of cameras, cars, musical instruments, and cranes); and for the German landscape, mostly of the south, green, rolling, and coniferous. A foreign ministry man spoke of the comfort he derived from 'feeling to be part of German solidity and security' as manifested in the comparatively superior sturdiness of German domestic architecture. But in the end it is the German language that is generally acknowledged to be the most satisfying expression of the German character. As Houston Stewart Chamberlain put it in a letter to the Kaiser before the first world war, 'The German soul is indissolubly tied up with the German language'. Evidently the anonymous broadcaster of May 1945 knew what he was about. His counsel may not have been quite so modest as it sounded at the time.

In the minds of the Kaiser, Chamberlain, and the Nazis, the German soul was something perspicuously superior to that of other peoples; and we all know the disastrous consequences of their thinking. Happily there is little evidence of any widespread survival today of such a disposition. The former SS General Sepp Dietrich, who did not stop at murder in his devotion to Hitler, was apostrophised at his burial last April as the incarnation of 'German honour'. But the graveside orator was an Austrian, and the three thousand or so mourners were mostly senescent SS men who had fought under Dietrich's command. (A Stuttgart newspaper demonstratively handed over to a fund for Jewish children the fee it had received for printing a fulsome obituary.) Some of the speakers of the German National Democratic Party, which increased its representation last spring in local government in Bavaria, Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein, peddle the once heady slogans of extravagant nationalism. But to the overwhelming majority of this generation the stuff is corked and not even any longer potent.

In the opinion of Professor Adorno of Frankfurt University the German language today could be an instrument of German excellence in the sphere of learning. He has submitted that probably their language is the most valuable contribution the Germans have to make to the contemporary world, since its ordered niceties fit it to be a singularly rich and precise vehicle of communication for scientists and

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philosophers. There are men in the foreign ministry at Bonn who evidently think along much the same lines. They consider the cultivation of German to be of immense importance to the nation's future influence in the world. The more effectively to set about this, the ministry handed over in 1952 the greater part of its cultural activities to the Goethe Institute 'for fostering the German language and German culture abroad'. The Institute has already 114 branches in Germany and the rest of the world, employing some 1,630 persons (125 in 1959). It has the tactical advantage of being a private undertaking under the law yet relieved by a substantial state subsidy of the worry of having to pay its own way. Its presentation of the German legacy is modest and liberal; and it sees its task of teaching German to Asians, Africans and Latin Americans partly as a contribution towards industrial development in their home continents. The Institute's work is reinforced by the semi-official *Deutsche Welle*, whose courses in German are being used by some 100 broadcasting stations in sixty countries.

Yet for all this hopeful effort the Goethe Institute's missionaries report a discouraging lack among foreigners of will to master the language. They note that attendance at courses quickly falls, the complaint of deserters being that German is much more difficult than English, and not nearly so useful. (German schoolchildren sometimes make roughly the same lament.) And, along with other philologists, professional and amateur, the Institute's teachers are concerned at signs of the language's debasement. They cite by way of example both nazi and communist equivocations that have slipped into general currency. (I recently left a suitcase, containing books and papers, standing in an empty office awaiting the decorator. After a while it vanished for ever. Asked whether he knew of its whereabouts, the porter of the building replied with finality that the apparently ownerless case had been *sichergestellt*: that is to say 'placed in safety'—the dictator's euphemism for the process of arrest or confiscation. He was not a whit embarrassed at being unable to say where and in whose safe keeping the case now was.) Undoubtedly the long presence of British and American troops in the country has also left some disfiguring traces on the language. 'Nato Deutsch' is as distasteful to fastidious Germans as is 'le franglais' to like-minded Frenchmen. To preserve the German language is a modest national ambition; but it is probably being excessively sanguine to hope to enlist many foreign students of its pedantic complexities.

THE Germans have not always had a reputation for extravagant self-assertion. To Madame de Stael in 1804, for instance, modesty seemed to be one of the traits distinguishing the German character. For some five years after their unconditional surrender the German people and their new leaders were diffident perforce. Yet they have remained so, more or less voluntarily, over the past fifteen years. And today most of them are still willing, even eager, to subordinate the

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German national ego to the international club rules. What struck Madame de Stael particularly was the German middle classes' readiness to learn through associating directly or indirectly with other people, especially foreigners. All Germans are of the middle class now. They are quick to learn when they see the profit. And they have thrown themselves with gusto and not a little altruism into all the ways that have been opened since the war towards collective management of such once sovereign matters as defence, trade, tariffs, communications, and financial and economic aid for other countries. The twelve more or less complete divisions of the Bundeswehr are all under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Confident of the backing of the electorate, German statesmen and senior administrators have gone to great trouble to collaborate considerately with other countries, particularly with those of the common market together, and with France singly. It is the policy of big engineering concerns such as Krupp, Mannesmann, and Demag, to undertake ambitious contracts abroad as far as possible only in consort with other foreign firms. The presence of over a million foreign workers in west Germany is scarcely resented, not just because they are useful to the economy but also because the Germans, embarrassed by memories of their exploitation of foreigners during the war, do derive some satisfaction from knowing they are now helping indigent Italians, Greeks, or Spaniards to earn a more comfortable living than they would at home.

The widening range of collaboration between states has prompted the Federal Government to set up a special section in the Ministry of the Interior commissioned with cultivating a cadre of persons qualified for international duties. The ministry's first experimental course—labelled 'Preparation for posting to international and European services'—was held this summer variously in Saarbrücken, Bonn, and Berlin. The participants were young civil servants drawn from both Bonn and the state capitals. The course covered in the main languages, international law and procedures. It is to be held regularly in the future, and the names of those who have taken it filed centrally in Bonn.

THE German people's political restraint since the war, and the harder interest many of them are now beginning to take in the nation's main chance, derive as much from economic as from moral causes. The country was laid so low in 1945 that the effort at first just to survive physically, then to repair the damage, or to build again from new foundations, wholly absorbed individual and collective energies. The Federal Republic's economic achievement has been the talk of the world, sometimes of its envy. West Germany is now keeping in comfortable circumstances not only its long-established indigenous population but also some eight million voluntary or involuntary newcomers from beyond the Elbe. It finds room in addition for over a million foreign workers (*Gastarbeiter* in polite parlance), and

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the means to give them the same rates of pay and social benefits as those applying within the German community, and even to cater for them nightly on the radio. Since 1948 wages have risen more steeply in west Germany than in any other west European country. The International Labour Office at Geneva reckons that in west Germany hours of work are shorter and social services ampler than anywhere else today. This performance has been made possible through west Germany having doubled its gross national product since 1950, a thrust unmatched by any other country. Real wages have doubled concurrently. More than eight million new dwellings have been built, and some 600,000 are still going up every year; so that it is easier to find a house or a flat now in this part of Germany than it was in 1939. It has been an absorbing individual and collective effort. All in all, the Germans are proud of it as, in increasing leisure and confidence, they look at themselves and the rest of the world, and consider their next objectives from a position of economic strength.

Not only Herr Erhard, who prides himself on having arranged the setting for socially-conscious economic enterprise, has lately been demurring that material prosperity may have gone to too many German heads to be safe for the community as a whole. Among other knowledgeable diagnosticians, the president of the Bundesbank, Herr Blessing, has long been warning the public in general and politicians in particular of the consequences of the country's propensity to live beyond its means. More and more citizens must have their own presentable car, the latest household luxuries, and a far-flung annual holiday; more and more local authorities their public building sprees. Industries unable fully to pay their way—farming and coal-mining, for example—are being increasingly subsidised from public funds. Of the Federal Government's total revenue from taxes in 1965, which came to DM 59,029 million (roughly £527 million), DM 14,476 million, about a quarter, was paid out again in one form of subsidy or another. 'Invisible' subsidies in the shape of tax concessions, or of waived interest charges, debit the federal budget by another DM 14,295 million, bringing the total of subsidisation to all but DM 29,000 million. At the same time wages and salaries are now exceeding productivity. The gross national product, which is now valued at DM 450,000 million annually, is estimated to be growing by between three and four per cent. Yet in the first half of 1966 wages and salaries have been rising by from 6 to 7·2 per cent. Last year west Germany had a favourable balance of payments of DM 1,000 million, compared with one of DM 7,000 to DM 8,000 million in preceding years. The export trade is slowing down. But heavy currency commitments remain: there is a transfer of DM 2,000 million annually through the earnings that foreign workers send home, another of DM 2,000 million in restitution payments to the state of Israel and individual victims of Nazi persecution. German holidaymakers—and Herr Erhard has said

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he is proud of this manifestation of liberalism—are spending DM 3,000 million abroad every year.

The Chancellor has recently been counselling German workers at large to cease supposing they could work still less than they do today without imperilling the foundations of their domestic prosperity and recovered international standing. On one occasion he told them that foreigners were beginning to ask whether the Germans might not have lost control of themselves—'have they always to overdo everything, must the German hubris once again become a danger?' But Herr Erhard straightaway added a sentence that affirmed his confidence in his countrymen's good sense in the long run: there should be a feeling among the German people, he reflected, that it was disgraceful for anybody even to talk about shortening hours of work. It is bold to assume the possibility of such a disposition. Yet it is probably justified. The chastened *Volk ohne Mass* has been behaving so moderately since the war, and through so doing has profited so much, that irretrievable relapse into immoderation seems to be out of the question for the time being. Not forgetting the inadequacies of generalisation, I am sure that the west Germans as a whole would claim that, for all its flaws, their system of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* has combined economic efficiency with social justice about as far as can be expected in an imperfect world. It has abolished extreme poverty. It has excluded hitherto resort by the workers to self-crippling strikes. (When the British seamen struck last spring with the demand for a juster deal than £59 7s 6d monthly for a fifty-six-hour week, the west German seaman was already receiving £64 monthly for a forty-hour week, and as likely as not living in more comfortable conditions at sea.) It is duly fostering concentration of industry and commerce in response to contemporary developments. At the same time it is permitting many more small businesses to survive than once seemed likely to. Membership of one or another of the voluntary chains of retailers (each of which is supplied largely by one wholesale buyer) is enabling most adaptable shopkeepers to hold their own with the big stores. Most of the big manufacturing concerns make a practice of ordering this or that from scores of small firms whose experience and skill can guarantee a high quality of specialisation. (Badische Anilin, the chemical manufacturers of Ludwigshafen, claim they are served in one way or another by some ten thousand small independent businesses.) Even on the land, which has lost nearly two million workers since 1950, encouragement of amalgamation in some regions and of cooperatives in others, is slowly promoting an agricultural efficiency that should eventually reduce the need for subsidies on today's scale.

AS they observe economic developments east and west of their own frontiers, the majority of west Germans are satisfied that their own economy is being run generally on the right lines. This satisfaction accounts largely for the Christian Democratic Union's continuing

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domination of the Bundestag and for the government's confidence that the discontented are not likely to go so far as to let their demands wreck the existing economic structure. It accounts in part, too, for the west Germans' growing confidence in international dealings. They are aware they have won respect, even though much of it is begrudged. They believe they have a useful political and economic contribution to make to the world, and have earned a weight-pulling partner's right to have an equal say in what is being done for European and trans-Atlantic integration.

Disquiet at the possible consequences of the German people mistaking today's priorities is not confined to the Federal Chancellor and the President of the Bundesbank. There is no dearth of teachers and prophets protesting that in dedicating itself to the worship of mammon the nation is neglecting its soul. They speak their minds daily—and let no-one suppose they are impeded—from pulpit and platform, and from press, television, and stage, rebuking spiritual sloth and carnal greed. They are quick to expose corruption and arrogance of office. They deplore what they call 'the education catastrophe', meaning mainly the inadequacy of the grants for higher education and scientific research. (The number of students at universities and technical high schools has risen from 97,000 in 1950 to 220,000 today; and west Germany is spending rather less than other industrialised states are on research—about two per cent of the gross national product.) They scold the Bundestag for its mediocrity, the Bundeswehr for its ambitions, industry for its power, and the citizenry at large for its congenital *Untertanengeist* (servility). In fact they descry so many ills in the west German body politic that the foreign observer sometimes wonders whether they may not be suffering from political hypochondria. But, after all that has happened since 1933, it would be disconcerting were there no hypersensitive public watchdogs everywhere on the prowl.

The sum of pessimistic thinking about the Federal Republic is presented by Professor Karl Jaspers in his latest book *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik*? The title can be most neatly translated as 'Whither the Federal Republic?' But the verb *treiben* implies propulsion. So perhaps 'Where is the Federal Republic heading for?' would be a more faithful if less succinct rendering. (A German will often ask another *Was treibst du*?, meaning 'What are you up to?'.) In Professor Jaspers' opinion the Federal Republic is up to no good and heading for trouble. He submits that, in consequence of the conflicting pretensions of the Soviet Union and the United States, the Federal Republic was pitched before it was ready into the business of being an independent state. The period of tutelage and self-examination was too short. The free Germans were on the move before they had found their bearings. Their severance from the trammels of the national-socialist state was still incomplete, their change of men and manners insufficiently radical. And so, in place of a genuine evolving democracy, Professor Jaspers discerns a 'vacuum

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concealed by screens and fictions of every kind'. In short, the professor signals the danger of an immature democracy, preoccupied with making and securing wealth, straying blindly by way of 'party oligarchy' into the embrace of a virtual military dictatorship that sooner or later would precipitate a war.

With all respect to Professor Jaspers, I suspect that he is too remote from the contemporary west German scene to be any longer in a position to see clearly what is happening. Himself a German, Professor Jaspers has been professor of philosophy at the university of Basel since 1948. He is now eighty-three. It is natural for a man of that age to brood over his own past times. For him much of these is hideous with the crimes of the Third Reich, and accusatory with the failure to oppose them of most of the Germans of his own generation and background. 'When the Jews were being transported', Professor Jaspers has written elsewhere, 'we did not go on to the streets and cry out until they destroyed us too . . . We are to blame that we are still alive'. But Professor Jaspers is hardly in touch with his middle-aged compatriots who, as I have already pointed out, were in their teens when the Third Reich fell and are now coming into authority, let alone with those who then were still unborn but now are studying at the universities, serving in the Bundeswehr, or already earning their living in the workaday world. It is not just to reproach these younger people collectively with being forgetful, indifferent, and heedless of their political responsibilities. There is ample evidence of a prevailing spirit to the contrary. Germans under forty are aware and ashamed of the consequences of their elders' slavish obedience to the Nazi state. But they themselves cannot be expected to grovel for ever in sackcloth and ashes. And they now compose the greater part of an active body politic whose limbs and organs are healthy enough to resist infection.

The Bundeswehr, in which pessimists of the Jaspers school of thought see a likely instrument of dictatorship, is much too occupied with growing pains to become involved in political adventure. In the meantime its rank and file are being systematically encouraged—at least from on high if not always from below—to behave as an intelligently questioning 'citizens' army'. The whole is integrated with the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, association with which naturally has a broadening and denationalising influence. Above all, the Bundeswehr is being kept—pretty well as far as any army can be—under the surveillance and control of a parliament that is by no means as smugly ineffective as some critics make it out to be.

The decentralisation that was imposed upon the Federal Republic after 1948 is one of the reasons why the capital looks remote, frumpish, and sometimes even futile to the citizens of Hamburg, Hanover, Munich, and Stuttgart. Bonn's situation in the extreme west and its small-town limitations have hampered the work and the development of the central parliament and administration, as have the regional

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powers of the eleven *Laender*. But these disadvantages are being gradually overcome, though at an alarmingly high cost, including abandonment of the original conception of the capital's impermanence.

For all its failings the federal parliament is as active and responsible as any other elected legislature in the western world. Its deputies, even those who are directly elected, are not so closely in touch with the constituencies as are the majority of the members of the House of Commons. Too few of them take the trouble to speak well. But the Bundestag's twenty-eight committees have for the most part cultivated a high standard of curiosity and expertise that enables parliament to keep an effective watch on over-mighty ministers and civil servants. Thanks to the ruling which disqualifies from representation in parliament any party that fails to win five per cent of the total poll, the Bundestag has achieved a degree of stability unknown to the Reichstag. As in England, two major parties have come to dominate the political arena—the variegatedly conservative Christian Democratic Union (from time to time they ask themselves how significant is their C), and the scarcely Marxist Social-Democratic Party. As in England, the liberals in Germany (Free Democrats) are neither a strong nor a growing political force. And the extremes of political aspiration—communist and nationalist—do not threaten gravely to disturb the settling habit of moderation. In these circumstances it is odd that, disturbed by what he takes to be signs of 'party oligarchy', Professor Jaspers should recommend abolition of the five per cent clause. His counsel that the state should cease to subsidise the major parties is more soundly based. Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in July 1966 that such subsidisation was illegal.

IT is often held against the contemporary German citizen that he is politically lazy; that, once having cast his vote after only a cursory examination of the issues, he is inclined to leave the whole responsibility of politics to the deputies he has chosen to represent him in parliament for the next four years. There are indeed many such political passengers in the Federal Republic, just as there are in other democratic countries. But the Bundestag has learned, sometimes to its discomfiture, that its proceedings are on the whole constantly and intelligently watched by one or another of the major components of west Germany's plural society. Professor Jaspers is not the academic world's only critic of Germany's rulers and policy-makers. The universities are the source of much of the questioning of the Bundeswehr's nuclear pretensions. With leading trade unionists, prominent academicians are also influencing the Bundestag to delay legislation that might make it easier for a would-be dictator to seize all power on the pretext that a 'state of national emergency' had arisen. It is the Protestant church, not the Bundestag, that has had the guts to take the initiative of inviting the public at large to consider the propriety of trying to

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allay east European suspicion of the German people through the unequivocal renunciation of any claim to Poland's western territories.

Given freedom of speech, a nation can today be seen reflected in the looking glass of television as well as overheard talking to itself through its newspapers. Freedom of speech exists in west Germany, and it is widely used and enjoyed. There is no minority, no shade of opinion, that cannot publicly state its case. (Although the communist party is proscribed the communist point of view is on the whole fairly presented.) There are three television channels, and more sound broadcasting programmes to choose from than there are *Laender*. There are several influential weekly journals, at least four nationally-distributed daily newspapers, and some 180 regional dailies. In 1965 the total circulation of the daily press was 22·7 million, catering, it is reckoned, for some 35 million readers. Naturally not everything is lovely in the garden of information. There is a trend towards concentration in the newspaper industry. But it is neither more nor less sinister than the similar trend in Britain and the United States. The English journalist still winces on reading in the German press of some 'murderer', 'robber', or 'sexual criminal', so named and condemned before he has been tried; or of some killer with a car spared salutary publicity through being masked as 'Herr A'. These are serious blemishes. But on the whole the west German public—would it could be said of their compatriots east of the Elbe—are being intelligently and responsibly informed about the world they live in. All in all, the west German radio and press are playing a worthy part in helping the German people to assess what they can and ought to be doing in the latter half of the twentieth century.

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GERMAN AND EUROPEAN REUNIFICATION

Two Problems or One?

Pierre Hassner

IN January 1964, Foreign Minister Schroeder declared in the Bundestag: 'The storm will soon sweep with might and main through the German house'. The summer of 1966 may be as good a time as any to ask whether this historic hour has arrived and whether the 'winds of change' which, at least according to French and Rumanian meteorological standards, are indeed sweeping across the two halves of Europe, are the forerunners of this German storm or are likely, for the foreseeable future, to stop at the door of the German house.

The German debate since the fall of 1965, from the unmistakable evolution on the border question to the excited reactions of fear and reassurance, resentment and gratitude, hope and disappointment, elicited by such events or non-events as de Gaulle's trip to Moscow or the exchange of letters and abortive exchange of speakers between the SPD and the SED, from the new positions taken by such politicians as F. J. Strauss and R. Barzel to the studied ambiguity of these positions in one case and the hasty retreat from them in the other, all provide ample evidence that new expectations coexist with old realities. Perhaps the new expectations are based on passing myths; or perhaps the old realities are crumbling. Probably a more accurate assessment would distinguish between three levels of the current situation, whether German or European.

On the first, diplomatic and declaratory level, initiatives, travel, and speeches make more and more frequent headlines. Some (de Gaulle or Ceausescu) may be more far-reaching and more consistent than others (Barzel's speech or Ulbricht's initiative). However, this level of flexibility, experiment, and even realignment, has by no means suppressed a more fundamental, military and territorial level, that of the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the division of Germany and Europe according to the line of this confrontation. But beneath both the agitation of the first level and the stability of the second, a subterranean evolution may be at work on a third level, that of the feelings and attitudes not only of peoples but also of leaders, on both sides of the line dividing Europe: that of the self-assessment of regimes and of alliances.

The question then is whether the slow evolution of the third level is going to erode or even to explode the barrier of the second, and whether the moves and countermoves of the first are likely to accelerate or to hinder and complicate the process, or again are going to use and influence it by channelling it in various possible directions.

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Here the German situation proves both inseparable and distinct from the European one. The three levels coexist in both; but their mutual relationship and relative importance differ: both the factors which make for stability and those which make for instability are sufficiently sharper in the German case to throw grave doubts on the long-range processes and the half-way solutions towards which the all-European situation may seem to point. It is not unreasonable to imagine all over eastern Europe a variety of communist regimes with multiple degrees of liberalisation and independence, but all more or less reconciled with their populations on a national basis and attracted by the West through their economic and cultural relations and through the search for a counterweight to the Soviet Union. So far, in East Germany and between the two Germanys, the evolution seems always to stop earlier because it is always in danger of going further. There seems to be little room for evading the stark choice between the maintenance of the political status quo (even though the daily life within it may be made less oppressive) and a qualitative or revolutionary change which would involve diplomatic negotiations and might affect the military balance. Elsewhere in relations with eastern Europe one can apply Bernstein's formula: 'The goal is nothing, the movement is everything'. In the case of Germany, the growing feeling for unconditional contacts, justified as a reaction to their old unconditional avoidance, is in danger of overlooking that here is one place where the movement cannot be isolated from the goal. The evolution necessarily raises the question of its political and military consequences, and hence of the German and European settlement which should be its goal and its framework.

The formula '*Wandel durch Annäherung*' may be applied, albeit in a more limited way, to the relations between the two Germanys as between the two Europes, but only to the extent to which both change and rapprochement stop short of reunification. If the last and decisive step in *Annäherung* involves a real change in the political structure of the continent, and, even more, a suppression of the duality of German states, it must be preceded by a fundamental *Wandel* in Soviet policy.

An evolution of East Germany in the direction of liberalisation or of national identity is in certain respects less possible and in others less desirable from a western and German point of view, than in the case of the other communist states. It is less possible for the obvious, if perhaps declining reason of the lack of national identification and of the attraction of reunification, which has seemed so far to set imperious limits both to the external independence and to the domestic liberalisation of the DDR; it is less desirable because, if this identification of the people with the regime and this self-confidence of the leaders are beginning to take place, they may indeed allow a certain amount of liberalisation and of independence, but at the cost of an increasing stabilisation and acceptance of Germany's division into two states. Again, this acceptance itself can be considered unsatisfactory not only from inside, from the point of view of German national consciousness

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and patriotism, but also from the outside, to the extent to which the same neighbours who would be suspicious of a reunified German state and of a revived German nationalism may also refuse to trust the disappearance of German national feeling even if it actually takes place; they may consider the existence of two German states as a source of potential instability and revisionism which has to be checked by the maintenance of the Soviet and American presence. One cannot, on the other hand, dogmatically deny that, given the action of time, the deepening of the division and the birth of two separate identities may go so far as to create two German states both so stable, so attached to their distinctness, and yet so friendly to each other as to suppress any fear or hope of their violent or peaceful reunification; but whatever one may think of the likelihood of this outcome, it does correspond to the declared goal, or at least to the declared second-best goal, of Soviet and East German policy (existence of two German states and friendly contacts between them), as opposed to the western position of one Germany reunified in freedom.

Hence the paradox of the double and, in a way, contradictory discrepancy between the German and the European situation. Today, precisely because of the potential instability of the East German regime, the German partition is the most rigidly stable element of the European picture. It is not the German problem which is again on the move, it is everything else in Europe which seems to be moving, and it is the German partition which, if only by its links with the presence of Soviet and American troops, constitutes not only the exception but also the limit to this movement. But even if the discrepancy between the political (as distinct from economic) immobilism of the DDR and the transformation and increased freedom of movement of the other communist states were diminished through a parallel evolution and self-assertion of the DDR, the same evolution which can be welcomed wholeheartedly by the West in the other cases can be welcomed only half-heartedly in the German one, since it would mean the consolidation of the division and the abandonment of the basic positions of the West's (and West Germany's) policy. It is only if and when one accepts the existing political framework (in terms of statehood and in terms of rule by the communist party) that one can welcome without reservation the evolution which is taking place within it. National communism in Rumania is a victory for the West because it never dreamed of expecting half as much; national communism in the DDR, even if possible and desirable, would still be a political defeat for the West because there what it hoped for was not simply, as in the case of Europe, a diplomatic, ideological, economic, human rapprochement between nation-states, symbolically, and perhaps less than candidly, designated as reunification, but the actual reunification of a country, involving, even if only as a last stage, the abandonment of the very existence of the communist regime and of the East German state. Whatever one's assessment of the wisdom of the western hopes, or of the wisdom of discarding them today altogether,

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and whatever one's prediction on the evolution in the DDR, it is fair to say that in one sense at least time works for the West in eastern Europe and against the West in East Germany. Hence the paradox that while the Soviet position in Europe is declining, the Soviet position in Germany is improving.

THE present general desire for initiatives in the West, and the linking of the German and the European problem, come from the coincidence of these two facts. We, and particularly the West Germans, have witnessed at the same time the failure of the western promise to secure the reunification of Germany, and the failure of the Soviet attempt to secure the sovietisation of east Europe. On the one hand the West Germans, prompted both by the decline of western integration and the existence of the Wall, increasingly turn their sights towards East Germany, but what they see is that the communist regime seems on the verge neither of collapsing from within nor of being abandoned by the Soviet Union; the result is an increasing feeling of hopelessness, an increasing urge to do something in order at least to prevent the two Germanys from growing further apart, to alleviate the situation of the East German population for a provisional period which seems destined to last, and to safeguard at least the psychological preconditions (in terms of human ties and common feelings) for some indefinite form of reunification at some indefinite point in the future. On the other hand, the evolution of east Europe constitutes a new, hopeful, and somewhat unexpected factor which shows that Soviet rule is not as permanent and immutable as it once seemed, that communism can not only be differentiated along national lines but also, more generally, lose much of its dynamism and its appeal; that, economically, culturally, and in certain cases and to a certain extent ideologically and politically, it is the West which attracts the East rather than the opposite. More generally and above all, they see that, as the French say, 'le pire n'est pas toujours sûr', and that the most welcome changes may occur where and when one least expects them. Seen from Bonn, the outlook in Pankow and Moscow is grim, the outlook in Bucharest is bright. Hence the idea of trying to link the intractable German problem to this one favourable development, the east European evolution, in the hope of some kind of spill-over or contamination.

On the idea of an active and friendly policy towards eastern Europe as a contribution to the German problem, the trend seems unmistakably favourable, in West Germany as in the rest of the West, not only on commercial and cultural bridges, which meet with no opposition worth speaking of elsewhere than in the United States, but also on the originally American and lately Gaullist idea of détente as a possible precondition, and not only as a result, of reunification, and on the necessity of making the prospect of the latter reassuring to Germany's neighbours and compatible with their interests, even at the expense of

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some legitimate German aspirations. Even on the desirability of diplomatic ties with east Europe (at the possible expense of the Hallstein doctrine) and on the border question, the winds of change clearly seem to be blowing in West Germany.

But since, at the same time, everybody does recognise that the ultimate key to the German problem is held not in Bucharest nor even in Warsaw, but rather in Pankow or Moscow or both, the problem is how to use the former to influence the latter. For the time being, it is not only that the DDR's evolution diverges from that of the other east European countries; as far as ties with Moscow are concerned, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the two; the more detached the other ex-satellites get, the more the Soviet Union values its relationship with the DDR and is induced to tighten it, in fear of letting it be carried away. Hence the two possible strategies of either trying progressively to reduce this contradiction or trying to sharpen it until it leads to a dialectical reversal. The first, Pankow-oriented strategy, would use the people's democracies as model and precedent, and would concentrate, by contacts and little steps destined to inspire confidence in the leaders and make them relax their grip on the population, on liberalising the communist regime. To Moscow it would demonstrate, by sincerely accepting the status quo and the existence of two German states, that liberalisation can be tolerated in Pankow as it was in Warsaw. The second, Moscow-oriented strategy, would accentuate both the trend towards European reunification (by drawing the east European countries and the Soviet Union itself into contacts and common enterprises with the West), and the trend towards isolation of the DDR within the communist camp: ultimately, the anomaly of the last stalinist satellite blocking the way to a genuine understanding with the West and to a mutual military withdrawal, might draw the Soviet Union, once it had achieved in eastern Europe a relationship based more on alliance and influence than on direct domination, and once it really needed the cooperation of the West, into abandoning Pankow against military and economic guarantees in an all-European or East-West framework.

IT is not our purpose here to discuss the respective merits of the two strategies. Our point is simply to illustrate their dependence on the wider questions of a European settlement, of East-West relations, and of the evolution of the two alliances. Obviously, while the great unknown of the permanence, the strength, and the character of the German national feeling, on both sides of the Wall, will tend to become an increasingly important factor, it cannot be isolated from the questions of the DDR's place in the eastern camp, of the Federal Republic's place in the western alliance, of the evolution of European integration as well as of the communist societies and, above all, of the situation of the Soviet Union and of its relations with East and West, with China and with the United States, with France and with Germany. It is a disturbing character of the problem that whereas the risks of the two strategies

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bear mainly on the German people, their chances have just as much to do with the international environment.

The risk of the 'little steps' policy is the stabilisation of the division; indeed, the most extreme and probably the most candid of its advocates seem to recognise that it means accepting the status quo while trying to make it more human, while others put their hopes in the ultimate long-range dynamics of rapprochement between the German states once they have accepted each other. But the relations between the two German states would be essentially different according to whether the two alliances were still in existence and whether some kind of international framework exercised some kind of control over the two Germanys.

On the other hand, those who frankly give up the hope of reunification in one national state, either simply accept the Soviet position on the political level, while hoping that this political capitulation, disguised under the label of dynamism, offensives, and movement may ultimately turn out to have given the Soviets a pyrrhic victory because the dynamics of the dialogue between societies, cultures, and ideologies prove to favour the West; or else they think that giving up national statehood may be giving up form rather than substance, if a federal Europe makes the nation-state obsolete.

This seems today to be the position of Franz-Josef Strauss. Instead of today's divided Germany in a divided Europe, instead of a united Germany in a divided Europe, which was presupposed by the various plans and solutions of the German problem in the fifties, one would have a divided Germany in a united Europe. In a European federation the existence of two German states and of an intra-German frontier would become acceptable both to the Germans and to their neighbours, because neither frontiers nor states would any longer have their full significance.

The other strategy is even more directly based on international factors, since its whole thrust is in the direction of influencing Moscow by creating a European situation which would be an incentive for the Soviet Union to change her policy. If Moscow should fail to be convinced and only the negative side of the policy was put into practice, the status quo—an isolated East Germany, isolated from the bloc as from the world and left *en tête à tête* with the Soviet Union—would again be strengthened, but this time the situation would be worsened not only politically but also humanly: the East Germans would be more oppressed and the West Germans more dissatisfied than today. The plan presupposes both a highly complex, differentiated, and centrally-managed or coordinated western policy in eastern Europe, and favourable conditions in terms of the world at large, enabling the US to participate decisively in this active policy in Europe and enabling Russia and the ex-satellites to receive it favourably. Its maximum version is psychologically unsuitable anyway, since it requires German public opinion to accept a kind of *politique du pire*, to adopt a friendly post-cold-war attitude towards other communist regimes while maintaining

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its reserve towards precisely the one with whom it wants to have contacts; and it would require from the other east Europeans a formal alliance with their former enemies against their allies, which is likely to occur only *de facto* in a less official and multilateral way. But even the more moderate forms of the policy (which accept all kinds of contacts with East Germany, but either want to maintain them in a framework of diplomatic isolation or to channel them through West Germany exclusively) become more and more problematic for reasons which have to do not with Germany but with the conditions linked to the international context. Indeed, if the present trends have any validity, the issue between the two strategies seems likely to be preempted by the evident impossibility of a common western policy or of any serious multilateral enterprise, due both to disunity among Europeans and to American passivity in Europe. In order to isolate East Germany (or in order to channel relations with her through West Germany), one needs a common policy; everyone, however, can engage in competitive bilateral relationships with east European countries, but these will of course include East Germany. As, on the other hand, a federal Europe is not around the corner, the ' little steps ' are likely to remain within the scope of the present German and European status quo, and hence to leave open the tensions created by Germany's division and by the rival designs for a European settlement.

If neither a truly reunified Germany nor a truly united Europe has any immediate likelihood, nevertheless their prospects have to be constantly kept in mind when evaluating either the daily moves of intra-German contacts or the general picture of intra-European relations.

There can be no solution to the German problem without a fundamental change in the European scene; on the other hand this change will come only if and when it seems to contain an acceptable solution to the German problem.

We are back, then, to the inseparable character of German and European reunification. The strategy of reunification may differ in the two cases and according to the various goals and priorities. So does the emphasis given to the one or the other: the United States has no strong feeling at the moment against the division of Europe, so long as it does not produce a crisis; it is prepared to encourage German initiatives, eastern diversity, and East-West dialogue, but not to run risks in order to reunify the continent; on the other hand, it has no objection to the reunification of Germany—which it considers morally right and which it has no geo-political reason to fear. Germany's neighbours, East and West, feel a much stronger impulse towards the reunification of Europe; but they have a much more divided mind on the reunification of Germany. Whatever one's inner preferences and actual policies, however, the fact remains that nobody can avoid linking the two issues.

The key to the German problem lies not so much in short-run intra-German or even East-West policies, about which there is no real controversy, as in the kind of Europe they presuppose or prepare. But by

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the same token, if we examine the kind of European framework (that is, the kind of relations between European states, West and East, and between them and the two super-powers) envisaged by the various competing schools in the western debates, the decisive criterion cannot help being the kind of inner structure and external role they provide for Germany.

II—Western debates and European reunification: the search for a framework

Converging reactions to east Europe

TWO FEATURES SEEM TO CHARACTERIZE the present debate among western Europeans. First, the debate has entered a stage where the Atlantic alliance and the European Community seem to be considered at least as much from the point of view of their geographical boundaries and their relation to the external environment (particularly eastern Europe) as from the point of view of their defence and internal stability. On the other hand, the debate about policies towards east Europe tends to oppose not so much these policies themselves as diverging views of the effects which the different forms of organisation or disorganisation of the West can have upon them. On the one hand, the Atlantic and European debate points to the long-range problem of German and European reunification and to the short-range problem of relations with eastern Europe; on the other, the discussion of these problems leads us back to the debate on the present and future nature of Europe and on its present and future relationship to the United States. The implicit and essential question raised by these sometimes circular discussions is: what is the relationship, if any, between, on the one hand, the evolution (economic, institutional, political) of western Europe and its links with the USA, and, on the other, the evolution of eastern Europe and its links with the Soviet Union?

Every western government favours a ' policy of movement ' in eastern Europe, a policy which implies the encouragement of polycentrism and hence of further independence of the ex-satellites from the Soviet Union, and at the same time the encouragement of détente, and hence of a dialogue with the Soviet Union itself. Of course, different governments have at different times stressed different aspects of this policy. Sometimes some of them seem on the verge of rejecting some of its aspects. At one time, Germany and France seemed committed to a rigid cold-war approach which would mean under-emphasising both the realities of change in eastern Europe and the necessity of contacts. At other times the United States has seemed tempted to accept the status quo in Europe, including Soviet hegemony in the East, for the sake of a bilateral understanding with the Soviet Union. However, Germany is becoming increasingly impatient with her division, or at least with its present character, France has increasingly entered a phase in which

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the Gaullist concept of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' has become the policy goal of an 'opening to the East', the United States has chosen to encourage the differentiation of the East, realising that progress on arms control cannot be made without an understanding with the Soviet Union but that this understanding is impossible without the participation of the western allies, and that acceptance of the division of Europe and of Germany would mean buying Soviet goodwill at the expense of instability, dissatisfaction, and division in the West, especially in the Federal Republic. Hence it would be self-defeating for any of the three countries, and particularly for America or France, as long as they value their relationship to Germany, to declare in favour of the status quo.

By the same token nobody pretends any longer to believe in its sudden or spectacular disappearance. Every western government has come to link the reunification of Germany to the reunification of Europe, and the latter to the encouragement of polycentrism through the building of bridges with eastern Europe. But the implication of these very links is that reunification will be a long and indirect process. If pure containment no longer seems sufficient, both pure disengagement and military roll-back have lost whatever plausibility they once seemed to possess. In the United States, the need for a positive answer to de Gaulle transforms the staunchest supporters of the classical policies into advocates of the search for new approaches towards the transformation of the European status quo. In Germany, both the old CDU policy of containment in the hope of a distant roll-back and the old SPD policy of negotiation for disengagement, seem to have died with the erection of the Wall.

THE policy of 'peaceful engagement in eastern Europe' seems to have been adopted by Johnson and de Gaulle, by the West German government and the SPD, including even, at least for the time being and at the governmental level, its most controversial feature: the isolation of East Germany within a framework of contacts with the other ex-satellites. It constitutes the ideal answer to the need to take active steps towards reunification combined with the inability to challenge the status quo in any fundamental sense.

However, every rational advocate of peaceful engagement will admit that bridge-building, if it is not to be simply a substitute for a policy, can only be one element in or an instrument of policy. It is addressed to the most accessible or vulnerable parts of the Soviet European empire: the rapidly differentiating regimes of eastern Europe. The two more intractable elements—Soviet military power and the German problem—remain; while the 'return to Europe' of the east European states may, indirectly and in the long run, help substantially to bring about a reconsideration by the Soviets of their presence in East Germany, for the time being it is this very presence which makes east European polycentrism possible by making it tolerable to the Soviet Union.

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Hence the two problems to which the containment and disengagement doctrines had addressed themselves: the military balance and a negotiating position for German reunification in freedom are still the beginning and the end of a meaningful *Ostpolitik*.

But they are also its most controversial parts. While everybody this side of the far right is for contacts with east Europe, there is no agreement on *who* should negotiate with *whom*, nor on the image of the distant goal to which the contacts are supposed to lead. For the questions of a common or of several competitive approaches to the East today, of the participants in an eventual European settlement tomorrow, and of the structure, limits, and external relationships of the reunited Europe of the day-after-tomorrow, all involve a choice or at least a distribution of roles between an Atlantic, a European, or a national framework.

These, much more than the choice between containment, roll-back, disengagement, and peaceful engagement, are the real issues in the debates of the various countries. In the United States, the decisive problem for the fate of the bridge-building and peaceful engagement policies is the future relationship of America to Europe, on the one hand, and to Asia on the other. The feeling is increasingly widespread in England that Britain's entry into western Europe or failure to do so is bound to have more important consequences for relations with east Europe than any of her diplomatic initiatives. In France, while there never was any real debate focused specifically either on disengagement or on policies towards eastern Europe, the old debates on Germany, on Europe, and on neutralism are obviously decisive for the latter. And again, even in Germany, whose freedom to choose her own orientation and framework is so much more limited, the immediate debate between the government and the 'German Gaullists' concerns much more Germany's orientation within the West than her policies towards the East. The deepest question seems to be whether the twin and sometimes conflicting goals of security and reunification are to be sought within the framework of an integration within the West or in the direction of a new European or an old German nationalism. To a very significant extent, then, the battle for the future of eastern Europe is being fought out within the West's debate about its own identity and future.

Conflicting perspectives

The debate on the actual and the desirable relationship between the two polycentrisms takes place on several levels. The general contest is between different degrees of unity and diversity within the West, and of symmetry and asymmetry between West and East. But one can first distinguish between the Atlantic debate on the proper relationship between America and Europe, and the European debate on the nature of the proper relationship between European states. Second, in a Europe based on the competing and mutually balancing policies of several

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nation-states, can or should the initiative in policies towards the East belong either to Germany or to France, or be contested between the two?

These various debates all seem to imply certain conflicting postulates or theoretical choices. In each of them one side tends to take for granted what we might call the *contrast postulate* and the other what we might call the *symmetry postulate*. According to the former, the stronger, the more stable, and the more united we are, the weaker, the more unstable and divided the other side will be. Our disunity helps their unity, by enabling them to exploit our divisions; our unity fosters their disunity through frustration, our stability and prosperity foster it by acting as a magnet on their more accessible or detachable members. According to the opposite postulate, the more united we are, the more we consolidate the unity of our opponents; our military alliances and economic communities induce them to imitate us by integrating themselves militarily and economically. On the contrary, let America withdraw and Russia will do the same, let the west Europeans be polycentric and non-aligned, and polycentrism and non-alignment will flourish in the East. The two blocs will only be loosened or dissolved together, by mutual example.

The other postulates concern relations within the blocs. According to the *contagion postulate*, a state rebelling against the policies of its bloc has a cumulative or electrifying effect on the other members; according to the *reaction postulate*, it will elicit a reaction in the opposite direction: the other countries will close ranks behind the leader.

It is enough to enunciate these postulates to see that they can have no complete or universal validity one way or the other. For instance, the attempt to revitalise Comecon as a reaction to the success of the Common Market was a clear example of what has been called ' integration by induction ' and a clear illustration of our ' symmetry postulate '. But the sequel to the story has shown just as clearly the limits of the phenomenon. For symmetric initiatives to produce symmetric results, the two sides must have a strong element of symmetry to begin with, which is more often than not lacking between the two alliances no less than between the two economic systems. Nor is the opposite simplification more valid. To continue the same example, the course of economic relations between eastern Europe and the West has also shown that the alternative to parallel unification and cooperation between symmetric organisations was not simply the existence in the East of autarkic and mutually hostile nationalisms, closed to the influence of the West. On the contrary, it is the Rumanians, the staunchest opponents of Comecon integration, who are also the most eager of all east Europeans to expand economic relations with the West. Their practice may seem to confirm the Gaullist doctrine that nationalism is the precondition, not the obstacle, to cooperation. But again it would be more than rash to conclude that universal cooperation combined with absolute sovereignty will, through being preached and practised by the two European

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rebels, become the principles of the new international order, as against regional groupings.

However, one cannot simply close the debate by appealing to empiricism and judging each case on its own merits. Throughout the Atlantic and European debate a genuinely universal contest is being waged. It opposes the two fundamental conceptions of international politics and of international order in our time: should a solution to the European problem be based on the growing interdependence of societies or on the restored independence of states? Or on the steady growing together of peoples and regimes through functional relationships and through the progress of enterprises like European integration and arms control, based on new common interests transcending old conflicts, or on the eternal ends and means of foreign politics, national ambition and the arts of diplomatic strategy? Here again some middle ground or combination should be found, although it would not conceal the fundamental opposition between the two perspectives symbolised by Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle, between the expansion, from a central core, of a zone of stability and cooperation which would devaluate national borders and limit the freedom of action of states through sub- and supra-national ties, and stretch finally from San Francisco to Vladivostok, or a dialectical strategy according to which the two Europes should first liberate themselves from the embrace of their two hegemonies, before meeting again from the Atlantic to the Urals in a restored concert based on a new balance between Gauls, Germans, and Slavs. The opposition observed in the method, between the primacy of domestic construction and the primacy of external strategy, is maintained in the eventual result: the reunification of Europe would be both a result and a means either of getting away from or of getting back to the freedom of action of the nation-state.

Although politically the harmony between the Atlantic and the European frameworks can less and less be taken for granted, the structure of the Atlantic and the European debates is very similar. The Atlantic alliance and the integration of western Europe are both said to be based on the division of Europe, and, whether or not they have shared responsibility for it in the past, to be helping to perpetuate it today, especially by greatly complicating the solution of the German problem. They are substituting artificial ties and divisions (based on obsolete ideologies or past military situations) for natural realities: the geographical limits of Europe and the national identities of its member states. Polycentrism in eastern Europe reflects the reassertion of these realities. Other factors, like Russia's troubles with China and western Europe's reassertion under the initiative of France, point to the same lesson: Europeans can now solve their family problems if they are not embarrassed by their too-helpful guests. The division of Europe and Germany can be overcome on the basis of the balance and cooperation of all European states. But the conditions for this are the end of the two-bloc confrontation and of any military (Atlantic) or institutional (European)

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development which might be predicated on its permanence. The criticism may be directed against the Atlantic alliance as such, or against the notion of an Atlantic community, or against the presence of American troops in Europe, or simply against German participation in Nato and, eventually, in the collective control of nuclear weapons, which is said to prevent German and European reunification by promoting the military integration of each of the two camps and raising in Poland and Czechoslovakia the spectre of German accession to nuclear weapons. Similarly, although the European integration movement was not originally based on the division of the Continent, once the process is under way, by force of circumstances in one half of Europe, it can, by transforming the economies, the societies, and ultimately the very existence of the member states, create a more fundamental and permanent differentiation from the other half than a military alliance. Germany's integration in the Europe of the six can create a deeper if less explosive problem than its rearmament. Giving a home and a purpose to an amputated West Germany seems to be one of the goals of west European integration; but precisely a divided, hence unsatisfied Germany, can be a factor of instability for an incipient European political community; a reunited Germany can, through its sheer weight, become a hegemonic threat and hence a factor of disequilibrium; both may be taken to point to a wider Europe as a way of satisfying the one or of balancing the other.

The Gaullist challenge

The positive counterpart of these criticisms can be summed up in the two famous and ambiguous slogans of General de Gaulle: 'European Europe' and 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. In order to be Europe again, Europe must be purely European; in order to reach to the Urals it must stop at the Atlantic Ocean. The basic idea is that geographical Europe has an historical existence which is more natural and, in the long run, more real than any ideological or strategic cleavage.

This historical geography involves an interpretation of Europe's recent past and distant future. For General de Gaulle, the two antinatural phenomena of 1944–45—Europe's division and its subordination to the two peripheral great powers—are two faces of the same reality: its partition among its conquerors. The objective is to obtain their departure, which will mean the restoration of Europe, that is the restoration both of its external role and of an intra-European concert based on an equilibrium comprehending the whole of Europe precisely because it would comprehend only Europe.

This permanent reality and this long-range perspective produce certain immediate possibilities. Between the two halves of Europe there are greater affinities, memories, mutual understanding, than with their 'daughter America'. Not only are eastern Europe's economic, tourist and cultural relations with western Europe more important because of geographical proximity, they are also politically less compromising. Indeed, according to the anti-Atlantic thesis, the more detached western

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Europe is from the US, the less dangerous it is for eastern Europe to have contacts with her.

But what about the passage from this immediate geographic and sentimental proximity to the distant prospect of reunification? As regards the goal to be sought, General de Gaulle's ideas were best expressed in his 4 February 1965 press conference. It appears there that the true and only originality of his solution to the problem of German and European unification consists precisely in the choice of the partners to a settlement and of the participants in the resulting equilibrium. In both cases they are the same. The goal and the road have the same characteristic: Europeanisation and exclusion of the United States. It is the six states of the European Economic Community which will have to organise their defence in order to permit a new European balance. It is Germany's neighbours, east and west, who will have to agree on its frontiers and armaments and to guarantee the settlement. The solution is to take place outside and beyond the confrontation of the present two camps, and within the new 'Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals' made possible by the abandonment of Soviet ambition and the transformation of the satellites. While called upon to cooperate with this new Europe, the United States, unlike Russia, is excluded from its inner counsels and balance. Intruders who come by sea are more intrusive than others. As to the strategy which should lead Europe towards this goal, it seems to be limited to variations around a threefold basic idea: thanks to Chinese and east European nationalism, the Soviet Union can be persuaded to abandon its exclusive domination of central and eastern Europe; but for her to withdraw, America must withdraw from Europe too; to obtain this double result, an active role of western Europe is both possible and necessary.

According to the Gaullist interpretation, the Soviet threat to western Europe is less and less real, eastern Europe is more and more independent, the American protection of western Europe is both less and less reliable and less and less necessary, western Europe is more and more able to stand on its own feet, and to enter into negotiations and into a permanent balance with a less hostile and less powerful East. In this scheme, an additional element consists of the threat of a tacit or explicit alliance of Europe with China, designed to increase Chinese pressure on Russia, a design of which the United States, because of its Asian confrontation with China and of its nuclear relations with Russia, is considered incapable. Only France can take the initiative, both in implementing the strategy and in negotiating the settlement. For the Soviet Union, an agreement with the United States would mean either an impossible condominium or an intolerable defeat, a federated western Europe would be an artificial creation devoid of the political weight and will called for by the negotiations, West Germany by herself would frighten the east Europeans without being able to ensure her own security. Only with a western Europe represented by France and

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supported by Germany can Russia enter an agreement without losing face.

Two kinds of answers have come from the Atlantic and European sides. The more conservative stress the value of what has been accomplished by the Atlantic alliance and European integration, and deny both that the conditions which made the two enterprises possible and necessary have changed and that the alternative perspectives are more than an illusion. The more adventurous accept (or at least pay lip service to) both the challenge of working more actively towards the reunification of Europe, and (at least for some of them) the possible desirability of a looser Atlantic alliance or a slower European integration, including eventually a special status for Germany, for the sake of reunification. But they maintain that basically the Atlantic alliance, or western European integration, or both, are necessary for any negotiation with Russia, for any solution of the German problem, and for any viable equilibrium in Europe.

It seems to the present writer that the balance sheet favours the general orientation of this third school. But one must be careful to distinguish between the different aspects of the problem. About the past, advocates of the alliance and the community are certainly right in pointing out that to a very great extent it is because their work has continued, unhindered by similar arguments in the forties and fifties, that the favourable changes in the relative stability of the two Europes, which are the occasion of the new debate, have been able to take place at all. On the other hand, being right in the past may just as well lead to being wrong in the present: those who prepared the new situation may not recognise their own success.

As to present conditions and possibilities, the Atlantic and European sides certainly have the best of their respective debates as far as security and stability are concerned: neither in the military balance nor in Soviet attitudes do the changes justify the conclusions drawn by the other side; if anything, an abandonment of the Atlantic alliance might reverse the favourable trend and destroy the hopes of a fundamental change in Soviet attitudes.

What role for America?

The real problem arises when one looks not to the past but to the future, not to the maintenance of the status quo, but to its transformation, towards the reunification of Germany and Europe. Here the only positive chances seem to lie in the direction of differentiated yet concerted action and reciprocal influence between Europe and the United States, which would mutually protect each other against the temptations of defensive status quo and isolated adventure.

Culturally, some of the eastern Europeans seem as attracted by the specifically American features of the West as some others are by the European heritage. On the economic level, they seem equally interested in receiving aid from or concluding profitable agreements with both the

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United States and western Europe. Joint multilateral enterprises, on the model of a new Marshall Plan, would seem to benefit most from a combination of European initiative and American help. Politically, just as a bilateral Soviet-American détente raises fears of an agreement on the division of Europe, a polycentric détente with neutralist overtones creates the risk of instability through the exploitation by the Soviet Union of the divisions of the West.

The real disadvantage of direct American action and the real advantage of a flexible division of roles lies in the fact that in a world characterised by a mixture of bipolarity and polycentrism, détente and cooperation in Europe are neither wholly independent of nor wholly dependent upon the general state of East-West relations and conflicts in other parts of the world.

This is shown, for instance, by the effect of the Vietnam war on eastern Europe's relations with the West. It seems to vary with individual countries and to be rather ambiguous; but there is no question that for the time being it has severely limited American possibilities in eastern Europe and has given to the Soviet Union a convenient theme for its attempts to reunify the bloc, and to France an opportunity to seize the initiative. The net result is a marked, although limited worsening of eastern Europe's relations with the United States, compensated, also to a limited extent, by the maintenance of a friendly attitude to western Europe.

If one believes in the indispensable role of the United States for a policy of peaceful engagement in eastern Europe, one can only be disturbed at the prospect of seeing it permanently engaged in Asia and handicapped in Europe for the purpose of both encouraging a détente and of applying diplomatic or military pressure. It is not the Gaullists (for whom keeping America away is an advantage to the reunification of Europe) but those who would like the United States to pursue an active policy in Europe who worry about Vietnam. But to the extent to which the limitations imposed by this Asian involvement on American policies in Europe are a fact, the common interest of the West may coincide with certain spontaneous tendencies in giving the initiative to western Europe for the time being.

Even the freedom of action of the west Europeans, however, cannot help being limited by the general situation. 'In this respect', writes Professor Griffith, 'the Vietnam crisis has served East German interests. It caused Erhard, aware of Washington's hostility to improving West German relations with China, to abandon the nearly-concluded Bonn-Peking negotiations for a West German trade mission in China, and thereby at least temporarily ended any prospect of a Bonn-Peking rapprochement at Pankow's expense; while, by impeding a Soviet-American détente, it has partially relieved Ulbricht of his other anxiety'.[1]

[1] W. Griffith, 'European Communism, 1965', in *Communism in Europe* (MIT Press, 1966) vol. 2, p. 23. One can of course argue that an American defeat in Vietnam

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This example also shows the problem raised by the prospects of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split with a view to European reunification. Without adopting the Gaullist position, one may favour a distribution of roles—the United States doing the military containment in Asia and the Europeans conducting the dialogue with China in order to apply pressure on Russia. But here again, the margin for pursuing partly contradictory, partly complementary policies, is very narrow indeed; if one took the strategy of using the threat of an alliance with, or of economic and military help to China as a means for obtaining Soviet concessions in east-central Europe seriously, it would have to be applied by America as well as by western Europe. For here again it is the United States which holds both the economic carrot and the military stick.

This brings us to the problem of the way towards a negotiated settlement in Europe. It is here, in the distinction between the *negotiation*, the *content*, and the *guarantees* of the agreement that the cleavage between the narrow Atlantic, the narrow European, and the broad Western or cooperative attitude is most important. For the first, the three stages must be Atlantic, for an opposition of interests or a separation between America and Europe is unthinkable. For the second one, all three stages must be 'Europeanised'—only Germany's neighbours can 'examine together, then settle in common, and finally guarantee jointly the solution of a problem which is the problem of their continent'.[2] But for the third school, the three stages must be distinguished: The *means* of reaching an agreement necessarily imply the presence and participation of the United States. Moreover, this agreement should necessarily be approved and *guaranteed* by Washington, and be part of a system in which the US participates. But its *content* may, and perhaps should, include a withdrawal of American troops and a status for a reunified Germany and a reunified Europe which would imply a fundamental differentiation within the western whole. The interest of the US in Europe and the presence of its troops is the major card in any negotiation; the permanence of this interest would be the main guarantee of an eventual settlement; but precisely the presence of these troops would be one of the subjects of negotiation, and their withdrawal might be one of the elements of the agreement. On the other hand, if it was imposed unilaterally and prematurely through a kind of western European revolt, it would lead to disorder and insecurity. Only the US, through active participation in the agreement, could both obtain a fair price and provide a safe cover for its own retreat. To that extent, one could say that the three concepts of *containment*, *peaceful*

would, by confirming the Chinese line, make cooperation in Europe more difficult. In fact, while a quick American victory would of course have been the most favourable outcome, disengagement would probably have less lasting and damaging consequences than a long war of attrition, which is bound to encourage American passivity in, and estrangement from, Europe.

[2] De Gaulle, press conference of 4 February 1965. More recent declarations (as during the Moscow trip) have been more ambiguous on the American role for the third stage.

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engagement, and *disengagement* have a useful role to play, but only in that order. To start by disengagement before Europe is sufficiently transformed to make containment certain or superfluous would be disastrous, and this applies both to the well-meaning but premature disengagement plans of the fifties and to de Gaulle's grand disengagement on a continental scale. Seen from Washington, there is a dialectical relationship between peaceful engagement and disengagement: it is only by more engagement today that it can create the conditions of a possible disengagement tomorrow. As put in the rhetorical question of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe on 4 May 1965, in obvious answer to de Gaulle's press conference: 'How would it be possible to reach agreement on peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the West if Europe and the United States did not seek it together? How would it be possible to reach a settlement providing for the reunion of Germans from East and West if the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States did not find in it the indispensable elements of security?'

This last and central problem: how to reconcile Germany's rebirth and consequently its inevitable power with the security of its partners, constitutes the link between the problem of yesterday and today—its rearmament and its participation in western nuclear strategy—and the problem of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow—its reunification and its role in a united Europe. If the United States is indispensable to protect and guarantee Europe, including Germany, against a real danger from Russia, is it not almost equally needed to protect and guarantee Europe, including the eastern countries, against a possible danger from Germany? Within a purely European concert of powers, Germany's weight may become preponderant, so that some of its neighbours would quite happily settle for a divided Germany within a reunited Europe. Conversely, in the case of a reunited Germany within a reunited Europe, as in that of a divided Germany within a divided Europe, the moderating influence of American presence and power can bring an element of reassurance to the eastern countries as well as to the Germans themselves. For the smaller countries of Europe, the only acceptable prospects are either an equilibrium which, to avoid dominance by either Germany or Russia, or by both, or a confrontation between them, must include the United States, or a long-range transformation of the situation so radical that the problem of establishing an equilibrium between the presently existing states would be left behind, together with these states themselves. The goal of western policy since the war has been to combine these two prospects by passing progressively from an emphasis on the first to an emphasis on the second. The opening to eastern Europe—which had been envisaged from the beginning but had been more or less lost sight of in practice—calls for important modifications; but it does *not* modify the fundamental perspective in either of the two respects. Conversely, the gaullist perspective is open to criticism not only because of its premature and over-emphatic exclusion of American

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participation, but also by its dogmatic rejection of European political integration.

Germany's place in a gaullist Europe

The concepts of 'European Europe' and 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' owe much of their success to the fact that, while being geographically precise, perhaps excessively so, they are very vague on the links constituting Europe. Hence, these ideas seem to lose much of their appeal when it turns out that nothing more than the classical relations of alliance and cooperation between independent and rival nations is intended.

If the Six must organise for their defence in order to permit a new equilibrium for the continent (as de Gaulle said at his press conference), can this defence be purely national? Leaving aside the strategic arguments, a nationally-based European defence can neither solve nor ignore the problem of German participation.

For the political organisation of the European states, the same problem arises. Would not western Europe have to be integrated if it is to speak with one voice in negotiations with Russia, and does the same not apply to continental Europe if it is to provide a stabilising framework for a reunited Germany?

It is true that in the absence of political integration the diplomatic possibilities are much greater for every state than the military ones. Germany and France both carry on highly successful bilateral relations with eastern Europe. West Germany seems at times to be driving a wedge between the Ulbricht regime and some other people's democracies; French policy probably serves in Bucharest both as a model and an alibi. Cross-cutting bilateral relations between European national states certainly have a positive balance to show.

Is this still the case when it comes to relations with Russia and to prospects for negotiating a European settlement? Is it not obvious, on the contrary, that so long as France and Germany act separately nothing is easier for Moscow than to play off the one against the other, and, far from modifying the status quo by withdrawing, to modify it by destabilising the West and thus stabilising the East? Without excessive subtlety, Russia has declared many times, to France or to Germany, that she was the other great power of the Continent and that if they could agree, all European problems would be solved.

Even more important, perhaps, it does seem that when talking to Germany there are more chances for Russia to go beyond the simple tactics of dividing its opponents through flattery than when she talks to France. After all, Germany has been her great preoccupation for the last fifty years. Nor is there any lack of precedents for a bilateral understanding with her. If one is to negotiate seriously, would one not rather do so with those from whom one has something to fear and to whom one

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has something to offer? The two factors are certainly present in relations with the United States, and perhaps, one day, with Germany; they are hardly present in the case of France.

According to advocates of the Gaullist grand design, like George Liska, France would nevertheless play the leading role in any European settlement. For that she needs the support of Germany: the whole strategy is based on Germany's quest for its reunification, which her alliance with the Anglo-Saxons cannot provide. But Germany in its turn needs France; for 'only France can legitimize the German interest in reunification and in politically and otherwise unprovocative military rehabilitation in the eyes of the less forgiving smaller nations of Western and Central-Eastern Europe'.[3]

Liska does note the existence of a third possibility for Germany, that of an independent negotiating adventure with Russia, but dismisses it as dangerous and unpopular. But after all, notwithstanding the reassertion of France and eastern Europe, the two main interested powers *are* Russia and Germany; and they certainly must consider that, to quote a French saying, one is never better served than by oneself. France, having made the introductions, may well find out that she has worked, as in another French saying, for the King of Prussia.

If the Soviet Union decided one day to run the risks of German reunification in another framework than through agreement with the United States, her interest would certainly be to do it in the framework of a direct dialogue with Germany, hoping thereby to acquire an influence on her political evolution. Even supposing she had abandoned every temptation of a political offensive, it is unlikely, from the point of view of her security, that she would count on French, Polish, or Czechoslovak guarantees, rather than on herself, to balance and control a reunified Germany.

When all is said, if Germany is reunited in a geographically European and politically international framework, one does not see how the first political reality in Europe can help being that of an equilibrium between Germany and Russia. France and east-central Europe can place their hopes of security in this equilibrium, and participate in it, but only in a secondary role, unless they hope to hold the balance of power by playing the two stronger forces against each other. But that would be highly dangerous and destabilising, if only because the Soviet-German equilibrium has had ways in the past of changing into an agreement with unpleasant consequences for others; again, France, Poland, or Rumania would remember the last European Concert in 1939–40.

Four relatively lasting elements besides the person of de Gaulle and his general policies on the international scene give France a political advantage over Germany, despite the latter's superior population and resources: the sympathy it enjoys in eastern Europe, the fear and hostility still evoked by Germany in several countries (above all in Poland

[3] George Liska, *Europe Ascendant* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964).

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and Czechoslavakia), the possession by France of a nuclear force which is forbidden to Germany, finally the division of Germany. Of the four, it is the last which seems most important. This is essentially why it is only if the European settlement consisted in maintaining, legitimising, or covering up the division of Germany that France would become again, for the East, the country to talk to. A reunified and neutralised Germany would need the agreement and guarantee of all, including the United States; a Germany reunited and free to choose its orientation presupposes the same conditions, but might conceivably emerge out of a direct dialogue between her and Russia, who might hope to bring her over to her side; only a Germany both divided and neutralised, a goal perhaps sought by the Soviet Union, could, if France agreed to it, be the subject of an agreement between her and Germany's other neighbours. But it is doubtful that such a negotiation is either possible or desirable, from the point of view of France herself.

The trouble with the gaullist attempt is that, while trying to remove certain key elements of the status quo (the double hegemony and the division of Europe), it tries at the same time to maintain certain other key elements (the autonomy of France and the inferiority of Germany) whose contradictory character would appear as soon as the Soviet-American confrontation gave way to a new balance of power. The European concert was based on the existence of several roughly comparable units. The difficulty with a European balance between 'Gauls, Slavs, and Germans' is that the Slavs and the Germans are so much stronger than the Gauls. The only way of regaining the similarity of dimensions required by the classical equilibrium would be, so to speak, to reduce the two stronger partners to the size of France, in terms of actual power. This is what the gaullist vision seems to mean—by amputating Russia, at least figuratively speaking, of its Asian part thanks to the Sino-Soviet conflict (hence the reference to the Urals), and by keeping Germany militarily inferior (by denuclearisation and arms limitation) and perhaps divided in the guise of some kind of controlled confederation. In both cases, the emphasis would be on paralysis rather than on partition. There are of course indications both that de Gaulle does not consider the question of Russia's Asian conquests as settled for ever, and that he is not blind to the advantages of two confederated Germanys as against one centralised Reich.[4] But the point is rather that Russia's Asian territories, through her preoccupation with China, will rather constitute a source of weakness which, by diverting her attention, her troops, and her resources, will prevent her from pulling her full weight as a European power; and that a Germany which would be decentralised, denuclearised, and supervised by friendly but vigilant

[4] The positions adopted on this issue at various times have to be interpreted, as was necessary for de Gaulle's pronouncements on Algeria, in the light both of his complex strategy and of his permanent views, as expressed mainly in his *Memoirs*. See, in particular, his comments on his conversation with President Truman about the link between the structure of Germany and the reunification of Europe.

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neighbours would also be unable to play an active role in European politics. France would compensate her inferior material weight by her superior freedom of action.

Would she, however, remain the only European 'nation with free hands' for any length of time? In the long run, there are only two ways for a nation of tying the hands of another one: either by keeping it under the domination of superior force, or by accepting the need to tie itself with it. Otherwise, the logic of our contagion and reaction postulates is likely to come into play in the most disastrous fashion: from resistance through submission to imitation and competition. The first reaction when a nation claims complete freedom of action is to condemn it and to close ranks; the second is to find that nothing terrible has happened, that she may not have been so wrong after all, and to follow her; but the third is to think that if she is right it is more normal and more advantageous to imitate her than to follow her, to work for oneself rather than for her.

We should not be surprised if the German reactions to the French initiatives towards Nato and towards the East followed, in part at least, the same pattern: first the predominance of fear and indignation, the assertion of the primacy of security and of Atlantic ties; then the discovery that after all the gaullist enterprise had not brought about the expected catastrophes, nor the 'good guy' attitude the expected reward; hence the growth of a left-wing gaullist movement, ready to follow France in its eastern explorations, which appear as the main element of movement and détente; third, application to Germany's relations with France of the same spirit of independence applied by her and after her to Nato; discovery of the Bismarckian principle recently invoked by the editor of *Der Spiegel* 'Jeder kann mit Jedem'—and especially the one who has the better cards.[5]

But let us suppose that Germany's sleep lasts long enough for her to let herself be tied by a settlement which would keep her inferior or paralysed. How long would this inferiority or this paralysis last? Once the factor of stability and control constituted by the Soviet and American troops is gone, who will prevent each state from slowly or violently getting back into its natural power position? In what respect would the new structure be more solid, less artificial, and less dangerous than the Versailles one? Whether one speaks of the gaullist hypothetical construction, or of the Soviet solution, based, in the last analysis, on maintaining the German partition by the threat of force, or of the various plans for Germany based on her denuclearisation, demilitarisation, or neutralisation, guaranteed by the great powers after their disengagement, one does not see how these diplomatic and military formulas could in the long run resist the dynamics of Germany's economic and demographic power and of its political aspirations. If what one wants is to continue an artificial

[5] R. Augstein, 'Ein neues Rapallo? Lehren aus de Gaulles Ostpolitik'. *Der Spiegel*, 25 April 1966.

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situation, nothing is safer, for everyone concerned, than the physical presence of Soviet and American troops. If what one wants is to let the relations of states and the aspirations of peoples regain the freedom to follow their natural course, then this course will not let itself be channelled by a defective diplomatic and military equilibrium. The only solution then lies in the creation of new ties, which would be more compelling because they would be based not only on states but also on societies or, as Jean Laloy put it, on cross-cutting communities. As far as the European balance is concerned, it presupposes the creation of a new political unit in the West, capable of resisting domination either by the United States who would be its ally, or the Soviet Union, with whom it could negotiate, or Germany, whose own weight would still be better balanced in an institutionalised framework than through diplomatic agreements and alignments. Perhaps such a creation is bound to remain a utopia; but that would mean that neither for the Europeans, nor for the United States and the Soviet Union, is there any alternative to the deadlock of the two alliances. It is even less realistic to imagine a Russia and a Germany whose power would be permanently reduced to the dimensions of France's, than to imagine a broadening of the problem to the dimensions of Europe, through the building of a federation whose dimensions would precisely enable it to contain Russia, to control Germany, and to attract the east European states, while getting them all to participate in a system of cross-cutting relationships and communities based on stable and reciprocal ties. It is possible, it is even likely, that this European *deus ex machina* who would be supposed to square the German circle, will never be born; it is certain that neither a purely national nor a purely Atlantic orientation can validly serve as his substitute.

Diversity and convergence

Nor can the European level itself lay claim to exclusivity. Certainly within the framework provided by alliances and communities, the day-to-day relations, initiatives, and exchanges have to proceed on a bilateral basis. So long as they persist, the less monolithic the groupings are, the more hope there is for their eventual coming together. Here we see the complex reality behind the simple postulates: there can be as much harm in too much unity—which would preclude initiatives and cross-cutting links, as in too much diversity—which would endanger the indispensable collectively-organised ground from which these initiatives are taken, and the desirable coordination without which aid and trade can hardly be made to serve a long-range purpose.

The three levels, national, European, Atlantic, would each have its specific role to play in a broadly conceived western view. Naturally, some kind of distribution of roles already exists implicitly on a geographical basis: West Germany has a preponderant voice in relations with East Germany; western Europe seems to be able to take advantage of traditional links and sympathies as well as of geographic proximity in

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relations with eastern Europe; the United States has by necessity a permanent dialogue with the Soviet Union. And it is just as well that these concentric zones do in fact overlap. For beyond the geographical repartition the three levels all have a fundamental role: the *Atlantic* framework by providing the military conditions of security and the economic conditions of peaceful engagement today, and one day those of a negotiated settlement; the *European* community by offering a solid basis of stability, a centre of attraction, and the long-range prospect of transforming the political problem by devaluating the nation-state; the various *nations* by constructing through their daily contacts the ties which should prepare the collective initiatives and long-range transformations. Today, in fact, they are severely inhibited from playing these positive and promising roles. The United States, through its deepening military engagement in Asia, is in an unfavourable position, both in terms of its own freedom of action and of the reactions it encounters, for any active peaceful engagement in Europe; the Common Market is suffering from a permanent political crisis, and in any case has only the timid beginnings of a foreign policy; the west European states, especially France and Germany, are too far from any agreement on foreign policy to accept a common political framework for their individual contacts.

Not much more is to be expected, for the time being, than the development of bilateral economic and cultural exchanges, and of some kind of informal and limited political dialogue between the two halves of Europe. Nor must one be blind to the danger of these exchanges perpetuating the division rather than eroding it. For the multilateral economic enterprises and the political-military settlement which alone could give those short-run contacts their ultimate framework and meaning, are precluded for the foreseeable future not only by Russia's conservatism but also by America's war in Vietnam and by de Gaulle's war on Nato and European integration. It is perfectly possible, first, that a widening gap should emerge between Europe and the United States, obsessed by the Chinese and the nuclear peril to the point either of sacrificing the détente in Europe or of buying Russia's goodwill by freezing the European status quo; second, that de Gaulle's example should lead Germany and the other west Europeans into a competitive scramble for contacts with the East, and hence encourage the East itself to prefer divisive tactics to positive settlement. In that case, the present years will be remembered as those in which Europe had a glimpse of her possible unification only to realise that it was too late to achieve it. It is up to the Europeans to insist that there is no more important or more urgent task than the search for a stable order in Europe, that this search can only be pursued together, and that, while a little dialogue with the East may lead one away from the Atlantic alliance and European integration, a real dialogue with the East (and hence any real prospect of reunification) brings one back to them, as to its necessary precondition.

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PARTY POLITICS AND THE WALL

Melvin Croan

THE erection of the Berlin Wall may well turn out to have initiated a new era in West German politics. Since 1961, the problem of Germany's division and the host of related questions of foreign and military policy have become the overriding issues of domestic politics—perhaps much more urgently that ever before. Moreover, while the great domestic debates of the 1950s on these issues were characterised by a relative clarity of alternative conceptions along partisan lines, the more recent discussions have been marked by vagueness on crucial matters of substance and ambiguity of party positions. Each of the major political parties, in varying degree, has found itself internally divided. All of them have nominally come to agree on the desirability of 'German initiatives' to overcome national division; so far none has proved able to produce a concrete programme for reunification.

To understand the causes of the evident disorientation of political opinion within the Federal Republic is also in part to appreciate the multiple challenge posed by the entrenchment of the East German regime. The Wall and the consequent deepening of the national division not only jeopardised for the longer term the entire elaborate network of defences, legal, political, and psychological, that had been built up in support of the Federal Republic's basic political rationale; the Wall also dealt an immediately crippling blow to all earlier partisan tenets on the German problem. More particularly, it seemed to invalidate once and for all the CDU's governmental reunification programme based upon military strength and Western integration, the SPD's earlier proposals for disengagement in Europe and a gradual demilitarisation of Germany in conjunction with a step-by-step reunification of the country, and the FDP's occasional schemes which borrowed elements both from the CDU and from SPD conceptions.

A concrete programme for reunification in the altered post-1961 circumstances appeared to require not only a common Western strategy to counter the East German challenge but also a West German readiness to settle the issue of Germany's eastern frontiers and to accept limitations on German arms in the interest of establishing a system of arms control for central Europe. Yet the moves which appeared to be required of West Germany could easily be interpreted in the domestic political arena as unilateral concessions. Worse still, there could be no absolute guarantee that they would lead directly to the restoration of German national unity. As if these imponderables were not serious enough, the domestic difficulties of drawing up feasible proposals on reunification have been rendered more acute on account of dissension within the Western alliance and Franco-American rivalry for German

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allegiance. Under such complex conditions, the understandable reaction of West German politicians has been not to venture too far from previously established positions; the irony is that the 'modest' departures which were undertaken threaten to undermine those very positions.

In view of Herr Adenauer's not undeserved reputation for political inflexibility, it is somewhat curious to note that in the period of shock and disillusionment which followed the erection of the Wall, he initiated the effort to redefine the immediate problem, moving from national to humanitarian terms. Stressing that the German problem was 'in the last analysis a human one', Adenauer promised that 'if our countrymen in the Soviet-occupied zone are granted decent living conditions and at least a certain amount of freedom and self-determination, we shall be open to discussion on a good many points'. Apparently the former Chancellor also sought to initiate such discussion himself with an offer to the Russians of a 10-year 'truce' between West and East Germany, provided that the sphere of freedom in the DDR was extended so that the East German population could eventually choose the form of government it preferred.

This novel emphasis anticipated the efforts of others to formulate a policy of 'small steps', designed in the first instance to alleviate the many personal hardships resulting from national division. From such modest beginnings, whose origins were essentially humanitarian, the Social-Democratic Party soon evoked larger political vistas of perforating the Wall so as to reverse the estrangement between East and West Germany. Both the desire for initiative and its ultimate objective were incorporated in the SPD slogan 'Change through Approach' (*Wandlung durch Annäherung*). And, not to be outdone by the political opposition, the CDU, or at least the Chairman of its parliamentary group, Rainer Barzel, developed a comparable slogan, 'Change through Influence' (*Änderung durch Einwirkung*). For its part, the FDP, many of whose spokesmen had long stressed their party's 'national concern' concurred with the expression of similar thoughts.

When it came to a more precise definition of policy, however, all the parties seemed to be handicapped either by internal divisions, anxiety about public opinion, fear of sacrificing the Federal Republic's legal position, or elements of each. All of them, to be sure, in principle approved of such 'small steps' as the pass agreements to enable West Berliners to visit their relatives in the East on major holidays and for urgent personal reasons. But, realising that the East German regime regarded even so small a step as a potentially long stride towards its objective of gaining recognition for itself and for the Wall as a legal state border, West German political figures found themselves frequently at odds about specific terms and conditions of the pass agreements. On the larger question of other official contacts and the more basic issue of over-all political strategy towards the DDR, opinion has been fragmented in numerous directions.

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INTERNAL party factionalism has been especially rampant among the Christian Democrats. After the retirement of so domineering a leader as Adenauer, the CDU-CSU may in any case have been ripe for fragmentation. In the event, Franco-American dissension provided the major impetus, and reunification policy, no less than foreign policy more generally, proved to be the main object of cleavage. A group of so-called 'Gaullists', consisting of Strauss and his Bavarian CSU and claiming the allegiance of a number of powerful figures in the CDU proper, not the least important of whom was Adenauer, professed to see in any policy of initiatives hidden but basic dangers to the Federal Republic's position. Rather than following up his own earlier initiative, the former Chancellor apparently grew apprehensive that seemingly marginal concessions might produce an irreversible adverse trend. Like-minded CDU leaders openly denounced all new initiatives. Their expressed concern for safeguarding West Germany's legal claims both against the DDR and in regard to Germany's eastern frontiers, drove them back to the vigorous defence of previously established doctrinal positions. Despite the persistence of some leaders like Foreign Minister Schröder and others usually associated with the CDU's 'Atlantic' wing in a 'policy of movement' consonant with their understanding of the American 'strategy of peace', the influence of the 'Gaullists' within the party's councils has been considerable. All told, the many cross-pressures, from Gaullists and Atlanticists, protagonists of a more flexible German policy and its hard-line opponents, have tended to stalemate the CDU and thus to complicate the Erhard government's efforts to tackle the increasingly complex problems of Germany's division.

So far the Social-Democratic Party has been less openly plagued by differences within its own ranks. For the SPD the tradition of party discipline has been strong. To be sure, the SPD leadership in Berlin has always tended to be at odds with the national party headquarters on the German problem. Before the Wall, the Berlin SPD generally took a harder line towards the East German regime than that of the national organisation. Since 1961, however, the positions have gradually been reversed, a development which must be accounted yet another effect of the Wall on West German politics. Cognisant of the special hardship which the Wall has posed for West Berliners, the Berlin SPD early championed initiatives on the German problem, some of which went considerably beyond the thinking in the SPD's national headquarters in Bonn. Under the leadership of Berlin's Mayor Brandt, however, the national organisation did come to endorse 'small steps' to assuage personal hardship and larger political initiatives as well. But, no less than other West German politicians, the social-democrats proved to be chary of seeming to advocate concessions that might prejudice the Federal Republic's position. As a result, while the SPD has continued to foster expectations of further steps to proliferate contacts across Germany's dividing line, and to encourage a longer-range vision

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of influencing developments within East Germany with the aim of ultimately eliminating Germany's partition, it has yet to embody its own views of an active policy to restore German unity in anything like a concrete, precise programme.

The third major political party, the FDP, long beset by its own internal divisions, has also shown signs of the larger disarray within the ranks of its senior coalition partner in the government, the CDU. As a party which has always sought to emphasise its national concern, the FDP has not wished to be caught behindhand with proposals for new initiatives. Although much of the party's recent concern has been with the procedural side of official contacts between the Federal Republic and the DDR, party chairman Mende has gone farther perhaps than any other political leader in attempting to differentiate among 'small', 'middle', and 'large' steps on the German question. What seems especially noteworthy about his proposals, however, and those which have recurrently emanated from other FDP leaders over the years, is the priority they accord to the pursuit of Germany's national aspirations over other considerations of foreign policy.

IN view of the inherent and increasing complexities of the unification issue, the fragmentation of partisan positions is doubly disquieting. First, disputes between the government and the opposition, and disarray within the government's own councils, offer the Ulbricht regime unprecedented leverage to pressure the Federal Republic for the maximum in concessions. By playing off various West German positions against one another, while playing up either to humanitarian impulses or to popular pressures in the Federal Republic, the East German regime has already been able to score a few tactical successes. The precise point at which such successes can be translated into a major strategic breakthrough can never be known in advance, least of all in the absence of a Western grand strategy on the German problem. Second, the fragmentation of partisan positions, no less than frustration in dealing with East Germany behind it, subjects the entire fabric of domestic politics in the Federal Republic to mounting strain. The heavy involvement of personal rivalries with alternative policy lines may well be symptomatic of this development. In any case, such tensions ill equip the Federal Republic to meet the fundamental challenge of Germany's division.

Yet, in the absence of a coordinated Western policy on German reunification, which would be something more than declaratory in character, the pressures on the Federal Republic to pursue its own initiatives seem certain to increase. In part these pressures originate in other countries of the Western alliance. American and British policymakers have tended to encourage a more active West German policy towards the East, without drawing any clear distinction between East Germany and the other communist states. They have done this in apparent compensation for their own inactivity on the German question.

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But that very inactivity itself generates further domestic pressures within the Federal Republic towards exclusively German initiatives. And even if that were not the case, humanitarian impulses to ameliorate conditions inside East Germany and to re-establish personal ties would generate powerful pressures of their own on any West German government.

All three sets of pressures point to the likelihood of more official contacts between the Federal Republic and the DDR. They also suggest the possibility of increased involvement of the two parts of Germany in each other's affairs. Proponents of this course of development, especially the SPD, the FDP, and certain influential non-partisan political commentators, postulate that it will facilitate eventual reunification. Their arguments represent the most significant alternative approach to have arisen in the Federal Republic since the Wall and, as such, merit closer scrutiny.

THOSE who purport to see in the proliferation of contacts between the two Germanies a roundabout road to reunification usually put the case somewhat as follows: Official contacts, desirable in any event to improve the lot of the East German population, can be utilised to introduce Western political influence into the DDR. Thus, even if the short-run effect may be to help the East German regime to consolidate itself, the long-term prospects promise liberalisation. And it is precisely through such liberalisation, and through it alone, that Germany's partition can be overcome.

This line of reasoning is based upon two assumptions that require careful examination. The first holds that internal liberalisation within the DDR will necessarily facilitate rapprochement with the Federal Republic. The second implies that the superior position of the Federal Republic and that of the West as a whole will remain intact during the period from the present stalemated division to its termination in national reunification.

The first of these suppositions raises a host of imponderable considerations that too easily tend to be overlooked because of the deceptive attraction of the word 'liberalisation'. Yet much, if not everything, would seem to depend, first, upon who carries out the liberalisation that is assumed to follow in the wake of greater security for the East German regime and the DDR's exposure to Western influence, and, second, under what conditions such liberalisation occurs.

A sudden relaxation of the SED dictatorship in an atmosphere of general political disorientation could once again, as was the case in 1953, lead to a popular uprising. This in turn would almost certainly prompt Soviet intervention and result in a serious setback to the entire cause of reunification. Such an outburst, however, does not seem especially likely, if only because the SED regime is already much more solidly entrenched than it was in 1953.

What, then, about a controlled relaxation of the East German regime

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brought about by elements in the communist leadership more secure in their position of power and therefore more readily responsive to popular pressure? This is indeed the eventuality which is usually uppermost in the reasoning about Western influence creating the preconditions for East German liberalisation. The chain of argument which leads from such liberalisation to reunification contains, however, a number of potentially faulty links. First of all, it presupposes a fundamental cleavage between the old guard in the SED leadership, exemplified by Ulbricht and his group, and a different, presumably more flexible set of leaders. Unfortunately, our knowledge of political preferences within the top echelons of the East German regime does not suffice to determine whether such a cleavage exists. In the absence of such information, a number of things deserve to be borne in mind. To begin with, whatever the outcome of the inevitable struggle to succeed Ulbricht, it should not be assumed that personal rivalry within the East German leadership will promote reunification. On the contrary, if past experience is any guide, the contestants for power in East Germany will have to guard themselves against accusations of readiness to 'sell out' the DDR. Moreover, whoever emerges on top, it is highly improbable that power will ever devolve upon the Ulbricht regime's most outspoken critics, who have been intellectuals far removed from the centres of actual power. It is true that within the present leadership there is a rising group which might justifiably be labelled 'technocratic'. It does not follow, however, that the members of any such group need to be receptive to pressures towards rapprochement with West Germany or even towards domestic relaxation. It would be a mistake to underestimate the vested interest that all members of this rising group have in the preservation of their own power. And it is also an error to treat the whole problem from the point of view of personalities. Ulbricht himself has already introduced significant changes in the DDR, changes which few competent observers in the West would have ventured to ascribe to him beforehand. With the further consolidation of the regime postulated by proponents of the formula 'reunification through liberalisation', either Ulbricht or his successors might well grant more and more concessions to the population without necessarily sacrificing their own control or proving more pliable on the national issue. On the contrary, such a sequence of events, by enhancing the popularity of the regime at home, might only serve to render it more truculent towards the Federal Republic.

In all such calculations, it is important to bear in mind that the East German leaders, no matter who they may be, will have one crucial asset which, paradoxical though it may seem, is rooted in their very vulnerability. As long as the leaders are conscious of their weakness relative to West Germany, they are unlikely to court their own downfall by an active reunification policy. An acute awareness of the risks to its own power seems certain to be a significant feature of the East German regime's position in all its dealings with the Federal Republic;

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indeed, intransigence has already been very much in evidence. No amount of West German assurance or economic aid is really sufficient on this score. Rather, to the extent to which West German concessions may tend to increase the self-confidence of the East German leaders by leading to a greater degree of domestic consolidation, their propensity to challenge the Federal Republic, far from being diminished, would probably increase.

UPON closer inspection, the vision of a liberalised East Germany may well turn out to be a spectre. If liberalisation does not lead to rapid reunification, which no West German advocate of measures to facilitate change has yet suggested, then a more liberal, domestically secure, but internationally assertive East Germany would be in a better position than ever before to damage the Western position. Ultimately, the implicit assumption of the advocates of reunification through liberalisation, that the West's initially far superior position would remain intact, might prove to be illusory.

Even before the stage of credible liberalisation is reached in East Germany, the proliferation of official contacts along the lines envisaged by proponents of broadening small steps (such as the seasonal Berlin pass agreements) into middle steps (including Western economic credits), offers a number of opportunities for the DDR to attempt to enhance its status. From the West German point of view the crucial issue is usually defined as that of official recognition of East Germany as a separate state. Except in the extreme case of one proponent of official contacts who is willing to grant the DDR formal recognition, almost all the others urge that the issue should be simply sidestepped. Unfortunately, however, this is not always easy. Short of formal recognition, there are still many concessions which the East German regime could obtain which would effectively upgrade its status. The very initiation of various contacts and steps generates its own forward dynamic of public expectations, which the East German regime can more easily manipulate for its purposes than the West German government may be able to control for its own. Nor is it always clear in advance how the specific method of handling intra-German contacts will affect the status of the DDR. The very disputes which have raged within the Federal Republic about whether to coordinate these contacts in a single government office, and, if so, where to locate this office in the official hierarchy so as to preclude an enhancement of the DDR's status, are susceptible of being manipulated by the East German regime to press its own case, if not with the Federal Republic then with the outside world.

Much more serious are the implications of the proliferation of contacts between the two German governments for the Western position in Berlin. On the one hand, Western rights of access to Berlin could be threatened anew, first in indirect and then in more open ways, as the DDR succeeded in making good its claims to sovereignty as a

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separate state. On the other, the determination of the Western powers to maintain their position and rights in Berlin might well be weakened as the DDR succeeded in overcoming its status as a political pariah. That domestic liberalisation, facilitated by the Federal Republic, would aid the DDR in precisely this ambition follows from the increased likelihood that other nations would be more ready to extend diplomatic recognition to a liberalised East Germany than before. So transformed, the DDR might well succeed in blocking the employment of the Hallstein Doctrine or other retaliatory measures against its new diplomatic partners by appeals to a more sympathetic public opinion in West Germany. At the bare minimum, it would succeed in complicating the Federal Republic's foreign relations in ways that might make Bonn's 1965 Middle Eastern imbroglio seem only a mild foretaste.

Finally, the large and longer-range impact of a more stable, more liberal, more widely internationally-accepted East German regime upon the domestic political life of the Federal Republic should not be minimised. The DDR might then be able to press successfully its long-standing proposal for confederation (not reunification) with the Federal Republic. Once established, such a confederation could offer numerous possibilities for the SED to demoralise West German politics and destroy its ties to the West. Steeped in its newfound respectability, the East German regime, even in the absence of a formal confederation, might find its political support sought by the opposition to any existing West German government. The more its support was sought, the higher its demands would probably be. The results might well include the paralysis of West German government and the discrediting of democracy in the Federal Republic as well as a steady weakening of West Germany's ties to the West. Once begun, these processes would be hard to reverse. East German strategy could easily follow two different courses simultaneously: on the one hand, nationalist frustrations over the failure to have achieved progress towards reunification could be encouraged along with neutralist reactions of recrimination against the West. On the other, the same excrescences could be decried in the outside world, to which the DDR might well begin to appear to constitute 'the other and better Germany'. And the latter development, in turn, would serve to fan further nationalism and neutralism in West Germany.

The contrary supposition, that a more stable and liberal East Germany would be subject to beneficent Western political influence, is not nearly the self-evident proposition that its adherents depict it to be. The process of ideological erosion in each of the two Germanies is quite likely to be asymmetrical, with earlier doctrinal positions collapsing more rapidly in the Federal Republic than in the DDR. The ensuing political atmosphere in West Germany could be much more problematic and more susceptible to East German influence and manipulation than vice versa. In a situation marked by the gradual satisfaction of the DDR's long-standing demands on its own behalf and the increasing

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frustration of those of the Federal Republic, the East German institutional structure might conceivably prove to be the more capable of the two in controlling immediately disruptive domestic pressures. It would indeed be a major historical irony if it were to turn out to be the more viable in the long run.

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BEYOND THE ODER-NEISSE

A Critique of Bonn's Ostpolitik

Ekkehart Krippendorff

FOUR years ago, F. R. Allemann began his article on 'Adenauer's Eastern Policy' in this journal (*Survey*, October 1962) by stating: 'Few aspects of West German policy have been left as hazy and indistinct as its relationship to Eastern Europe. Ask any West German what this policy is, and you stand a three to one chance that the man you ask, if he is at all politically sophisticated, will look at you in frank astonishment and tell you that, as far as he knows, there ain't no such thing. Strange as this may sound, he will not be far off the mark.' Today, in 1966, this statement still stands with very few qualifications. Admittedly, in foreign affairs, in the political, cultural, economic, and ideological relations between countries, four years are not a long time. But viewed against the surprisingly rapid developments elsewhere in the world, not least in western and eastern Europe, the continued relevance of the 1962 remark testifies to the continuity, perhaps even to the stagnation of West Germany's foreign policy. We shall try to show later on how this inflexibility of the Federal Republic's approach to eastern Europe stems from the relatively rigid German attitude to eastern affairs in general.

One of Allemann's observations is, however, no longer strictly true in its original form. This is his remark that, with the exception of the USSR, the nations of eastern Europe are blanks on the map of the German mind. Here things have changed considerably during the last few years. Tourists have visited Czechoslovakia and the Black Sea, youth groups have travelled to Poland; by these and other means informal contacts were established, producing within the spectrum of German public opinion on eastern Europe a small body of informed, unbiased, and liberal minds, particularly among the younger generation. But the more the efforts of a few journalists, student associations, youth leaders, and clergymen began to bear fruit, the more obvious it became that they did so among a small minority with little power to influence official German attitudes towards eastern Europe.

These have remained substantially unchanged even though it has become fashionable of late to talk about 'a more flexible approach'. This is little more than a figure of speech, to which all Bonn's established political parties subscribe without having the slightest intention to consider, let alone initiate, a new departure. The stumbling block, which has so far defied all attempts at implementing a 'flexible eastern policy', and which will, in all probability, continue to do so for the foreseeable future, is the relationship to Poland and the concomitant problem of the Oder-Neisse line. On this issue the political parties, as well as the overwhelming majority of organised public

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opinion, show little sign of abandoning the position that, until the signing of a peace treaty by a freely elected government, Germany must continue to exist within her 1937 frontiers because, so the argument runs, neither the provisional Federal Republic nor the illegal German Democratic Republic is entitled to cede German territory. This precludes the formulation of any constructive and imaginative foreign policy.

The entire complex of recognising the Oder-Neisse line and of giving if not actual, at least de facto, recognition to the existence of the GDR has, no doubt, the makings of a political taboo. The credit to have courageously and openly defied it goes to the October 1965 memorandum of the Evangelical Churches. But the taboo, nonetheless, remained so powerful that, pleading for the recognition of the new eastern frontier, the memorandum could be published only by sidestepping the Church committee concerned with eastern problems, thus precipitating bitter disputes among the clergy. Although it gave fresh heart to the minority of Germans already referred to, it was sharply rejected by the press; none of the established parties nor any of their prominent politicians would either defend or support it, while the few journalists and professors rash enough to do so had their homes burnt down, notwithstanding the police protection extended to them.

The Federal Republic's refusal to make concessions has a political logic of its own for which—and this has occasionally been admitted—the formal legal argument provides an exceedingly convenient facade. The desire to keep the issue of the eastern frontiers alive springs from the wish to see the question of German reunification solved in accordance with the social and political concepts of the West German elites. It would, moreover, be gravely misleading to regard the non-recognition of the territorial changes wrought by the second world war, and hence by Germany's own policies, as a tactical device, rather than an integral part of a strategy aimed at changing the *status quo*. Although today the fact that Germany's eastern territories were lost in the Hitlerian gamble (recognised in 1946–47 and repressed during the following fifteen years) can again be cautiously adumbrated, this does not imply that West Germany's political leadership has despaired of its ability to regain eventually at least part of the lost provinces. The Federal Republic's east European policy rests mainly on two assumptions: First, that West Germany's economy is bound in the long run to acquire a power and momentum which the weaker developing countries of eastern Europe particularly will be unable to withstand, the less so since the Federal Republic's economic might is being complemented by an increasingly self-sufficient military posture, which in turn gains in importance as the power of the West's integrated military system declines. The Bundeswehr is obviously no longer equipped for purely defensive tasks and has, as the Starfighter shows, also acquired an offensive potential.

The second assumption is that the strength of West Germany's

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negotiating position and her ability to exert pressure is likely to increase with the spread of polycentrism. The trend towards greater economic independence among the countries of eastern Europe allows West Germany more room for manoeuvre and provides her with opportunities of playing off one eastern European country against another by appealing to their economic self-interest. In the short term, such a policy might help to isolate the GDR within the Comecon and Warsaw pact systems, while in the long run pressure on Poland may induce her to consider a complete or partial revision of her western frontiers.

IMPLYING carefully planned political strategy, these two assumptions seem to contradict my original contention regarding Germany's failure to formulate new east European policies. This contradiction is more apparent than real, for in fact the principles outlined do not represent a new departure, but merely continue the 'position of strength' tradition. Originally formulated as the guiding political strategy in dealing with the USSR, more or less disregarding the so-called satellites, this policy has recently been modified as the symptoms of dwindling cohesion among the eastern European countries encouraged hopes that stratagems based on economic temptation and pressure would yield results.

By producing some results in the early sixties, these policies seem to confirm the effectiveness of the economic approach. The Federal Republic managed to establish trade missions in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary in 1963, and in Bulgaria a year later, the general representative of Krupp's acting on each occasion as a sort of trail-blazer. However, the hopes originally raised by the establishment of trade relations failed to materialise, due partly to the trading partners' integration into the mutually hostile supra-national economies, and partly to the balance of payments difficulties bedevilling transactions between West Germany and the east European countries. In an effort to overcome these difficulties, Krupps tried to pioneer the idea in Poland of joint industrial operations, but so far this plan has come to nothing. On the other hand, the Federal Government did succeed in driving a number of wedges between various east European countries, based on the formulation of the so-called 'Berlin clause', which regulates West Berlin's participation in the West German export trade.

The four treaties show subtle though marked differences in their readiness to compromise on this diplomatically and politically important issue. They extend from Poland's uncompromisingly 'hard' attitude to the more flexible approach favoured by Rumania, which in 1966 also become the first country to bestow consular status on the Federal Republic's trade mission. Even so, the establishment of economic contacts failed to pay off in political terms. The failure to conclude a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, which had been under consideration ever since 1964, indicates the difficulties

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West German political demands are causing east European nations. Hence the stereotyped predictability with which the Federal Government's annual pronouncements, as well as the short statements issued by the Foreign Ministry on its eastern policies, note that 'relations with these countries had to be confined to non-political matters in view of their well-known attitude to the Federal Republic's claim to be the only legitimate representative of the German nation'.

It is precisely this governmental contention that precludes the normalisation of the central European situation and bars the way to a constructive foreign policy towards eastern Europe. The desire to break out of this self-imposed isolation has led during the last few years to the emergence of a political theory which—to put it simply—contends that the communist states in eastern Europe recognised the GDR only under duress and against their will. This proposition is held to invalidate the 'Hallstein doctrine' which, it is argued, can be invoked only against states which, after the Federal Republic and the GDR came into being, voluntarily opted for diplomatic recognition of the latter. Hence the Federal Republic has so far felt constrained to sever diplomatic relations only with Yugoslavia and Cuba.

Perhaps it may be mentioned in passing that this claim to exclusive legitimacy—and there is no sign that it is considered negotiable, indeed any modification would necessitate the passing of constitutional amendments—is solidly supported by public opinion, the press, and all politically articulate forces in the Federal Republic, even though it implies a number of logical contradictions. One of them relates to an argument occasionally preferred against Poland, accusing her of unreasonable intransigence in insisting on the recognition of a frontier not even shared by the two countries concerned. More important than such sophistries is the fact that the frontier issue is deliberately kept in abeyance to provide bargaining counters and means of bringing pressure to bear on eastern Europe in general, and on Poland and the Soviet Union in particular. Essentially, three interconnected policies are here at work.

First, the non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse line is meant to induce, if not to force Poland to promote German reunification and thereby to antagonise the GDR. What this implies has been expressed by H. E. Jahn, a member of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee: 'Recognising any eastern border now would remove all incentive for the Poles to manifest an interest in German reunification. If Poland knows, however, that she can get an internationally recognised western border only from a reunified Germany, she will perhaps show some interest in being helpful in bringing about this reunification.' Although it remains an open question where exactly this frontier between Poland and a reunited Germany would run, there can be little doubt that a Germany led by the social and political elites at present ensconced in West Germany would not be satisfied with the Oder-Neisse line.

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Second, the Federal Republic hopes to bring about a change in the *status quo* by making full use of the gravitational pull exerted by her powerful economy. Responsible leaders of the ruling parties have backed the SPD's 1965 project of initiating a 'Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe'. By way of large-scale industrial installations and generous long-term credits at low preferential rates, they announced their readiness to pay a high price to Poland and the rest of eastern Europe for the partial or total return of Germany's former provinces. Poland was to be generously recompensed for the loss of her western territories; and in this sense the 'sacrifices' West German politicians suggest they are prepared to make in the cause of reunification have real economic substance.

Third, West Germany expects from her policies that non-recognition of the eastern frontiers will lead to a revival of Russo-Polish friction. Poland is to be constantly made aware that she acquired her western territories only by ceding others in the east; and that the Federal Republic, by insisting on the righteousness of her own demands, was bound to support with equal dedication legitimate Polish claims against the Soviet Union. Such indefatigable German determination to press her claims is, moreover, calculated to inject an element of doubt as to the security of their tenure into the minds of Poles now settled in the western territories. In the long term such uncertainties, by preventing pacification at home, would force the Polish Government to transmit such internal pressures to the East. Since the Federal Republic has no territorial claims on Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria, and since for economic reasons these countries are greatly interested in improved relations with West Germany, Poland's isolation from the rest of the eastern European countries would in turn provide West German policy-makers with further opportunities of exerting pressure.

Although perhaps nothing more sinister than a mere display of political folklore or a piece of electioneering, it remains in this context nonetheless significant that the 1965 party rally of the ruling CDU, which officially inaugurated the general election campaign, started with a ceremonial march past of German flags. These included not only the colours of provinces now in the GDR, but also those of the former eastern territories, as well as flags representing German settlements further afield, like Memel, the Banat, and Transylvania! The Federal Government's determination not to acquiesce in the *status quo* by a sort of tacit agreement was further demonstrated by an authoritative ruling as to the official appellation of the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse. 'German territories east of the Oder-Neisse are to be referred to as "Germany's Eastern Territories at present under foreign administration", or where a briefer version is wanted, simply as "Germany's Eastern territories".' The decree goes on to say that localities within Germany's former boundaries 'are to be referred to only by their former place names'.

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THIS brief outline of the long-range political strategy towards eastern Europe may appear a little hypothetical and somewhat far-fetched. In fact, it only projects into the future potentialities which are now becoming faintly noticeable within the context of West Germany's foreign policy. But the student of current affairs is still reduced to conjecture and working hypotheses because no actively pursued German foreign policy is as yet discernible.

The only detailed plan on the subject so far aired in public and put down in writing comes from the foreign affairs adviser of Franz Josef Strauss. This envisages the creation of a west European federation which must include France, and possibly England; it will

> represent a new power combination whose field of force is bound to exert an influence on the countries of eastern Europe. With the situation so radically transformed, the Soviet Union would hardly hesitate to seek an accommodation with this second western world power. Needless to say, such a federation of European states, moving towards an integrated confederation, would have no need to regard the Soviet zone as anything other than an insignificant left-over from the days of the occupation and the arbitrary division of Europe. Within such a concept the issue of the German-Polish border would have become equally irrelevant. Since European divisions could be surmounted only within the framework of a European Confederation, national boundaries would have disappeared by the time a reunited Germany became the neighbour of the Polish nation. By then the question of frontiers would have become largely meaningless and would no longer constitute an international problem. Even the Germans' right to their old homelands would no longer pose a contentious problem, because in the meantime intra-European laws would have safeguarded the citizen's right to live and work wherever he chooses.

These long-range plans become more plausible and convincing if seen against the permanent pattern of Germany's Polish and eastern policies. Surprisingly, they changed very little under the varying regimes from Bismarck to Weimar and Hitler. This is not the place to outline these developments in detail, but it may be revealing to look a little more closely at one episode, chosen because it took place under a democratic dispensation when Stresemann, renowned for his peace-loving and conciliatory approach, was Foreign Minister. This is what the German historian Martin Broszat in his *200 Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Munich, 1963, p. 17) has to say on the subject:

> With the treaty of Locarno and Germany's admission to the League of Nations a year later (autumn 1926), the Reich's eastern policy was in some respects committed to a new course. A dispassionate and realistic assessment of Germany's actual military power persuaded Stresemann to abandon more or less illusory hopes, based on the use of force against Poland, which Seeckt [head of the *Reichswehr*] was known to have favoured on occasion. The task

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of pressing for frontier rectification was, therefore, passed on to the official propaganda and diplomatic services, whose endeavours inside the League of Nations and elsewhere would, it was hoped, become the more persuasive, the wider the reputation of their unexceptionable and pacific intentions had spread, and the more their cordial relations with the western powers forced the Poles on the defensive. Time and again Stresemann had to defend this approach against violent denunciations from the *Deutsch-Nationalen* and *Völkischen* extremists on the right, as well as from all sorts of patriotic groups, who mistook his renunciation of force as a veiled recognition of the existing eastern frontier. In his Reichstag speech of 18 May 1925, he made it clear that Germany 'had neither the will nor the power to bring about a change of her eastern frontiers by force'. In its public utterances as well as in its diplomatic statements, however, the Government let it be known that it was not prepared to accept as final boundaries 'imposed in flagrant disregard of the right to self-determination' . . . By repeatedly making such public statements and re-emphasising them at more confidential levels, Stresemann became one of the most vocal advocates of this thesis, contributing to the widespread German misconception that the eastern problem could be solved under the Locarno treaty and by negotiations within the League of Nations. Yet the German Government must have been fully aware of the Polish resolve, ceaselessly repeated in season and out, that it was not under any circumstances willing to discuss a frontier revision. Stresemann had no illusions on this point, and admitted that no negotiations with the Polish Government would produce frontier changes of the kind desired by Germany . . . As his objective was not to be attained by force, and was not susceptible to negotiation, the question how it was going to be gained is both pertinent and not a little puzzling . . . Such of Stresemann's utterances as 'in the East, we are not yet at the end of the road', a new chapter in European history will begin 'the moment Russia decides to tackle the Polish problem', indicate the lines along which his mind worked. The kind of wishful thinking prevalent in the Berlin of 1925–26 can be gauged from the exaggerated hopes Stresemann and his experts pinned on the expected collapse of the Polish economy . . . At a secret session of *Land* Prime Ministers, Stresemann remarked that conditions in Poland were 'approaching a civil war situation'; Germany had therefore to be alert and ready 'to press her claims at a European conference'. The whole world, he observed, 'regards the Polish Corridor as already untenable, a point of view which entitles us to consider it as the next European problem on the agenda'.

The same approach, based on similarly unrealistic assessments of the actual situation, is now being re-enacted by the Federal Republic. Here, too, one encounters the same repeated and public statements forswearing the use of force in settling frontier disputes; here too expectations are being kept alive or aroused which a scrupulously democratic government cannot satisfy; here, too, claims known to be totally

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unacceptable to the other side are being staked out; here, too, the Government dissociates itself from the presentation, though not necessarily from the essence of the 'unreasonable' and 'radical' demands advanced by sundry patriotic leagues and high-ranking members of the Cabinet and leading political spokesmen, deplored as 'injudicious', 'unfortunate', 'unwise'; here, too, it is hoped that the unequivocal commitment to the West, allied to German economic strength, will eventually bring about a change in the eastern *status quo*. It seems hardly necessary to add that it was Hitler who finally redeemed the unfulfilled pledges and expectations of the Weimar Republic, which were indeed not susceptible to fulfilment by the means previously suggested.

THE continuity in Germany's eastern policy is particularly surprising because it was in no way implied in the transition from Wilhelminian Empire to Weimar Republic. The foreign-affairs thinking of the former was derived largely from the alliance between the feudal squirearchy east of the Elbe and the Prussian bureaucracy, an alliance which, at least as far as foreign affairs were concerned, seemed to have collapsed in 1918; and indeed Stresemann did not represent these groups. There still exists, however, at least with regard to the formulation of foreign policies, a subliminal consensus among the ruling establishment, a unanimity from which the leadership of the SPD cannot be excluded either. It is precisely this consensus of the ruling elites which made the continuity of Germany's eastern policies and the consistency of her approach to foreign affairs possible, irrespective of changes in the form of government, and which also makes nonsense of the argument often advanced that the Federal Republic could not possibly be acting as the legatee of the former Reich in its approach to the eastern question because, instead of Prussian bureaucrats, it is now ruled by the affluent and propertied West German middle classes. In fact, Stresemann's official and unofficial statements have been almost word for word echoed by Chancellor Erhard. Similarly, West Germany's Social-Democratic Party, possibly for tactical reasons and the need to refurbish its national image, explicitly committed itself to an equally uncompromising course. Hence, neither a change of government, nor a 'national coalition' would signify a change of course or lead to a serious reconsideration of West German foreign policies.

This was made transparently clear by the so-called 'peace note' issued by the Federal Republic in March 1966. It explicitly asserted that 'legally Germany continues within the boundaries of 31 December 1937 until a freely elected all-German Government recognises different frontiers'. This wording not only implies the Federal Government's refusal to recognise the Oder-Neisse line, but also fails to satisfy repeated Czech demands for an explicit rejection of the Munich agreements. All the note has to say on this topic is that 'Hitler tore up the agreement which, consequently, ceases to have territorial significance. The Federal Government has, therefore, as often pointed out

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before, no territorial claims against Czechoslovakia'. Here, too, the phrasing allows at least for the return of the Sudeten German minority to their former homelands. Although, predictably, this 'peace note' failed to elicit the response the Federal Government, in a mistaken assessment of the actual situation, had hoped for, it was explicitly endorsed by the social-democratic opposition.

A rational policy based on a proper assessment of prevailing realities calls for radical re-thinking, if peace and stability are to prevail in central and eastern Europe. This, at least for the foreseeable future, seems unlikely to emanate from West Germany's ruling establishment and the social forces supporting it. Only outside pressure, firmly and consistently applied, mainly by the Western allies, could induce the Federal Republic to modify its outlook and approach. Since much time will pass before these concepts are integrated into the framework of western foreign policy, it must take even longer before they will be acted upon. Yet the longer action is deferred, the more difficult it will become to impose a restraining influence on West Germany's foreign policy towards eastern Europe.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GDR

Kurt P. Tudyka

How are you to appear democratic to the outside world when democracy in your own country is in chains?
—Karl Marx [1]

IN recent months, some spectacular political initiatives have once more got the GDR talked about. They justify an examination of the permanent characteristics of East German foreign policy, which in its course may focus attention on the hidden motives which underlie them.

East Germany's attitudes and relations to the outside world are, for all their limited scope, as full of contradictions as is the foreign policy of West Germany. This is true at many points, and as much for the incongruity of formulated aims as for their relation to political reality. The contradictoriness on both sides is mutually determined in many respects, being bolstered still further by the tub-thumping of the former Allies. The East-West German edifice of antinomies ultimately rests on the status quo, and this, at the least challenge—such as the planned exchange of speakers—is in danger of shaking and falling in on itself like a house of cards.

What does the formulated foreign policy of East Germany hold, and what makes up its internal and external contradictions? East Berlin's policy stems from three declared aims: she wishes first to identify herself with Soviet policy; second, to follow the 'Leninist principle of internationalism', and third, to represent the 'national interests of Germany'. Almost every foreign policy programme speech, from 1945 to the present, has held these three components. What have they separately to tell us? How do they relate to each other and to reality?

In whatever degree the pressure behind East Germany's close ties with the Soviet Union is explained by the evolution of the Soviet zone of occupation into the GDR and by the personal career of Walter Ulbricht, doubts must nevertheless remain as to whether it was justifiable in the interests of German communism to make a virtue of this necessity. Indeed, from the start there was a lively enough criticism of this 'Russification' to be heard from within their own ranks. Such criticism took its stand on popular dislike, on the irresponsible dismantling of industry, and on the pro-Polish settlement of the Oder-Neisse question, and was to be silenced only after hard and bitter wrangling. Walter Ulbricht admitted, at the thirteenth session of the SED party executive, that 'we must wage decisive war on

[1] 'Ausländische deutsche Politik', *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, July 1848, reprinted in Marx-Engels, *Werke*, vol. 5, p. 155 ff.

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nationalist deviations . . . and on this account anti-Soviet arguments can no longer be tolerated'.[2]

Even then, in 1945–46, when the only immediate concern was for good relations with serving units of the Red Army, Ulbricht was trying to revive the old anti-Western resentment among the conservative bourgeoisie in Germany, as for example when in January 1946 he demanded 'in the national interest' that 'all anti-Soviet campaigns must be stopped. The policy of stubborn adherence to the West, as followed after 1918, must not be repeated. . . . We want no recurrence of the old policy by which German ministers and businessmen would try for better relations with the Soviet Union only when Germany was undergoing an economic crisis'.[3]

With the lengthening shadow of a divided Germany, in particular after the 1947 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, these protestations of friendship rose to unquestioning adulation of the Soviet Union and its leader. This spirit of ingratiation symbolised a comprehensive political strategy. For example, in the summer of 1948 Ulbricht announced: 'The strengthening of democracy demands a radical change of mood among the people, in mass organisations, and in government departments—a conscious attitude of friendship to the Soviet Union and to the countries of the People's Democracies must take root. People with anti-Soviet views have no place in the State apparatus'.[4] This Russophilia, heightened almost to self-abnegation, prompted the Chairman of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, to refer to the German communists even more contemptuously as 'the Russians'. The SED, in contrast, praises to this day 'that struggle against anti-Sovietism and nationalism' which led, as the party admits, to the excommunication of those who wanted 'to shift the spiritual centre of gravity of the Marxist world movement from Moscow to Berlin, and in so doing to westernize it'. Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl could sum up as follows: 'Our members were aware that a democratic development of Germany is possible only in the closest conjunction with the Soviet Union, and from this they have correctly concluded that anti-Soviet elements will get nothing from staying within our party . . . the party unreservedly acknowledges the leading role of the Soviet Union and the CPSU'.[5]

Although the subsequent purges were connected with the independent course just then embarked on by Yugoslavia, they were nevertheless something more than mere kowtowing to the Soviet masters. No other east European regime showed itself more devoted and obedient to the 'friends' (as the Soviet leaders are called) than did and indeed still does the German communist leadership in East Berlin. In the GDR

[2] Walter Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, vol. 3, 1946–50 (Berlin, 1953), p. 335.
[3] Ibid. p. 544.
[4] Ibid., 5th ed. (Berlin, 1960), p. 278.
[5] *Protokoll der I. Parteikonferenz der SED* (Berlin, 1949), pp. 373/85.

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during the Stalin era, there were no limits to the barren and servile cult of flattery of the Soviet Union, its policies and direction. Yet the more de-stalinisation helped other People's Democracies to modify their position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, by so much did the continuing efforts of the SED leadership to identify itself with the Soviet course mean that the rest of its policy became tainted in the eyes of third parties. Since the start of the sixties, the conflict between Peking and Moscow and the decentralisation tendencies in east Europe, the claim to follow a policy serving both the national interest and the building of socialism has hardly squared with the self-confessed immaturity implicit in dependence on the Soviet Union. For this reason, even the neighbouring 'socialist fraternal peoples' have inevitably shared the impression of large sections of the East German populace as far back as the immediate post-45 period—namely, that the GDR is under foreign overlordship, and that on this account the actual contribution of German communism to the world revolution is nothing more than an anti-national Soviet policy on German soil.[6]

Emphatic protestations of German-Soviet friendship and identity of foreign-policy interests are all the more remarkable for their scant and rarely observed correspondence to the *facts*, whether one looks at the first post-war decade or at most recent history. Thus, until well on in the fifties the Soviet Union regarded its German zone simply as occupied territory and an object of exploitation from which it drew reparations to the sum—never audited—of between 30 and 50 thousand million marks. It could not be in the interests of the German communist leaders that the occupiers were bringing further social and economic ruin to an anyway largely notional Central Germany by dismantling the remaining plant and exacting more from current production.

But then, just as earlier the loyalty of the German communists got scant reward from the Soviet occupiers, so now the recent policy of the USSR towards Germany can scarcely correspond with East Berlin's expectations. The Moscow government, with the Pact of Assistance concluded in June 1964, finally shelved the notion of a separate peace treaty which shortly before had been put about by East Berlin; in like manner, the transformation of West Berlin into a so-called 'Free City', loudly proclaimed by East Berlin propaganda, has also come to nothing. This at least is the view shared by the East Berlin leadership, which very soberly assesses the German-Soviet treaty as a preliminary cornerstone in German-Soviet relations. In this view, Moscow will conclude a peace treaty with both German states, given settlement of the West Berlin question, but will make no separate agreements with East Berlin.[7]

[6] Cf. Ernst Richert, *Das Zweite Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), p. 29 f.

[7] Cf. the comment on and discussion of the German-Russian Friendship Treaty by the Scientific Council of the Institute for International Relations at the 'Walter Ulbricht' Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft; in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 9, 1964.

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For all this, the pact of 'Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance' has brought the SED leadership to the goal of its long courtship of the Soviet Union. The pact affords the GDR a lasting guarantee from the USSR which gives the East Berlin regime privileges in comparison with its east European partners, and secures it against the West to the extent that no bilateral agreements between Moscow and Bonn can pass it over. 'Goodbye to a sell-out via Bonn' was the comment often heard in East Berlin following conclusion of the treaty. Amid its general protestations of socialist unity, the treaty gives special point to bilateral cooperation, the aim of which must be to realise 'coordination of national economic plans and specialisation and cooperation of production', and to ensure 'to the national economy of both states a high level of productivity by joint consultation and agreement' (Article 8).

With this, the secret is out which hides and has always hidden behind the affirmations of friendship of the East Berlin to the Moscow leadership, and for which she has surrendered other aims and compromised other policies. Since 1945 the concern of the East Berlin regime has been primarily to claim and secure its power. *Raison d'état* of an absolutist nature characterises the substance of East Berlin policy, to be found equally in the unconditional loyalty to Moscow as in the proclamation of a socialist foreign policy and in commitment to an allegedly national line. The policy of the GDR is organised rigorously and consistently to match this *raison d'état*. Above all, proximity to the Soviet Union allowed the East Berlin leadership to lessen the threat to her existence of an alternative Soviet policy on Germany, the possibility of which was apparent at the Moscow Foreign Ministers conference early in 1947, in the East-West exchange of notes at the beginning of 1952, the two conferences of 1955, and finally at the Foreign Ministers conference of 1959. Viewed in retrospect, these events all mark crucial points in Soviet policy on Germany, showing how the importance of the GDR regime has grown from one occasion to the next.

THE second element in East German official foreign policy, that is, adherence to the 'Leninist principles of internationalism', is found by definition in any Marxist-Leninist party and the government it controls. The use of this formula in foreign policy statements enables one to draw up a membership list of the nations within the club. The list names, first, the communist states, in particular the countries within Comecon, with whom relations are governed by 'comradely cooperation, and mutual help, and the socialist division of labour, coordination, cooperation and specialisation'. Second, the new national states with whom relations accord with the 'socialist moral obligation of active solidarity and humanity', with the object of assisting them 'to overcome colonial backwardness and to acquire complete economic independence'. Third and last, the list includes neutral and other states with

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whom relations should be established on terms of 'equality of rights and mutual advantage'.[7a]

This principle in East German foreign policy is meant to serve as a watershed separating good from evil in international relations: on one side the forces of peace and socialism, of progress and coexistence, the oppressed peoples and masses; then, against them on the other, the aggressive powers of international reaction, led by American business capital, imperialism, and militarism. Thus glossed, international relations are a war between two world systems in which one system, 'the socialist camp', will prevail and with its unity ensure peace. The imperialists' struggle is directed first and foremost against the unity of the socialist countries, which for this reason—says East Berlin with great emphasis—must be guarded 'as the apple of one's eye'. In relations between countries of the two systems, the principle of peaceful coexistence must be applied, and this will be the more successful in so far as 'the working class is welded together in unity of action, and draws into this struggle all peace-loving and democratically-minded people'. This policy of peaceful coexistence, advocated as the 'best form of relations between states with differing social systems', does not, in the eyes of its adherents, rule out 'the struggle, within capitalist countries, colonies, and dependent states, of the exploited and oppressed masses'.[8] Such a struggle is rather seen as a legitimate and necessary, albeit internal, feature of these countries.

Admittedly this whole doctrine is to a greater or lesser degree the foreign policy programme of other communist countries as well. At the same time its adoption by East Berlin is incompatible with the claim of the SED to represent the nation. Since, however, this precept of foreign policy takes on substance only through Lenin's 'creative principle of application', a cool analysis of it in the light of political practice leaves nothing standing save for some measure of *ex post* apologetics. For all that, it is used as the explanation of most undertakings of East Berlin foreign policy, whether these have to do with the justification of the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish 'peace frontier', the declaration of the Baltic as the 'sea of peace', the condemnation of 'reactionary Zionist ruling circles in Israel' as 'the political and strategic bridgehead of world imperialism', or whether the point to be brought out is that the GDR 'stands on the side of the oppressed colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and state independence, and will lend them all support in her power'. In the name of democracy and progress, of peace and coexistence, East Berlin woos the favour of the so-called 'third world' with especial vigour. Support is declared for 'the fighting patriots in the areas still under Portuguese dominion'; opposition is expressed to 'the policy of racial terrorism practised in the Republic of South Africa'; 'every

[7a] *Cf.* Gerald Götling, 'Das internationale Gewicht der DDR', *ibid.*, No. 4, 1964, p. 267.

[8] Cf. *Einheit*, 1960, No. 5, p. 788.

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possible help is given to the anti-imperialist war of liberation of the Algerian people'; full sympathy is voiced for the 'legitimate striving of the people of Cyprus to settle their internal affairs without foreign intervention'—to sum up, there are 'ties of solidarity with the peoples of the Asian, African, and Latin-American countries who are fighting for their national independence', and in particular there is support for 'the rightful efforts of the African peoples to intensify through concerted action their war against imperialism and neo-colonialism'.[9]

Beneath this stream of protestations of sympathy and solidarity there nonetheless lies a very unambiguous and cool-headed policy which is governed once again by nothing other than the GDR's *raison d'état.* Just as this is defined vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by a pure instinct of self-preservation, so from all third parties, whether inside or outside the 'socialist world system', it seeks to gain 'recognition'. Following the attainment of the GDR's majority, attested by the Soviet Union in 1954, 1955, and again in 1964, this is as it were Act Two of the same drama: namely, to have this species of independence receive diplomatic recognition by third parties also and confirmed in international law. In its propagandist evaluation and upgrading of the value of international contacts, the GDR displays a frenzy which covers nothing save the need for self-affirmation. From the football World Cup to the Leipzig Trade Fair, from membership of the World Postal Union to signing the Moscow Test-Ban treaty, such contacts with the outside world trigger off in the GDR a neurotic recognition-euphoria. With tricks and stratagems of unflagging novelty, the East Germans seek to extend their international contacts, to boost them, and to exploit them to the point where the state's existence is acknowledged. It cannot be denied that in this the foreign policy of the GDR has shown considerable ingenuity, and has in fact won greater successes than are officially admitted by West Germany—though naturally these again are smaller than East Berlin would have them appear.

IN East Germany it is no secret but and open and rigorous commandment that citizens shall exploit their international ties for the benefit of the GDR's *raison d'état.* For example, an East German study on scientific help from the GDR to underdeveloped countries has this to say: 'Our scholars give generous support to the activities of the GDR government in the field of foreign policy. Scientific activities of this kind help the peoples of the young national states to realise just what the actual standpoint of the two Germanies on the national and colonial situation really is. They come to see that there can be no bridging of the contradiction between the further task of the anti-colonial liberation movement and the neo-colonialist aims of the imperialist powers. Moreover, they also know that their own vital interests, just

[9] Cf. *Wörterbuch der Aussenpolitik* (Berlin, 1965), p. 84 passim, and Walter Ulbricht addressing the diplomatic corps on 1 January 1961, in *Aussenpolitische Korrespondenz*, 6 January 1961.

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as those of the German people, make it essential that relations with the GDR be even closer. An expression of this are the treaties and agreements for scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation signed with many African, Asian, and Latin-American states '.[10] On the one hand, scientists, technicians, and artists, on the other, football players, athletes, ski-jumpers, and sportsmen of all kinds are bidden to demonstrate above all else that they are appearing in the capacity of GDR representatives. They are nurtured in the belief that they owe their careers to the achievements of the workers' and peasants' state alone.

In the GDR's fight for recognition, a special task falls to external economic relations. 'In the economic field there is a genuine disinclination among the imperialist states to apply the Hallstein Doctrine'; thus runs an empirical law of East German foreign trade policy.[11] Existing economic contacts are maintained and kept well oiled by an energetic policy of frequent visits, such as for example those made early in 1964 by Wolfgang Kiesewetter, the deputy Foreign Minister, who led a government delegation on visits to Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, and India. In the countries on his itinerary he was received by official governmental bodies, and on his return he said, undoubtedly correctly, that the West German government 'in accordance with the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, is drawing a false conclusion from the differences at present observable in the degrees of relations with the two German states: namely, that the governments of these countries support Bonn's exclusive claim to represent Germany. To be sure, the application of neutralism and non-alignment to the German situation would encourage the establishment of equal relations with both German states. The reasons why these countries have still not decided to adopt this course are many . . .'.[12] The reasons apostrophised here as 'many' in fact have a single common origin, flattering to neither East nor West Germany, which is that the third country concerned wishes to gain the maximum advantage for herself from the feud between the rival German states by playing them off against each other. A sign of the level at which this double game is played are those GDR trade missions and consulates in countries which maintain official diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic alongside them.[13] True, the GDR does not rest content with this part-won terrain of semi-official status, and urges the governments of these countries 'henceforth to operate the principle of neutrality towards Germany by placing their relations with the two German states on an equal footing without discrimination to either—that is, to maintain the same normal relations with both '.[14]

[10] Hubert Helbing, 'Die wissenschaftliche Hilfe der DDR fur die schwach entwickelten Länder', in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 6, 1963, p. 479.
[11] Hermann Axen, *Aktuelle Fragen der internationalen Beziehungen der SED und der DDR* (Berlin, 1965), p. 19.
[12] *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 4, 1964, p. 273.
[13] Excluding the 'socialist world-system', the GDR at present enjoys official relations with 36 states.
[14] Walter Ulbricht in a declaration to the diplomatic corps on 26 September 1960.

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Although Walter Ulbricht has expressly stated that the GDR has no 'so-called Hallstein Doctrine in reverse', the GDR leadership views with extreme misgivings the West German trade missions newly set up in the East European capitals. Hermann Axen, SED politburo member, has expressed himself very clearly on the subject, seeing it as 'the seed-bed for nationalist tendencies to take root in'. The GDR is not opposed to the import of equipment, patents, and licences. 'But we are opposed to that national shortsightedness which believes that world rank can be reached by one socialist state through its own unaided efforts, and through bilateral agreements with advanced capitalist countries'.[15] So it is that trade with the West, and with West Germany in particular, puts still further out of key the harmony, already soured by differing cultural and economic viewpoints, between the GDR and the other countries of East Europe. For in fact it is not these countries but the GDR which is 'nationally shortsighted' in the true sense. In order to survive it must put 'socialist unity' before a 'separate national road' with no reservations whatever. Further to which the East Berlin regime, by virtue of the activity of the West German government in East Europe, is put into much of the same defensive position as that which Bonn has taken up relative to East Berlin in the 'third world'. As with the emerging countries, the foreseeable future offers the East European countries the chance to play off two German governments against each other, or at least to accept rewards from East Berlin for 'socialist' good conduct.

Yet it speaks well for the flexibility of East German diplomacy that it attempts to use this new development to its own ends. This is shown by the following pronouncement by the deputy Foreign Minister Paul Wandel: 'Although she may claim with full right to be the sole representative of the German people's national interests, since she is the rightful German state, the GDR, adhering consistently to the policy of peaceful coexistence, nonetheless favours the adoption by countries of the socialist camp of diplomatic relations with both German states.'[16] This concession, however, is at once coupled with a demand to the neutrals and the western world: 'A country which limits its German diplomatic relations to the Federal Republic is willy-nilly supporting the opponents of a German peace settlement which is of great importance for the securing of world peace.' Otto Winzer, former Secretary of State and now the GDR's Foreign Minister, was more skilful in his reasoning in an interview with *Le Monde* (2 March 1964); he directed attention to the attractive possibilities of trade between France and the GDR, thereby giving a stimulus to the establishment of a French trade mission in East Berlin: 'Is France, then, to have fewer rights than the Federal Republic, which has started to set up trade

[15] Hermann Axen, loc. cit. p. 35.
[16] Paul Wandel, 'Die internationale Stellung der DDR', *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 10, 1962, p. 1125.

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missions in a number of socialist countries? . . . There seems no reason why what is claimed by Bonn should be denied to Paris'.

Recently the foreign policy of the GDR has concentrated its efforts on a particular goal: membership of the United Nations. In former years, too, East Germany scarcely missed a single opportunity to engage itself in UN affairs. It issued declarations of the renewal of agreements or conventions, citing the UN as depository. It took a stand on United Nations' problems, and submitted documents to the General Assembly, to the special committees, to the General Secretariat, and also to the special organisations before even being asked for them. In doing so it occasionally made use of the good offices of its East European partners. Thereupon each adoption of a GDR-written sentence into the official minutes of the UN or its special organisations was chalked up as a 'recognition success' in East Berlin with a meticulousness bordering on the absurd. Thus, while the most recent progress of the GDR on the road towards acceptance by the United Nations admittedly marks a high point in her struggle for recognition, the achievement was prepared for and announced well in advance.[17] As early as in the party programme of the SED there is reference to the party's claim to UN membership for the GDR, and to demands that she be allowed to collaborate with the special organisations on an equal footing. The last intitiative directs its appeal to the principle of 'universality' of the United Nations, and to the proclaimed and avowedly demonstrated willingness of the GDR to help the developing countries; a country economically as significant as the GDR should therefore not be excluded from such collaboration. Yet even here, too, the foreign policy of the GDR is in a contradictory situation, since on the one hand it denies to the UN the right to intervene in the German question, and on the other it stresses the benefits to peace accruing from membership of both German states in the Organisation. This attitude gives rise to an abstruse chain of arguments: 'The policy of renouncing equal representation in the United Nations of both German states . . . is part of the anti-national, aggressive concept of the Adenauer regime, which for long has stopped at nothing in selling out the rights of the German people to international imperialism', declared, for example, Peter Alfons Steininger, President of the East German United Nations Association, adding in the same breath that to refer the German question to the United Nations amounts to intervention, since 'national problems must be solved by the country concerned'.[18]

GRANTED that the German-Soviet alliance underwrote the continued existence of the GDR, and granted, too, that the policy

[17] *Cf.* Harald Rose, 'Der Anspruch der DDR auf Mitgliedschaft in den Vereinten Nationen', in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 5, 1963, p. 355 ff.

[18] Peter Alfons Steininger, 'Imperialistische Anschläge gegen die UN-Charta', in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 1, 1963, p. 25 ff.

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of peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism brought her a measure of recognition which, though admittedly small, can no longer be entirely discounted, the third element of GDR foreign policy—the claim to embody Germany's national interests—is a double somersault made with no catcher on the opposite trapeze. The attempt to represent 'the German nation' stands contradicted by the history, the existence, and the rationale of the GDR.

In her biography of Ulbricht, Carola Stern reports that the communist emigrés on their return to Germany from Moscow at the end of the war vowed thenceforth to avoid one of their crassest mistakes of the Weimar period—'underestimation of the national question'.[19] During emigration they had had ample opportunity to make themselves masters of the terminology of nationalism, as they joined with 'progressive officers' among the German prisoners-of-war in founding the National Committee of Free Germany. At that time it was credible enough for the banners of patriotism and of socialism to unite in the struggle against Hitler's fascism, since the destroyer of the German nation was also the class enemy: Hitler and the bourgeoisie were one. After the war the communists continued to play this nationalist role. In content it was admittedly governed by the Moscow group under Ulbricht, but no event took place in the immediate post-war period in Germany but was given its commentary, couched in nationalistic phraseology, from the communist side. Its effectiveness even prompted the Chairman of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, himself no mean hand at national pathos, to give warning in his first speech before the Bonn Parliament that it was not the social-revolutionary so much as the national-revolutionary slogans of the East that could be a danger for the Federal Republic.

Since then the communists have in no way abandoned or toned down their German-nationalist vocabulary; one might say quite the opposite. After the building of the Berlin Wall, the official party organ of the SED, *Neues Deutschland*, wrote on 17 August 1961: 'The GDR is the only German state, and has for years unwaveringly represented the national interests of our people. Anything which strengthens this national force is a further step towards the peaceful and democratic unity of our people. . . . The Bonn potentates, as is known, have years ago given up the idea of a German national state. At first they tried to veil their treachery against the nation with such phrases as "the West" and "European integration", but since then they have revealed in their entirety their anti-national aims'. This article then continued with quotations from Adenauer, Strauss, and Brandt, and stated that the GDR aspires to unity of the people for the whole of Germany without these 'traitors to the nation'. Phrases such as these are by no means exceptional, but rather are typical of the 'national' claim of the GDR regime we have been discussing.

[19] Carola Stern, *Ulbricht* (Cologne, 1963), p. 215 ff.

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The Bonn republic is described as 'anti-national', its conduct is seen as 'a fundamental policy of non-reunification', the West German parties are charged with 'overt high treason'; 'They have subjected themselves shamelessly to the American monopolies and have made an American satellite of West Germany. . . . National treason stands written on the forehead of the Bonn imperialists like the mark of Cain', as the *Neues Deutschland* put it at the beginning of January 1961. Even the eastern policy of the Federal Republic, that is, the setting up of trade missions in the east European capitals, is upbraided as 'anti-national vis-à-vis the GDR'. At the same time, in connection with Bonn's legal claims to the 1937 frontiers, the West German government is accused of spreading among the West German populace the poison of nationalist superiority, revanchism, and chauvinism.

Entirely the opposite picture is painted of the patriotism of East Germany. Walter Ulbricht declared in his 'national document' of 1962—addressed significantly to 'the whole German nation'—that everything which is good, beautiful, and progressive in German history finds its home in the GDR. And *Neues Deutschland* wrote (18 January 1961), apropos of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire: 'The working class laid in the GDR the foundation-stone for a future united, democratic, freedom-loving Germany. This makes us the final warriors in the struggle waged by the democratic revolutionaries of 1848; with us, too, the best endeavours of the progressive liberal forces of the German bourgeoisie are led to victory'. What is one to make of these and similar pronouncements? One gets near to an answer if one bears in mind that these utterances are put out with one eye on the local population and the other on the citizens of West Germany, in particular the 'working class' and the 'progressive bourgeoisie'. These nationalistic exaggerations clearly are primarily designed to usurp the patriotic vocabulary of Germany and thus at one and the same time to take the wind out of nationalist irredentist sails among the GDR population, and also to recommend themselves to eastward-looking national-conservative groups in West Germany. But could not this nationalist thread, running through GDR foreign policy statements, also be said to conceal a long-term programme for action?

In Paragraph 1 of the GDR Defence Statute, which became effective in September 1961, it is stated that the GDR is 'the representative of the German nation'. One month after this law was passed, the central committee of the SED declared, on the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the GDR: 'In West Germany the militarists are not to be defeated with ballot-papers, a fact proved once more by the parliamentary elections of 17 September . . . It is lucky for the German nation and the GDR exists. Not merely does she block the militarists road to rule over all Germany; she is also central to the

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rebirth of Germany as a freedom-loving, anti-imperialist, democratic state. This is where the historical mission of the GDR lies '.[20]
And on the eve of People's Army Day in 1961, General Heinz Hoffman, Minister for National Defence, stated: 'As the army of the socialist and rightful German state, which embodies the peaceful efforts of the people, the National People's Army is at the same time the true national army in Germany '.[21] Pitched in the same key, in accents horrifyingly reminiscent of the nationalist and militarist traditions of Germany, the official army newspaper noted that the People's Army is 'an important element in the struggle for peace, and a decisive guarantee for the national existence of the German people and the national rebirth of a united, peaceful, and democratic Germany '.[22]

Here the picture becomes distinct of a future Germany whose seeds lie in the GDR. The underlying suggestion that the GDR alone can claim to stand for Germany is in striking contrast to the usual programme of a confederation which is East Germany's recipe for reunification. It is well known that Ulbricht more than ten years ago said: 'Since in Germany two states exist with differing social systems, it is necessary first of all to bring about a rapprochement, and then later to find a temporary solution in the form of a confederation or federation, until it is possible to attain reunification '.[23] One year later, Otto Grotewohl, then Prime Minister of the GDR, enlarged on this proposal: 'We see a confederation of this kind as a loose union, in which to begin with the two German states will continue to exist independently in their present form and make-up, as in their whole way of life '. From other pronouncements it has emerged that the communists were aiming to get from this peaceful coexistence, or 'togetherness ', a further rapprochement of the two German states in the sense of a social-political transformation, eastern in origin. On 21 April of this year, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the founding of the SED, Ulbricht expounded once again, and this time in more detail, the East German concept of reunification. According to this, the GDR will 'pursue unwaveringly its socialist construction '. Conversely, 'in the West German Federal Republic there must unquestionably be many changes before the process of association can begin '. According to this new programme, confederation must be preceded by certain prior achievements on the West German side, chief among these being that 'patriotic forces ' must be given more political influence. By such forces, Ulbricht means 'the trade unions, the SPD, the Communist Party, the progressive intelligentsia, and the working peasants '. Further, the state apparatus, police, judiciary, and army, must be purged of 'militaristic, revanchist, and ultra-reactionary

[20] *Neues Deutschland*, 4 October 1961.
[21] Ibid. 1 March 1961.
[22] Oberstleutnant Effenberger, 'Armee in nationaler Mission ', *Die Volksarmee*, No. 39, 1961, supplement, No. 9, p. 8 f.
[23] *Neues Deutschland*, 30 December 1956.

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elements', and finally 'the workers, peasants, the progressive intelligentsia, and the democratically-minded forces of the bourgeoisie' must be given official state functions. Only then will democracy be achieved, 'which in West Germany is needed if the road to the fatherland of all Germans is to be taken'.[24]

In East German publications the GDR herself is dubbed 'the fatherland of all Germans' whenever the occasion permits. Assuming that the GDR leadership does not have it in mind to annex West Germany—an absurd notion—then this terminology can be understood only as a renunciation of reunification. It suggests that East German utterances on the national question, especially when most exaggerated and when the alleged readiness for peace is militantly underscored, are best regarded as expressions of a national neurosis, understandable enough in the light of the discrepancies between them and the outside world. It is really fantastic to attempt to balance a policy which seeks at one and the same time to identify itself with the interests of the Soviet Union, to live up to proletarian internationalism, and to have pretensions to being the German national state. This seems to be the chief contradiction of the German communists: that they wish to 'make a state' out of a tenure lent them by a foreign power, and yet also to lead and unite the whole nation behind them.

WHATEVER the future development of Soviet policy towards Germany may be—and there is not a scrap of evidence for any striking change—the SED leadership under Walter Ulbricht must face the question of the future of the GDR. Theoretically, this question might admit of three possible answers. First, the GDR will become one state among all the European states, inhabited by a German-speaking population, and like Austria governed on grounds of historical development and geographical position by special political conditions which would allow a rapprochement with the other German state only within the framework of a larger European security system or together with other members.

Second, the GDR is temporarily led by a revolutionary party prepared, in the interests of a wider sphere of action, to surrender its present position of state power for the role of an opposition within a united Germany.

Third, the GDR is the only true German state, guarding and nurturing the national heritage, whose historic mission lies in the absorption of other German areas after such time as 'the democratic forces of workers, peasants, and progressive bourgeoisie' shall have prevailed there.

This allows us to pose the question of the GDR's function as it is reflected in the consciousness of her ruling stratum: is the GDR to become one German state alongside two others in Europe? Is she the operational field of an all-German Communist Party, temporarily

[24] Ibid. 22 April 1966.

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disguised in garments of state? or is she the only legitimate German state?

The hubris of power would lead the German communist, agitating in what by comparison with other regimes is remarkable political and ideological isolation, to strive for the third possibility as a solution to the German problem. But in view of the Western constellation, to strive thus would be to deceive himself. Over and above this there are clear signs that the east European states also, while admittedly upholding the GDR's present status as justified, will not support any expansion by her into other German territory.

To follow the second possibility is less attractive for the younger stratum of leaders in the GDR. It is a controversial point just how far an adequate sense of statehood has been developed in the GDR; yet indisputably a good many younger wielders of state and economic power betray a state of mind that has long since taken leave of the German Empire as fashioned by Bismarck.

So we are left with the first solution alone as a goal that seems capable of attainment. But this view of the future would demand of the GDR a different policy. The West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and the East German Chairman of the State Council Walter Ulbricht declared recently, for once in agreement, that the postwar period has ended. Such a realisation must be followed by deeds—on both sides—if East-West German policy is not dangerously to entangle itself still further in contradictions and unbelievable follies. Starting from East German *raison d'état*, this would consequently entail a revision of policy for the regime. She would have to realise that, apart from her alliance with the Soviets, her future will not be decided 'via Calcutta to Paris' (that is, not in Africa and Asia), but in Germany alone.

The crisis of the Atlantic partnership and of West European integration may see the German Federal Republic on the way to an intensive 'national' policy, especially as in internal politics the activities of the radical right wing mobilize the nationalists within the Bonn parties. Will the GDR be able to meet a West German challenge of this kind? The manoeuvres around the exchange of speakers showed that the GDR leadership is at the very least unsure of the support of a considerable part of the East German populace. How could it be otherwise, when previously the inhabitants of the GDR have been less directed than confused by their government on national questions? The East German regime will be able to withstand any future debate with a national West German state only when it has a more democratic society to offer as alternative. The democratic alternative, however, would have first to be developed and brought about with the people of East Germany; at the time of writing, the GDR is not ready for a serious all-German challenge, regardless of whether this were to come from an exchange of speakers, from the removal of the Wall, from a referendum, or even from civil war. For the GDR the primacy of foreign policy demands the primacy of home policy.

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THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND EASTERN EUROPE

Hansjakob Stehle

ANYBODY using the words 'Eastern policy' (*Ostpolitik*) in Bonn today touches upon problems that have connotations both for home and for foreign affairs. The rebuilding of Germany as the unified nation-state which perished twenty years ago after little more than three score and ten years of independent existence is one of the main objectives the Federal Republic set itself in its constitution. Yet this task cannot be achieved without the cooperation of those eastern European countries whose frontiers, internal cohesion, and external security, were destroyed by the aggressions of this former German nation-state.

For a long time German policy-makers were convinced that 'Moscow held the keys to German reunification', a belief which seemed to relieve them of all efforts to establish proper diplomatic relations with the (then) satellite countries to the east. When, without deriving much benefit from these contacts, West Germany reestablished diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in 1955, Czech and Polish soundings regarding the normalisation of their relations with the Federal Republic became clearly audible. For years, however, Bonn turned a deaf ear to these overtures, notwithstanding gentle British and American prodding to restore the severed connections with eastern Europe.

In this way the first period of destalinisation passed, and the narrowly legalistic formalism of the so-called 'Hallstein doctrine' was allowed to serve as an excuse for Germany's protracted inactivity. Originally designed to deny the GDR, the communist-controlled, truncated part of Germany, any diplomatic recognition, the Hallstein doctrine increasingly defeated its own purpose by preventing the Federal Republic from establishing diplomatic relations with countries within the communist system of alliances which had already recognised the GDR. The doctrine found its most dramatic application in 1957 when, after Belgrade had recognised the GDR, relations with Yugoslavia were broken off. After that the Federal Republic regarded it as impossible to embark on new initiatives in any of the east European capitals. Towards the end of 1958, Khrushchev's new strategy of Berlin ultimata and the steadily increasing agitation of east European communists against what they termed Bonn's 'revanchist' policies, encouraged the policy-makers in the Federal Republic to abandon any initiatives of their own. Timid efforts towards the end of the Adenauer era to establish contacts with Warsaw came to nothing, particularly when sponsored by Herr Beitz, the representative of Krupp's. This was due both to inadequate diplomatic preparation and to the fact that Poland had meanwhile increased the price for her cooperation, making the

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unequivocal recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier a precondition of normalisation.

Only with the advent of the Schroeder-Erhard regime did Bonn begin to reactivate within carefully defined limits its eastern policies. It did so partly under the illusion that the increasingly independent states of eastern Europe could be won over to policies more critical of the GDR and, indeed, of her Russian protector, and partly because it was more generally realised by all West German parties that reunification—however far off—could not be attained unless Germany's immediate neighbours were given some convincing, cast-iron guarantees. It had only slowly and comparatively recently dawned upon politically influential quarters in the Federal Republic that such guarantees must, of course, include explicit assurances as to Germany's emerging military role and geographical status, that is, as to the frontiers by which she intended to be bound.

THE Federal Republic's 'peace note' of 24 March 1966, handed to all governments including those of eastern Europe, indicates the self-imposed limits within which these tendencies have to operate. They reveal for the first time a willingness to consider the limitation of European armaments (along the lines of the Rapacki and Gomulka plans), provided any such agreement 'would actively promote the resolution of political problems in Central Europe'. This seems to make reunification in accordance with the wishes of the Federal Republic a precondition for any concessions on her part; and in this context would, no doubt, entail the dismantling of the GDR which—presumably not by accident—was neither mentioned in Bonn's note, nor included in any of the proposed bilateral non-aggression pacts.

Even such proposals, had they embodied a firm statement on the frontiers of the future Germany, might conceivably have interested the countries of eastern Europe. However, instead of outlining borders, or discreetly dropping the subject altogether, Bonn's peace note reproved the Polish Government for insisting on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, notwithstanding the well-known fact that the issue of frontier demarcation must await a peace settlement. For, the argument runs, 'in international law, Germany continues within the boundaries of 31 December 1937, until a freely elected all-German Government recognises different frontiers'. Bonn's professed willingness to discuss 'at an opportune moment' the frontier question, which for Poles, whether communist or not, is not a debatable issue, was bound to cause alarm, intensify ill feeling against the Federal Republic's eastern policies, and add grist to the mill of communist agitation. To make matters worse, by choosing 1937 as the key date, the note, while recognising Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity, described the Munich agreements as 'torn up by Hitler', a turn of phrase which compelled the Czech Government, in solidarity with their Polish neighbours, to reject the

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note, and to demand that Bonn declare the Munich agreements *a priori* invalid.

In spite of the undoubted goodwill of its promoters, the peace note illustrates perhaps more convincingly than any other document the limits to which Germany's eastern policies are confined, and within which diplomatic initiatives will have to operate until the climate of home opinion has changed. It was only due to the gradual airing of the question in the Federal Republic that the memorandum of the Evangelical Churches 'On the Relationship to our Eastern Neighbour' could be published, and this in its turn led to the exchange of letters between German and Polish bishops which created an atmosphere favourable to the drafting of the still inadequate peace note.

'The Federal Government has in many ways tried to improve relations with the states and nations of eastern Europe', the note states, before somewhat startlingly revealing that 'the results of these efforts were by and large satisfactory', a conclusion which was said to encourage the Federal Government 'to persevere in its endeavours'. What endeavours, one might well ask, for east European critics interpret this passage both as a reaffirmation of the Hallstein doctrine and as a demand for frontier rectification. It is open to doubt whether this is, in fact, a correct reading. In all probability the passage refers to the modest, practical results of the new approach to the problem which the Foreign Minister, Herr Schroeder, has been pursuing during the last three years. It led to the establishment of West German trade missions in Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia—late fruits of protracted and all-too-cautious thought processes.

What is the real importance of these trade missions? They came into being only because for the last fifteen years Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania had run similar offices in Frankfurt. They served a genuine commercial purpose in view of the state-monopolist structure of foreign trade in these countries, even though from the start they may on occasion have also been used for other ends. The Federal Republic, with its privately run import and export trade, had, on the other hand, little need for such missions, particularly when one bears in mind that her total trade with all the eastern European countries amounts to less than 4 per cent of her total foreign trade. If nevertheless German trade missions were introduced and staffed by Foreign Office personnel, they were obviously meant to serve political ends, contradictory and limited though they may be. Sceptics regard these missions as nothing more than an alibi for a policy, while enthusiasts really believe them to be the keys to far-reaching developments. Who is right?

All four missions suffer from the same congenital defect; they must not appear to be what in fact they are, substitute diplomatic missions. Their status, scrupulously defined after protracted and delicate negotiations with the host countries, remains nevertheless somewhat hybrid and full of unresolved ambiguities. Under it, diplomatists accustomed to the

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various privileges of their profession find themselves in a far from enviable position; for to them the formal courtesies of the established etiquette are more than empty self-indulgences: they stand for mutual respect and good will, just as the requirements of protocol set the stage on which diplomats can meet the politicians of the host country.

The governments in the four capitals to which the German trade missions are accredited try hard to keep them confined to their nominal activities as trade representatives. At first, and especially in South-East Europe, these missions were merely regarded as staging points on the road to fully-fledged diplomatic representation, which in Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia was not tied to any conditions. However, it became increasingly evident as time went by that the Hallstein doctrine, or rather the Federal Republic's concomitant claim to exclusive representation, barred the way to further political advance. Afraid of trade competition, East Germany for her part did her best to caution her allies, and managed to frighten Prague into rejecting any kind of official contact with the Federal Republic.

SO far the most successful relationship has been established with Rumania, whose own ostentatiously independent foreign policy greatly assisted the de facto normalisation of relations. The head of the mission, Count Yorck von Wartenburg managed at various diplomatic receptions to establish contacts with Rumanian politicians. In May 1965 Bonn's State Secretary Lahr opened an impressive West German industrial exhibition in Bucharest and delivered a somewhat sensational speech. He recalled how the two countries had aided each other 'when dangers threatened Europe'. Although during the war they 'finally' fought on opposite sides, this, according to Lahr, was due to the 'divergent interests of outside powers' rather than to any innate hostility. The State Secretary also passed nimbly over what he called the outdated legacy of war, 'even though in view of the enforced division of our nation, it is particularly hard to bear for us'. Expressing enthusiasm for the new Rumania, he came out in support of coexistence, sentiments which no West German official had as yet publicly voiced in any communist country. Finally, Lahr advocated exchanges of artists, students, and tourists without however offering any modifications in the Federal Republic's visa requirements. Citizens of east European countries have, without exception, to wait four to six weeks before receiving entry visas into the Federal Republic, although West Germans are given tourist visas for any of these countries (Poland excepted) immediately or in a matter of days. Contrary to international usage, transit visas for Poles travelling through the Federal Republic are valid only for 24 hours.

However, when Rumania's Prime Minister, Maurer, impressed by the speech, saw Lahr, he was disappointed to learn that he had nothing to offer in the way of an exchange of ambassadors or the normalisation

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of diplomatic relations (although Herr Schroeder had seriously considered such a step). All that could be achieved was an extension of the trade agreement to 1969, and additional German import licences for Rumania up to 90 million DM. Rumania, like Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland, was to be put on the liberalised east-trade (*Osthandel*) list. These economic concessions were, however, too trifling to secure Germany any political benefits, for although the Federal Republic is Rumania's third biggest trading partner, she accounts only for 6·5 per cent as compared with the Soviet Union's 42 per cent of Rumania's foreign trade.

West German reluctance to make any political concessions prevented Rumania from taking full advantage of her new freedom of manoeuvre. Even so, and in view of the fluidity of the situation, she refrained from indulging in any noisy polemics against the Federal Republic. In May 1966 the West German trade mission assumed some consular functions by granting visas and issuing passports, while leaving the formal and legal protection of her citizens still in the hands of the French embassy. It was perhaps in part because of the irritation caused by Bonn's hesitation that the Rumanian party leader Ceausescu, in his 'independence speech' of 7 May 1966, uttered an emphatic warning against 'giving revanchist Germans access to nuclear armaments'. Progress in economic cooperation, observed Ceausescu, might have extended to other fields, 'had West Germany been able to assess more realistically the present international situation'.

In neighbouring Bulgaria a ten-man trade mission from West Germany has been staying for about eighteen months unobtrusively in the Hotel Balkan, unknown to many politically minded and well-informed Bulgarians. The head of the delegation, Legation Counsellor Hermann, has found it difficult to make any contacts with Bulgarian officials. His staff, like that of the other West German trade missions in east Europe, show a marked reluctance to mix socially with their hosts, apparently frightened off by some deep-seated anxieties compounded of spy mania, anti-communist sentiments, and what might be termed the eastern phobia. In the interests of a steadily growing tourist traffic—more than 100,000 West Germans visited Bulgaria in 1965—Bulgaria authorised its Frankfurt trade mission to issue visas. The West German mission was unable to exercise the same function because of a professed inability to secure the necessary office accommodation—a somewhat surprising statement from the trade mission of a country with a 37 per cent share of the total import-export trade Bulgaria transacts with the West. Bulgaria was also the first east European country to allow German motor-car manufacturers to establish service stations. Such consideration stems, no doubt, from the long tradition of friendship with Germany—an attitude which is, however, also reflected in marked respect for the susceptibilities of the ever-suspicious GDR.

Although Hungary provides a particularly propitious climate for

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political initiatives from West Germany, Legation Counsellor Brückner, who heads the Federal Republic's seven-man trade mission, remains as cut off and isolated as the rest of his colleagues in the east European capitals. The mission is housed in a two-storey villa and Brückner, a jovial and intelligent Bavarian, has tried hard, so far with little success, to establish social contacts. The Federal Republic, accounting for six per cent of Hungarian foreign trade (45 per cent of her trade with the West), is the country's largest Western trading partner. Before the war Germany's share of the Hungarian market amounted to 40 per cent, a position now held by the Soviet Union. The Hungarians would not be averse to a resumption of diplomatic relations, but they object to and will not encourage a substitute solution which only serves to perpetuate the Hallstein doctrine.

The trade mission concept encountered the greatest difficulties in the country where it scored its first apparent success, Poland. Here Berthold Beitz, Krupp's plenipotentiary, making use of his extensive personal contacts which included the Prime Minister, had done much valuable political and psychological spade work. On 7 March 1963, although opposed to any 'substitute solution', the Poles after month-long negotiations finally accepted a German trade mission, fearing perhaps that otherwise their own Frankfurt office might be in jeopardy, and also because they were interested in the long-term trade agreement which Bonn offered. Bernd Mumm von Schwarzenstein, a high-ranking diplomat and former Ambassador to Luxembourg, was put in charge of its Warsaw office. He personified qualities which in the opinion of the Foreign Office were bound to stand him in good stead in his new appointment; he had been a victim of Nazi persecution and is a Protestant and an aristocrat. Yet his two-and-a-half year stay in Poland (he retired at the beginning of 1966) did not yield political dividends. For a long time it proved impossible to find office accommodation for the mission and a suitable residence for its chief. Bonn's thrifty treasury officials had looked for premises in Warsaw that could be suitably converted into an embassy at a later date. Since this might have been interpreted as a political concession, the Poles objected. They did not want to see the status of the trade mission raised. The conditions for the normalisation of diplomatic relations, as they emphasised in their reply to the German peace note of 29 April 1966, included not only the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier, but also the recognition of the GDR, at least as a partner to German reunification. In transmitting its reply, the Polish Government deliberately refrained from making use of the trade mission; instead it asked its ambassador in Copenhagen to hand the note to his West German colleague with the request to have it forwarded to Bonn. This in spite of the fact that Bonn had asked its economic expert, Ambassador Emmel, who happened to be negotiating a trade treaty in Warsaw at the time, to deliver the peace note personally to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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For the Poles the trade mission and its head are politically non-existent. His car neither rates a CD plate nor a national flag. He enjoys such diplomatic privileges as immunity, the right to receive and dispatch coded telegrams, the use of the diplomatic bag, and the usual customs exemptions. But, not being regarded as a member of the diplomatic corps, he was never invited to any of the state and diplomatic receptions, and only as a guest of the other Western embassies could he make any contact with Polish officials. For a diplomat of the old school like Mumm von Schwarzenstein, this, at the end of a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, was difficult to endure. After his retirement it was therefore thought inadvisable to replace him by another career diplomat, to whom the ambiguities of his position were bound to be distressing, but rather by a professional economist, preferably one who had his own personal and informal contacts in Warsaw. Herr Stahlman, of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, is generally regarded as the most likely successor; his appointment has, however, not been confirmed at the time of writing.

CAN economic relations ever replace political ones? This has become a key question in the context of German-Polish relations. The impressive word cooperation that Herr Beitz was so fond of using early in 1965 failed to live up to the extravagant hopes associated with it. It was probably the enormous publicity and some expellee talk about buying the Oder-Neisse territories from Poland which suddenly persuaded the Polish Government to drop the ambitious project of a joint industrial installation. Beitz's grandiose scheme never got off the ground. As a modest beginning a Polish-German machine tool trading company (Depolma) was started and set a pattern subsequently copied by the fashion trade. Early in 1966 Bonn initiated a more generous credit policy, and on 10 May—barely ten days after the receipt of Warsaw's stern reply to the peace note—the Polish-German trade agreement was extended for another three years. Moreover, the waiving of the quota system greatly assisted Polish exports of consumer goods, and even of the capital goods produced by Poland's heavy industries. All this was, no doubt, a result of Herr Schroeder's single-minded determination to make the most of every opportunity that could possibly lead to an improvement of the political atmosphere between the two countries. Even so, formidable obstacles continue to bar the way to a genuine settlement, not only the highly political questions in dispute, but also matters of comparatively marginal interest. To this day the Federal Republic has done very little to indemnify the Polish victims of Nazi outrages. Even the 'Association of Poles in Germany', an insignificant emigré organisation, has for the past ten years been engaged in unsuccessful litigation to recover the property confiscated in 1939.

The example of Czechoslovakia shows how little bearing improved

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trade relations have on the formulation of a viable eastern policy. The cautious Prague politicians, forewarned by the international attention which Bonn's policy of trade missions had caused, played for time. Not only did they forgo the privilege of installing their own trade mission, they also allowed their trade agreement with the Federal Republic to lapse. It expired in 1964 and was not renewed, owing to Prague's refusal to accept the West Berlin clause, which was not part of the original agreement but which with various modifications had been incorporated into the agreements concluded with Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest. Did such Czech reticence harm trade relations? Not in the least. Czechoslovakia has increased her trade with the Federal Republic eightfold since 1948; a quarter of all her electrical equipment and an eighth of her engineering imports come from West Germany; Czechoslovakia is also the port of Hamburg's largest single customer. Without an accredited trade mission, without a trade agreement, Prague opened her frontiers to German—even to Sudeten German—tourists and greatly increased the volume of cultural exchanges. For more than two years now Czech scholars, writers, and artists have formed an accepted part of cultural life in the Federal Republic. Similar exchanges between West Germany and Poland, on the other hand, developed far more slowly; and it is only since the beginning of 1966 that Warsaw has relaxed its restrictions on visits by its cultural elite to Germany, while return visits by West German orchestras, academics, and students remain extraordinarily rare.[1]

Until now the burdensome past as well as substantial political interests and self-erected barriers have conspired to block the emergence of a viable German policy towards east Europe. Its formulation has been further bedevilled by the 'recognition complex' in both Germanies, which compels them to judge every event—apprehensively in Bonn and in East Berlin gleefully—by its impact on 'recognition' or 'improved diplomatic status'. This unfortunate preoccupation with the formal aspects of a situation—the real relevance of which lies in its political implications—has prevented Germany from facing up to existing realities, let alone from trying to modify them.

Some of these hard facts were mentioned in a report which an American diplomat with considerable east European experience submitted to the State Department. 'Eastern nations (he observed) can hardly be expected to encourage developments which would lead a reunified Germany to dispute their territorial integrity and confront

[1] Many of the difficulties are rooted in mutual prejudice. On one occasion, for example, the Bonn Foreign Office advised the Ministry for Family Affairs against giving financial support to a group of young Germans intending to visit Poland, 'because according to Foreign Office experience visits sponsored by the official Youth Tourist Office in Warsaw are mere sightseeing trips designed to be exploited for propaganda purposes without affording any opportunities for social contacts'. In fact the Polish authorities refused entry visas to a number of German youth groups because they too were afraid of too much fraternising.

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them with a host of new security problems.' So far the Federal Republic has steadfastly refused to draw the conclusions implicit in the situation. Afraid of the repercussions at home, it has been only too susceptible to the promptings of powerful pressure groups in all the political parties, advising the policy-makers to await 'a more opportune moment'. Something might turn up—perhaps a shift in the European balance of power, an increase of German strength compelling other nations to take more notice of her, a decline of Soviet influence (due to Chinese pressure)—any of these possibilities, it was hoped, might persuade Russia to conclude a new, if modified, 'Rapallo'.

Speculating on such chances—they are busily though furtively canvassed by a number of German politicians—the actual relationship to Germany's eastern neighbours becomes a topic of secondary importance. Germany's neighbours are naturally aware of these hopes and dread—equally furtively, of course—the nightmare of a new Rapallo. Even though history hardly repeats itself quite so literally, the past is remembered by Germany's neighbours far more vividly than casual observers are led to believe.

When towards the end of September 1925 Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, on his way to a west European watering place, passed through Warsaw, he assured the Poles of Russia's 'natural friendship'. This did not prevent him, while stopping over in Berlin, from showing considerable interest in a note prepared by his German opposite number, Herr Stresemann—incidentally on the verge of leaving for a meeting in Locarno—ventilating 'joint attempts to reduce Poland to her ethnic frontiers'. This, Stresemann informed his guest, was not to imply military action, but on the other hand 'we shall, of course, never voluntarily recognise the Polish frontiers'. The Locarno pact which he brought back soon afterwards contained a general renunciation of the use of force, but on the question of frontiers, Germany explicitly accepted only her western borders. Subsequent treaties in which France first guaranteed the Polish and then the Czech frontiers never quite succeeded in allaying Eastern apprehensions, the less so, as the Berlin agreement with Russia (1926) tended to confirm and strengthen the Locarno structure and allowed the Reichswehr to test its panzers secretly in the Soviet Union. Even in those days Germany could boast a Minister of Transport who in an address to expellee organisations could, to the undisguised dismay of his Prime Minister, demand publicly and militantly that the frontiers be revised.

This brief historical flash-back may illustrate the nature of the nightmare still haunting the peoples, and not only the communists, of eastern Europe. They do realise that the United States presence in Europe and the American-Russian balance of terror have transformed a situation which now bears very little resemblance to that prevailing in the twenties. But the dynamics of the German problem remain explosive enough; indeed, with partition, they have become even more

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dangerous. Even de Gaulle's policy, much as it may appeal to the East, will hardly relieve deep-seated and basic fears. Inherent dangers are, moreover, aggravated by the fact that events in South-East Europe now have immediate repercussions in Central Europe, and that the centralising and centrifugal forces of events can no longer be contained within the countries in which they originate.

Whether these apprehensions are rational is another question; however, even purely psychological factors have to be taken into account, particularly in the formulation of Germany's eastern policy which, perhaps unknown to itself, has the keys to peace in its keeping. To use them judiciously demands the courage to face up to and bear the political consequences of the lost war. This should be easier for the Federal Republic which is, in spite of it all, the most prosperous country in Europe, than it ever was for the Weimar Republic, politically eroded by the stab-in-the-back myth and economically impoverished by recurring crises. Even so, West Germany still needs the help of her allies who, out of a false sense of loyalty, have all too often tried to keep unpalatable truths from her. She also needs the support of her east European neighbours who, fearful of a Nazi revival, tend to arm themselves against ghosts which ultimately can be laid only by neighbourly cooperation between East and West.

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IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLICY

Peter Bender

EVER since the establishment of the Federal Republic, Bonn's reunification policies have suffered from a decisive handicap; namely, that insight into the facts of the situation has always limped years behind the facts themselves. And even when insight was forthcoming, the politicians—mainly for domestic political reasons—did not dare to admit to it publicly. Thus it was many years before what was really self-evident became generally accepted—that not only the Federal Republic in its fear of the Russians and the communists, but also the Soviet Union, felt the need for security. Hence the Federal Republic (with the support, to be sure, of the three western powers) confined itself until the end of the fifties to the demand for free elections for all Germans, and, for a reunited Germany, complete independence in its foreign policy. It seemed oblivious of the fact that these demands could have relevance only to the outward form of Moscow's renunciation of its occupied region of Germany and the surrender of it to the West. Both the government and the Christian-Democratic party refused for a long time even to discuss the *political* problem of how the Soviet Union could be induced to relinquish East Germany. There was an absolute ban on the question of the price that would have to be paid for reunification. Even today this question is avoided as far as possible, although the reason now is a tactical one—the unwisdom of showing one's hand too soon. The government confines itself to the oracular pronouncement that the Federal Republic is prepared for 'sacrifices'. Vague indications that these sacrifices would have to extend to matters such as frontiers, military status, and a system of security [1] are described, either approvingly or critically, as daring. Some politicians toy with the idea that a renunciation of nuclear weapons could induce the Kremlin to renounce East Germany: 'The Federal Republic's complete lack of independence in nuclear questions does away with any incentive to discuss the German problem. Should the Soviet Union concede reunification, the question of security would wear another aspect.' [2]

In addition, it is admitted only indirectly, if at all, that the discussion about a possible price to be paid for reunification has today no relevance (if indeed it ever had). Bonn does concede that, since 1955 at the latest, the Soviet Union's policy on reunification has been undeviatingly, although with varying tactics, directed towards stabilising the partition of Germany. Yet, in spite of all this, the attempt is made

[1] Cf. Gradl, Federal minister for the expellees, in *Der Spiegel*, 17 January 1966, and a resolution of the Social-Democratic party annual conference of June 1966.

[2] Ernst Majonica, chairman of the foreign policy committee of the Christian-Democratic party. *Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, 1 January 1966.

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to gloss over this fact, either by the formula that it must be made clear to the Soviet Union that the unification of Germany is in its own interests, or by the demand that the cold war must be won and Moscow must be made to see that its attempt to consolidate the East German state is doomed to failure. One political leader only, Franz-Joseph Strauss, has so far dared to say that he cannot conceive how, under present or foreseeable circumstances, a national state consisting of the whole of Germany could again come into being.[3] This utterance immediately brought upon Strauss the rebuke that he was flouting the injunction on reunification enshrined in the Constitution. The reproach came, to be sure, from Erich Mende, the chairman of the Free Democratic party, who for his part had been accused by Strauss's followers of having abandoned the fundamental principles of a common reunification policy. Mende had declared at a press conference, reported in the press on 5 April 1966, that he thought it possible that the Federal Republic might be forced some day to talk and negotiate with the rulers in the Soviet Zone, given the concurrence of the former four occupying powers.

Of course, there is a lot of party political rivalry behind these reciprocal accusations, but it is significant for the contemporary situation how and about what the battle is waged. Strauss made the right diagnosis, but refused to draw the consequences; Mende drew the right consequence, but contested the assumptions on which it was based. If the Soviet Union refuses to give up the German Democratic Republic and cannot be forced to do so, then, for the foreseeable future, the Germans are condemned to live in two separate states. In this situation what other choice have they than to re-establish relations between the two states on as tolerable a basis as possible and with the greatest possible number and variety of contacts! Taken in conjunction, Strauss's and Mende's remarks give a true picture of the German situation. Yet the two attack each other with the same argument—the betrayal of the principles of the reunification policy.

This dispute can serve as one example among many of a highly significant fact, namely, that the only way to introduce a new policy in the Federal Republic is to guarantee that it is merely the continuation of an old one. It is true that most politicians think it important not to appear dogmatic. Lately, also, several have made themselves the spokesmen for a revision of Bonn's reunification ideology. Thus Erich Mende, minister for All-German affairs, declared: 'We cannot in the year 1966 pursue a reunification policy with the platitudes and clichés of the fifties.'[4] And Willy Brandt, Burgomaster of Berlin, said at the SPD conference in June: 'Our situation does not permit us to treat sham formulas like sacred cows—as both inviolable and useless.' Yet whatever Mende and Brandt may have meant, expressions such as 'platitudes', 'clichés', 'sham formulas' keep open a secure line of

[3] *Die Zeit*, 8 April 1966.
[4] *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, 4 February 1966.

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retreat into the safe pastures of orthodoxy. The confusing contradictions between words and deeds in current German politics can be satisfactorily explained only if they are seen as the interplay, the confrontation, and finally the complete confusion between old and new policies.

THERE are many reasons why in West Germany these old ideas have been so indestructible. In the first place there are internal political considerations (above all on the question of the eastern frontiers); then, illusions are still cherished that the Soviet Union might, owing to a change of heart or under some form of pressure, be induced to give up East Germany. Again, ideological conceptions about the 'christian west' which must be defended against 'pagan' communism, still exert a powerful influence, especially on Catholic politicians. Others have still not shaken off the fear—long since become baseless—that the people of East Germany would regard negotiations with their communist government as a betrayal. Added to all this there is a widespread conviction that the surrender of legal positions would entail the loss of political potentialities as well. It is easy to understand why the politicians think rather in legal than in political terms, since most of them, at any rate in the government camp, are lawyers. At the same time, the over-emphasis of the legal aspect can also be interpreted as the rationalisation of a fear.

It is not possible to understand fully either the Federal Republic's relations with the east, or its military policies, unless this deeply-rooted fear of communists and Russians is constantly borne in mind. One in every five Germans who today live in the Federal Republic personally experienced expulsion from the eastern territories or the reign of communism in the regions between the Elbe and the Oder. The experience has had an even more traumatic effect on some of those who knew of it only by hearsay. Until the beginning of the sixties, security against the east was, for this reason, the most potent of all political catchwords, more potent than reunification. In 1957, one year after the Hungarian revolution, Adenauer gained an absolute majority of votes for the Christian-Democratic party with the slogan 'no experiments' (in policies towards the east). Even in 1961, one of the younger members of the Federal parliament confessed to me that 'just having some information about the communists is enough to arouse the suspicions of our older colleagues'. Bonn was convinced—although it expressed this conviction only by implication—that political deals with the communists would become possible only when the latter had ceased to be communists. When people see no possibility of real action they cling all the more to outward postures. These attitudes have been much modified in recent years but their after-effects are still with us. The tendency to think in terms of dangers to be encountered rather than of possibilities to be explored does not yet seem to have been overcome.

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Another not unimportant reason for this rigid adherence to out-of-date principles is the fact that there is nothing else to hold on to. Reduced to its hard core, Bonn's reunification policy consists of demands (to the four powers that they should re-unite Germany), expectations (that the Kremlin might have a change of heart), and negations (non-recognition of the eastern frontiers of the GDR). The expectations have not been fulfilled—on the contrary, their prospects have become worse; stressing the demands is a course which has had less and less to recommend it as time has passed, because the western powers too are of the opinion that negotiations between Russia and Germany will be of value only if Bonn does not from the outset stonewall any sort of conference by laying down conditions in advance. Thus the only room for manoeuvre left is the attempt to prevent East Berlin from attaining a 'rise in status'. If the Federal Republic were to abandon the dogma of non-recognition of the GDR there would be nothing left which bore even the semblance of a reunification policy.

Finally, the reason why Bonn is so loth to relinquish the claim to the whole of Germany is that this claim has served to cover up Germany's defeat in the war. Any policy based on the present power-political situation—for instance, an attempt to draft a negotiable peace treaty—would abruptly end the illusion that Hitler's defeat could be cancelled out by a victory in the cold war.

THIS kind of attitude can last for only a limited period; the realisation that things could not go on like this was one of the main reasons why German politicians have begun to look about for new possibilities of action. Things had gone so far that, in the Federal Republic as elsewhere, merely to raise the reunification theme brought instant flight. More and more politicians declined to make speeches on 17 June (the day of remembrance for the East German uprising of 1953), and the population used the free day for trips into the countryside. People became more and more dissatisfied with evasions and substitutes for action. Neither Christmas trees at the Berlin Wall nor apostrophes to the right of self-determination could disguise the sterility of the official policies any longer. When Herbert Wehner, vice-chairman of the SPD, spoke out in the Bundestag on 2 December 1965, he only said what others were thinking: 'We need a reunification policy which will be popular with the whole people, because we need everyone's help in carrying it out.' The fear of unpopularity is increasingly motivating the desire for change. Helmut Schmidt, deputy-chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, declared in a press interview: 'Political leaders . . . should be more concerned not to weaken the credibility of democracy by concealing the truth when they are formulating their attitude to the reunification question, particularly the Oder-Neisse frontier.' [5]

[5] *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, 4 March 1966.

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A further reason for relaxing old rules has emerged from the realisation that Bonn's set of principles is placing political obstacles in Germany's own path. 'The Federal Republic's reunification policy must not be hamstrung by the regulations to prevent the recognition of East Germany which make it incapable of carrying out its most important tasks. If the Republic goes on hampering itself in this fashion, it will merely help the SED to do and leave undone just what it pleases.' [6] There are plenty of examples to illustrate Herbert Wehner's words. Bonn could not actively follow up Ulbricht's proposal for an exchange of newspapers between the two parts of Germany because its laws prohibited the sale of communist journals. The SPD-SED exchange-of-speakers project was frustrated in part at least because leading communists who might come to the Federal Republic were threatened with arrest for their responsibility in the shooting of refugees. Many possible meetings between youth groups, sportsmen, trade unionists, artists and scientists, could not take place because communist organisations, emblems, flags, or speeches would have been the unavoidable concomitants of such contacts. East Berlin leaders could put a stop to any discussion they found embarrassing by demanding that the negotiations in such an important matter should be continued between members of the two governments.

This blockade of itself by Bonn has been just as noticeable in foreign affairs. It became clear during the visit of Ulbricht to Egypt in the spring of 1965 that the Hallstein doctrine could sometimes produce results the very opposite of what had been intended—instead of the isolation of the GDR, the isolation of the Federal Republic. When Bonn breaks off relations with a state, only the East Berlin diplomats remain on the spot and become the 'sole' representatives of Germany. In eastern Europe it became obvious that to limit diplomatic representation on the establishment of trade missions was to limit diplomatic activity to trade relations and to prevent nearly every other kind of activity. It became less and less easy to deny that the customary image of East Germany no longer corresponded with reality. Since about 1962 neither Stalinist terror nor the existence of a widely-based opposition has been the main feature of the situation in East Germany, but rather the adjustments to each other of both regime and population. In East Germany, as elsewhere, economics have become more important than politics, provided always that internal security is maintained; and the exigencies of a modern industrial society have now more influence on the daily life of individuals than the decisions of the politburo. In addition, the GDR has grown in international importance. It has increased its trade with western Europe at the Federal Republic's expense; it has representatives in almost all the neutral states (although not yet with ambassadorial status), and is becoming more and

[6] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22 April 1966.

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more active in these quarters; it has managed to get the sometimes reluctant east European states to present a united front with it against Bonn.

Even more important than the cumulative effect of these developments was the shock inflicted on the Federal Republic by the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961. Since the 'defensive' nature of this step was widely misunderstood, the first reaction was concern that this might be the start of aggressive action which would constitute a threat to West Berlin and even to the Federal Republic. After it became manifest that once more it was the East Germans who were the chief sufferers, and after them the citizens of West Berlin, anxiety gave way to bitterness. But even the bitterness gradually diminished and made room for a more unbiased view of the situation. Since about 1962–63, more objective, less prejudiced debates on these questions have been taking place in the Federal Republic. Views which would formerly have aroused the worst suspicions are now accepted as legitimate expressions of opinion worthy of serious discussion.

WITH the policies pursued hitherto, the status quo is unalterable and the outlook hopeless. The growing realisation that this was the real state of affairs was the first result of the Wall's presence. The second came about through the suffering caused in a city by its radical division into two separate parts. The alleviation of this suffering proved to be a necessity to which any principle had to take second place. In December 1963 the West Berliners visited their relatives in the eastern section of the city for the first time since the erection of the Wall. The 'permit agreement' has since been several times renewed—although with interruptions and slight modifications.

This agreement has been extremely important in the formation of German public opinion. For years there had been nothing but setbacks in everything relating to the reunification issue. The communists acted, the west looked on and protested. The cleavage between the two sides grew ever deeper. However modest the improvement brought about by the permit agreement, it was nevertheless the first step forward for many years. A road out of stagnation seemed to be opening up. The permit agreement became the prototype for a new policy of 'small steps'. This change of attitude can be traced through a series of successive slogans. At first everyone shouted 'The Wall must come down'. Then Willy Brandt coined the phrase: 'making the Wall permeable'. Today those who (like the Executive of the Federation of German Trade Unions in spring 1966) make the removal of the Wall a condition for taking up contacts, lay themselves open to the suspicion that they are merely seeking a pretext for avoiding these contacts.

Finally, the growing realisation that in the countries surrounding Germany changes were also taking place, was one of the strongest incentives to modify reunification policy, for in the east communism itself, and in the west the policies towards communism, were both

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changing. The Federal Republic, too, has noted that communism is not necessarily identical with Stalinism, and that the motive power of nationalism can be stronger than any ideological doctrine, but these insights have come later and more slowly than elsewhere. From time to time there has even been some romanticising of the Poles, particularly in intellectual circles. This development had three underlying causes: first, a sense of guilt towards the nation which under Hitler suffered so much; then the irritation with the lack of insight displayed by so many of the leaders of the expellees; lastly, an over-estimation of the extent to which the Polish regime has been liberalised. The increasing paralysis in Poland's domestic policies and its inaccessability for West Germans have in the last few years somewhat dampened the enthusiasm.

Of more significance for the politicians in Bonn was the fact that the Allies were changing their policies towards eastern Europe. The first impulse came from Kennedy, the second from de Gaulle. Ever since 'rolling back' and 'liberation' were struck off the programme in favour of cooperation and a united Europe, Bonn, too, has been forced to modify its attitude in order to avoid isolation. West German politicians are all anxious not to give the impression of being 'disturbers of the peace', particularly as Soviet propaganda is endeavouring, not altogether unsuccessfully, to give Bonn precisely this sort of reputation. The establishment by the Federal Republic of trade missions in all the east European states (Czechoslovakia excepted), sprang from the desire to fall into line with the other Allies.

One final motive for turning more to the east is to be found in the shipwreck of west European hopes. Since de Gaulle started blocking every move towards integration and brought nationalism back on to the scene, the West Germans in their turn have been referred back to a national goal. This has nothing to do with thoughts of Rapallo, but the east is appearing once again on the Federal Republic's horizon.

THE drive for a new policy is strongest among the Social-Democrats and the Free Democrats. The balance sheets of their party conferences, which followed one another closely in June 1966, show a high degree of accord. To be sure, the leaders of both parties profess their adherence to the principles of the old policy, but they interpret them in a manner that allows for new possibilities of political action. Mende, chairman of the FDP, offers what is practically a model for such an accommodation with reality with his demand for 'the setting-up under the aegis of the four victorious powers of three all-German commissions composed equally of delegates from both parts of Germany'.[7] These commissions should examine and debate three sets of themes: (1) individual and tourist travel between the two parts of Germany; (2) industrial and trade relations; (3) exchanges in the fields of culture and sport. Mende bases this proposal on a memorandum from the

[7] First in April 1965, then at his party's conference in June 1966.

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Federal government to the Allies (never made public but known in outline) dated August 1963. In this too there was talk of three all-German commissions—but with different terms of reference: (1) The restoration of freedom of movement and of technical contacts; (2) industrial and trade relations; (3) the drafting of legislation for universal, free, and secret elections under international control. The differences are obvious. The commissions envisaged in the government's memorandum were stages of a reunification time-table to be drawn up after agreement with Moscow. Mende's commissions (in which negotiations about electoral laws play no part) have been made without reference to the reunification question and are concerned solely with 'contributing to a relaxation of the tensions in divided Germany'.[8] In order to maintain four-power responsibility, at least in a formal sense, Mende proposed that Bonn should receive instructions from the three western powers, and the East Berlin government from the Soviet Union, to set up these commissions. As the minister for All-German affairs had himself to admit, the project was wrecked by the opposition of the Christian-Democratic Union (in an interview in *Der Spiegel*, 18 April 1966), which feared the erosion of four-power responsibility and the strengthening of the Soviet two-state theory.

Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social-Democratic party, used arguments similar to those of Mende.[9] The Federal Republic's claim to represent all Germany must be 'adjusted to the changes which have taken place in world affairs'. West Germany should not, out of the principle of non-recognition of the GDR, 'make or cause to be made a chain with which to fetter ourselves'. The FDP demanded full diplomatic relations with the states of eastern Europe. Brandt, for his part, declared: 'The representatives of communist Germany must not be allowed to determine even indirectly where the Federal Republic of Germany should strike its flag.'

On relations between Bonn and East Berlin Brandt asserted: 'Whether we like it or not, the communists have become a political power in the German land.' To explain this remark he described the changes which had taken place in the GDR: industry had registered some remarkable successes; the principle of promotion for performance was gaining ground, so that high positions could be reached by those outside the ranks of the SED; the younger generation of highly qualified professionals was asserting itself more and more; the system was being changed—at all events in part—from within. On the other hand, since the erection of the Wall, hope of getting help from the West had diminished. 'From this several results had followed which were of benefit to the regime.'

[8] In an interview on West German radio, 5 January 1965, printed in the Federal Government White Book: *The efforts of the German government and its allies in the cause of German reunification* (April 1966), p. 515.

[9] The statements of social-democratic politicians quoted below were all made—if not otherwise stated—at the party conference of June 1966.

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No other German politician—with the exception of Mende in some of his remarks—has ever painted so realistic a picture of the GDR. Perhaps Brandt's most important phrase was the following: 'Objectively' East Germany could 'be called a colonial territory of the Soviet Union, although its progress from the status of satellite towards that of partner is unmistakable.' From this remark Helmut Schmidt drew the following conclusion: For no region in the world did international law interpret contacts, even between ministers, as constituting recognition of a state. Albertz, deputy-mayor of West Berlin, declared that it was immaterial what title the East Berlin rulers gave themselves—'they could call themselves emperors of China'. At the party conference Albertz supplemented this remark by saying: 'It is we ourselves who determine in what recognition consists; recognition can take place by design only, never by oversight.'

Erich Mende said the same, in a slightly more discreet manner: 'Between our attitude and recognition—which we totally reject—there lies an empty space of which much better use could be made.' Both the Social-Democrats and the Free Democrats have long been in no doubt as to whether the Federal Republic has or has not an interest in the economic prosperity of the GDR. According to Brandt: 'Surely we cannot wish that our fellow-countrymen should be badly off . . . We have no reason to feel sorry if Soviet Zone industry is able to establish itself in world markets.' Mende also mentioned the political consequences: 'If an increase in its trade helps to consolidate the regime, we will have to put up with that, for at the same time the standard of living will rise and there is the further hope that other conditions over there will also improve, not least those relating to the liberty of the individual.'[10] Liberalisation and consolidation are interdependent; if the West wants the one, it must also put up with the other. No politician before Mende had ever publicly accepted this logical conclusion.

There is less clarity whenever the question of institutional associations between east and west comes up. Brandt rejected the East Berlin plan for a confederation, but thought it might be possible 'for a strictly limited period' to enter upon a 'qualified, regulated form of coexistence between the two territories, provided the switches are set by international decision and freedom of opinion is allowed to develop in the other part of Germany. It would be a matter of establishing a modus vivendi, but with the determined aim to proceed to further political solutions'. The significance of these remarks is clearly highlighted by comparing them with another, still valid declaration by the former minister of internal affairs, now foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder: 'The procedure of reunification can begin only when every detail of the process has been clarified and there is a certainty that the

[10] *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, 4 February 1966.

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agreements concerning it will be carried out without a hitch.'[11] Brandt spoke of an 'aim', Schröder of a 'certainty'. Helmut Schmidt was even more explicit than his leader: 'Having set our sights we must be prepared to take the first steps even though the later stages of the journey have not been plotted in advance.' Herbert Wehner, vice-chairman of the SPD, argued that anyone who rejects a 'German alliance' (between the Federal Republic and the GDR) as a possible station on the road is acting unrealistically, 'because he is not taking into account the possibilities of exerting an influence in the GDR.'[12]

IT is in remarks such as these that the deepest rift between the SPD and the Christian-Democrats is made manifest. In the opinion of the Christian Social Union the reunification policy is an international affair; Bonn's part in it is essentially limited to inducing the three western powers to negotiate with the Soviet Union. To be sure, the Christian-Democrats agree in theory that efforts should be made to improve the lot of the East Germans and to strengthen private ties with them, but in practice they generally regard such efforts with suspicion, because they fear that they may lead a 'rise in status' for East Berlin. The Social-Democrats see little chance of a four-power agreement. They realise, of course, that the problem of Germany cannot be solved by the Germans on their own. But they think in dynamic terms. By adopting a comprehensive policy for the relaxing of tension they hope to improve relations with eastern Europe, and within Germany itself to usher in a process which will gradually loosen up the situation, alter conditions in East Germany, and later perhaps even have international repercussions. Instead of continuing to call for reunification without any prospect of success, the SPD (and increasingly the FDP also) is concentrating on a policy of 'small', 'medium sized', and 'practicable' advances. At first glance there appears in all this to be only a difference of degree, but the point at which quantity changes suddenly into quality can, provided both remain consistent, be foreseen. Perhaps this point was already reached when Brandt declared that to help the people of East Germany and to promote harmonious relations with them was the *all-important political* problem. As is clear in Mende's commissions proposal, the Free Democrats are here following in the footsteps of the Social-Democrats; however, the former still nurse stronger hopes of successful negotiations between the four powers than do the Social-Democrats.

The implications for the manner in which our foreign affairs should be conducted are self-evident. It is true that all the parties without exception emphasise their desire for peace, a relaxation of tension, and disarmament. But the CDU—and some Free Democrats also—would like every step in this direction to be accompanied by some advance

[11] *Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic*, 12 June 1958, p. 1048.
[12] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22 April 1966.

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along the road to reunification. (This is one reason why Bonn's 'peace note' of March 1966 met with such a poor reception in eastern Europe and elsewhere.) The SPD, on the other hand, seems to have struggled through to the realisation that relaxation of tension must be the first priority. Brandt called for a triple policy of safeguards for peace, relaxation of tension, and the solution of the German problem, without impracticable conditions laid down in advance. The SPD and the Free Democrats want Bonn to renounce the claim to share in the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons. On this question the CDU is divided. Convinced as they are that there is 'no road to Germany which does not pass through Europe', the SPD leaders are pleading for participation in de Gaulle's east European policies. On this the CDU stands somewhat aloof while the Free Democrats take up a position between the two, but nearer to the SPD.

These differences are becoming just as obvious in domestic German politics. The Social-Democrats' decision to enter into correspondence with the Socialist Unity party, to agree on an exchange of speakers, and to nominate for this project the three party leaders Brandt, Wehner, and Erler, put the CDU in a difficult position. Its embarrassment increased when the Free Democrats associated themselves with the SPD and made contact with the Liberal-Democratic party in the GDR. The Christian-Democrats were faced with the threat of isolation, or alternatively of being dragged in the wake of the opposition. They have even tried sporadically to associate themselves with the efforts for east-west contacts. This can be equally correctly interpreted as caution or deference to public opinion, but undoubtedly nothing shows up more clearly the change of mood and opinion in the Federal Republic than the fumbling uncertainty of the government party which has to make the decisions. When, seven years before, the Social-Democrats published their 'Plan for Germany', the essence of which was the dynamic consideration that the east could be changed by means of direct confrontations, the conservatives launched a barrage of charges which quickly forced the Social-Democrats to pull back. Even now most of the members of the CDU were not quite happy about the experiment on which the SPD was engaged; but they had neither the courage, the power, nor the support of the majority in their own party to oppose it publicly and unequivocally. Doubts whether the old policy can make any headway have infiltrated the government party also.

Opinions within the CDU cover a wide spectrum. The groupings into 'Atlanticists' and 'Gaullists' also influence judgments on the situation in the east. Thus the two 'Gaullists', Adenauer (who once upon a time regarded the Soviet Union as a 'deadly enemy'), and Gerstenmaier, the Bundestag President, declared that the Soviet Union also desired peace; and Franz-Joseph Strauss said in the Federal Parliament on 17 May 1966 that in his view Moscow did not want even a communist reunited Germany because its power potential would be too great. Erhard contradicted Adenauer, and Schröder was emphatic that the

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threat of the Soviet Union had not grown less. On the other hand, Schröder supported the SPD project for an exchange of speakers, which Adenauer, Gerstenmaier, and, with certain reservations, Strauss also, rejected. But even in the CDU there are today some leading politicians whose outlook does not differ greatly from that of the SPD. For example, one of the most powerful men in the party, vice-chairman Barzel, leader of the parliamentary group, while avoiding any definite commitment, declared that he was ready to speak in Dresden. It was Barzel, too, who pressed for all-party discussions on the German question, who has continually stressed the ways in which the GDR might be 'influenced', and who is fully aware of the impossibility of combining nuclear ambitions with a viable eastern policy. However, his over-cautious tactics have prevented him from exercising a decisive influence, or perhaps this was due rather to the realistic consideration that only formulas of compromise could hold together a party made up of so many disparate elements. And so Barzel's pronouncements, which have sometimes altered from day to day, have provoked scepticism among commentators.

SO for the time being West Germany will remain the battleground of conflicting forces. In parliament there is already a majority in support of a new policy. But all this is as yet only theory. In the first place there is still only the germ of a new policy; furthermore it is extremely improbable that the Free Democrats will see their way to a change of coalition partners. Supported largely by 'bourgeois' voters, and in fear that their vote might fall below the five per cent which entitles a party to representation in the Bundestag, the FDP shuns experiments; nor is it certain that the SPD is interested in forming a coalition with them. Influential Social-Democrats believe that only with the cooperation of the CDU can basic changes in West German policy be initiated and carried through. The SPD is probably waiting in expectation that the Christian Democrats, or at any rate substantial numbers of them, will be unable to remain outside of the general swing in public opinion. The Social-Democratic leaders can find support for this view in their own recent experience. Even as late as the 1965 election campaign, they did not dare to highlight the reunification theme. Afterwards, however, the opposition within the SPD itself, but above all the favourable public response to the exchange-of-speakers project, encouraged the party leaders to stick out their necks as far as they did at the party conference in June 1966.

The forces of revision are probably already more numerous than the defenders of orthodoxy. In the autumn of 1965, the Evangelical Church published a memorandum on the Oder-Neisse problem; soon afterwards, the Catholic bishops of Germany exchanged open letters with the Polish bishops. These manifestations did not acquire political significance because they brought new insights or led to consequences which no-one had foreseen. On the contrary! The Evangelical

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memorandum is itself the outcome of a compromise, and only indirectly recommends the renunciation of Germany's former eastern provinces. What is important is that behind these pronouncements (as behind Adenauer's remark about the peace-loving Soviet Union) are authorities that even those with conservative views have to respect.

The opposition has already been put on the defensive. Its occasional noisy interventions reflect the recognition that it is fighting for a forlorn hope. Very significant was the remark by Wenzel Jaksch, president of the Association of Expellees, at a big demonstration: 'We . . . are making no new demands about policy towards the East. We only ask that the Federal government and the Federal parliament should keep their word.' A CDU newspaper reported the demonstration under the headline: 'Expellees are sick of being caricatured.' [13] Among the leading politicians in all the parties there are today but few who still seriously believe that changes can be made in the Oder-Neisse line. The only reason why Bonn clings to a policy so completely divorced from reality is because the expellees from the eastern provinces still constitute the largest and most powerful of all the pressure groups (about 10 million strong)—much more powerful than the refugees from the GDR (about three to three and a half million). After a period of sometimes embarrassing opportunism, the Social-Democrats at their party conference went a long way—further than the other parties—in revising this attitude as well. Brandt said that many people behaved 'as if we owned the territories east of the Oder-Neisse'. Helmut Schmidt demanded that the 'unconditional legal claim to the frontiers of 1937' should be abandoned. He gave as his reason that any reunification treaty between east and west would become progressively more improbable, the more it was cluttered up with frontier problems.

Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the effects of the ensuing disappointment, if expectations that have been raised too high are not fulfilled. This will certainly not affect the Social-Democratic leaders, but there will be a very different reaction in some sections of the population. The favourable response to the exchange-of-speakers project confirms the old suspicion that the much denounced indifference of the West Germans can largely be explained by the atmosphere of hopelessness surrounding all the reunification policies pursued hitherto. Now that something is being done, interest is growing; but illusions are growing too. Examples of naive reporting on the GDR and of the fashionable quest for contacts are becoming more frequent. A swing too far in one direction only causes a swing too far in the other. Some time will have to pass before the extreme oscillations of the pendulum have subsided into a sensible central position. Nevertheless it can safely be said that West German policies have now a better chance than ever before of catching up with reality.

[13] *Kölnische Rundschau*, 15 May 1966.

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THE HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE

Hans Speier

THE so-called Hallstein doctrine, as formulated in December 1955, was primarily intended to warn neutral and non-aligned states not to recognise the GDR since the Federal Government, claiming to speak for Germany as a whole, would regard such recognition as an unfriendly act. Heinrich von Brentano explained in the Bundestag on 28 June 1956:

> The recognition of the 'GDR' means recognition . . . of the division of Germany into two states. Reunification would then no longer be the elimination of a transitional disturbance in the organism of our all-German state; rather it would be transformed into the infinitely more difficult task of unifying two different German states. . . . The recognition of the 'GDR' by third states would have to be regarded by the Federal Government as agreement to the unlawful splitting off of a part of the territory under German sovereignty and as interference with domestic German affairs. Legally the unity of Germany as a state has not perished. . . .[1]

According to international practice, a government saying that another government has committed an unfriendly act is likely to break off relations with that government or take even more drastic counteraction. Thus the Hallstein doctrine is meant to put other governments on notice that their recognition of the GDR will adversely affect their relations with the Federal Republic.

The Hallstein doctrine was formulated in December 1955 in order to protect a principle of German foreign policy that three months earlier the Adenauer government itself had felt obliged to violate. In September Adenauer visited the Soviet Union and agreed to an exchange of ambassadors between Moscow and Bonn. Since that time the Soviet Union has been the only major power maintaining diplomatic relations with both German states. Should Bonn ever enter with East Berlin into negotiations more momentous than those conducted in the past via the West Berlin Senate, the *Treuhandstelle* in Berlin, and occasionally through Bundestag deputies or businessmen, it may yet become important that the Soviet government has ready access to both Bonn and East Berlin; the possibility of acting as arbiter between them may give to the Soviet government an advantage which the Western governments lack.

In 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev were interested in stabilising the political status quo in divided Germany by establishing diplomatic

[1] Cited by Rudolf Schuster, 'Die "Hallstein Doctrine",' *Europa Archiv*, 25 September 1963.

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relations with the Federal Government as well as the GDR. Adenauer acted against the counsel of his senior advisers on foreign affairs—von Brentano, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn—and handed a diplomatic success to the Russians. He did not get much more in return than the review of a military honour guard, lavish banquets, and a performance of *Romeo and Juliet*. It is true the Soviet leaders undertook to release 10,000 German prisoners of war who were still being retained in the Soviet Union. The Russians denied knowing anything about an additional 80,000 German civilian internees mentioned by the German delegation, but promised to release them too, should they be found. It took nine months of negotiations and West German agreement to an expansion of Soviet-German trade to obtain the release of most of these civilians. Forty-eight hours after the departure of the West German delegation from Moscow, however, an East German delegation headed by Premier Grotewohl arrived in the Kremlin. After three days, it brought home a joint communiqué in which the Soviet government pledged the release of German prisoners of war in response to a written request by the GDR, dated 27 July, and of the more recently expressed wish of the Federal Republic. In addition, the Soviet government granted to the sovereign GDR the right to control civilian traffic between West Germany and West Berlin. On 3 October 1955, the Western powers formally protested against this relegation of control to the GDR. On 18 October the Soviet government rejected the protest, insisting on the right of the GDR to exercise sovereignty on its territory.

Adenauer negotiated in Moscow from a position of weakness in consequence of international events and for domestic political reasons. In order to maintain close rapport with the Western allies, the German Chancellor had to take account of the fact that at the time he went to Moscow his allies were under the spell of the spirit generated in July at the Geneva summit conference. As Anthony Eden has observed, 'Each country present [at that meeting] learnt that no country attending wanted war and each understood why. . . . In the minds of the men who commanded power in the world, the lessons of the Conference might result in a reduced risk of total destruction to the human race.'[2] Similarly, Wilhelm Grewe remarked, 'Critics who were sceptical regarding the German question, as for example Walter Lippmann, considered the result of Geneva primarily to be a tacit renunciation of war by the atomic world powers on the basis of the status quo'.[3] After the Geneva conference Adenauer could not afford to let himself be called, either abroad or at home, 'the last Mohican of the cold war'.

In West Germany, the Social-Democratic Party was at that time prepared to oppose the government's foreign policy, and could have made life difficult for Adenauer had he rejected the Soviet invitation to come to Moscow. In an opinion survey conducted in August 1955,

[2] Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (Boston, 1960), p. 340.
[3] Wilhelm Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, 1960), p. 217.

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before the Chancellor left for Russia, the majority of the respondents proposed that the Chancellor should discuss with Bulganin and Khrushchev the issue of reunification, while those recommending negotiations on the return of prisoners and the maintenance of peace were in the minority. Regarding the prospects of the Moscow conference, as many as 31 per cent believed that the visit would be crowned by success. Only 24 per cent expected the Soviet leaders not to make some concessions (45 per cent were uncertain regarding the outcome of the visit or expressed no opinion).[4] This public optimism had been stirred up by a large number of German journalists who in the summer of 1955 had returned from the Soviet Union with euphoric notions about the prospects of coexistence, lamenting Western cold war propaganda and its 'fairy tale of "the unhappy slaves"' in the East. They predicted that Soviet society would assume an 'absolutely middle-class' character in the future.

In Moscow the going was rough for Adenauer and his delegation. Carlo Schmid, then SPD vice-chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, appealed to Soviet magnanimity (for which Adenauer later thanked him) in order to make some progress at least on the prisoners-of-war issue, but Adenauer did not succeed in getting a Soviet commitment in writing; this the Russians had reserved for Grotewohl. The issue of reunification was not discussed at all.

The only Soviet concession consisted in officially receiving a juridical reservation on which the Germans insisted in connection with their agreement to normalise diplomatic relations. The Soviet government restated in turn its position. This procedure was sufficient to make it clear that the Germans did not intend to recognise by implication the existing territorial status in Europe and that Soviet policy was in no way affected by the German reservation. Following Bulganin's suggestion, Adenauer read the German statement at a press conference on 14 September, shortly before it was transmitted to the Soviet Government:

> The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the USSR represents no recognition of the present status of their respective territories. The final determination of the borders of Germany is reserved for the peace treaty.

The Soviet declaration was published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry the next day:

> With reference to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Government the government of the USSR deems it necessary to declare that the question of the German borders has been solved by the Potsdam Agreement

[4] *EMNID-Informationen*, 20 August 1955, quoted by Gerard Braunthal. 'An Agreement with the Russians', in J. B. Christopher, ed., *Cases in Comparative Politics* (Boston, 1965), p. 265.

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and that the German Federal Republic exercises jurisdiction on the territory on which it has sovereignty.[5]

Note that the Soviet declaration did not speak of the Federal Republic of Germany, but of the 'German Federal Republic', thus putting West Germany even in name on a par with East Germany.

THE Hallstein doctrine was formulated in December 1955 at a conference of German ambassadors who were called to Bonn in order to consider how to prevent other states from recognising both German states. The fact that Adenauer himself had enabled Moscow to set this example was seen as inevitable, since cooperation of the Soviet Government would be needed for the restoration of German unity. This argument has been repeated many times; to this day it is not quite conclusive. It was not the Federal Republic but the Soviet Union which sought the exchange of ambassadors, and it did so in furtherance of its contention that two German states existed. Brentano considered tendering his resignation in disapproval of the poor bargain that Adenauer had made. The arrangement that was reached may have been a politically inevitable consequence of the spirit of Geneva, given West Germany's dependence on her allies, or of West German domestic politics, but it was not sought by the Germans in order to create one of the preconditions of reunification. If anything, this agreement reduced the chances of reunification by helping to confirm the status quo.

The main question before the conference of ambassadors in Bonn was how to prevent other governments from establishing diplomatic relations with the rival regime of the GDR. The Western allies were pledged to consider the Federal Government as the only legitimate German government, and they presented no problem. With regard to Russia's allies, which had already recognised the GDR, the principal question was whether the Federal Government should refuse to exchange ambassadors with any of these states (even with the reservation filed in Moscow) in order to prevent dual representation in the capitals of eastern Europe, or whether it should rather seek to establish such embassies, if an opportunity arose, in order not to leave the field to the GDR. The second alternative gained some favour only in the sixties, especially after the Middle Eastern crisis in 1965. To many Germans, this alternative appeared preposterous ten years earlier. Wilhelm Grewe, the architect of the misnamed Hallstein doctrine, strongly argued as late as 1960 against establishing diplomatic relations with communist states that had such relations with the GDR. If the Federal Government were to do so, he wrote, the allies of West Germany and a few other states would probably continue not to recognise the GDR, but 'about thirty to fifty states of the neutral and non-aligned world' would undoubtedly follow a different course

[5] Cited by Wilhelm Grewe, op. cit. p. 221.

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by recognising the GDR. The Federal Republic would simply have no pertinent argument to deter Cairo, New Delhi, or Jakarta from entertaining diplomatic relations with both German states, if it enabled Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague to have such dual representation. Grewe characterised the successful application of a double standard based on the distinction between communist states that have recognised the GDR for years and other, neutral or non-aligned, states that have not, as 'pure utopia'.[6]

As far as the non-aligned states are concerned, the Federal Republic has been remarkably successful in asserting its claim to represent Germany; this is true at least if diplomatic recognition is used as a criterion of success. By 1956, the year in which the first West German ambassador arrived in Moscow, the Federal Republic had established 47 embassies and 21 legations. Nine years later, West Germany had diplomatic relations with 97 sovereign states which on their part did not entertain such relations with 'the Soviet Zone of occupation'.[7]

This growth in diplomatic representation of the Federal Republic abroad has been a consequence of the process of decolonisation, of Western economic power, and of the Hallstein doctrine. Given their neutralist leanings, many of the new states might have established diplomatic relations with both Germanys had it not been for the doctrine. Such a development would have been a marked setback for the Western policy on Germany; by lowering the international standing of the Federal Republic it would have added considerable political weight to the two-state theory in the non-communist world. It would also have made inevitable the entry of the GDR into international organisations, in which it now has but a few seats; as matters stand, the GDR has been most successful in gaining recognition in international sport organisations.

By recognising the Federal Republic and not the GDR, the new non-aligned states in fact aligned themselves on the side of the West. The facts do not appear to be fairly assessed in Rüdiger Altmann's observation that 'the neutralist states of Asia and Africa, when denying international recognition to the zonal State, were able to refer to their neutralism—their refusal to participate in the East-West conflict'.[8] They did recognise only the Federal Republic, which lies on this side of the dividing line.

It is true that several new states, such as Guinea and Mali, went through intense conflicts with the colonial powers from which they gained their independence and were therefore tempted to move closer to the GDR rather than the Federal Republic. In some other neutral

[6] Wilhelm Grewe, op. cit. 151.

[7] Auswärtiges Amt, *Vertretungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Ausland*, 1 September 1956; Communiqué of the Federal Government of 7 March 1965, *News from the German Embassy*, Washington, D.C., 11 March 1965.

[8] Rüdiger Altmann, 'Überlegungen zur deutschen Aussenpolitik', *Der Monat*, April 1965, p. 11.

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states, security considerations arising from geography led to prudent respect for communist interests so that the stock of West Germany fell; this was true, for example, of Burma, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Sukarno came close to recognising the GDR in exchange for Soviet support of his territorial ambitions. India seemed to believe that utterances favouring the Soviet two-state theory on Germany furthered the cause of world peace. And yet, by 1966, the GDR had embassies only in communist countries, including China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba.

Tito permitted a legation of the GDR to be established in his country in 1957. This led to the diplomatic break between the Federal Republic and Yugoslavia. Albrecht von Kessel, then a high official of the West German foreign service in Washington, had the impression that Georg Pfleiderer, a vocal opponent of the Hallstein doctrine and at the time West German ambassador in Belgrade, was not forceful enough in trying to dissuade Tito from recognising the GDR. 'Until the end, the Yugoslav government did not believe that Bonn's warnings and threats were meant seriously.'[9] But neither Tito nor the heads of other communist governments have succeeded at any meeting of the non-aligned governments or at any Afro-Asian conference in persuading other states to follow Tito in recognising the GDR.

In January 1963 the Federal Government broke off relations with Castro. Occasionally, Bonn took less drastic retaliatory measures against lesser 'unfriendly acts'; for example, economic aid to Ceylon was terminated in the spring of 1964, in response to the establishment of a GDR consulate-general in Colombo, and military aid to Tanzania was cancelled in February 1965 in answer to the opening of an East German consulate-general in Dar-es-Salaam.

Nine years earlier, when the doctrine was formulated, economic means—technical, economic, and military assistance, or its punitive withdrawal—for gaining in the new nations respect for Bonn's all-German interests, played virtually no role. The Ministry for Economic Development was created only in 1961. Since then, German economic aid has become a politically usable, if often economically wasteful, instrument supplementing the diplomatic instrument of the Hallstein doctrine.

It is often pointed out that the Hallstein doctrine makes the Federal Republic vulnerable to blackmail. Certain non-aligned countries, it is said, can extort economic aid from West Germany merely by threatening recognition of the GDR or non-recognition of West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic, or they can threaten to accept East German offers of aid in the hope that West Germany will then outbid the GDR. To be sure, facts can be cited in support of these arguments, for example in respect to relations with Ben Bella and Sukarno; but it is not quite clear what the argument is supposed to prove. Is its meaning that for moral and legalistic reasons the GDR

[9] Albrecht von Kessel in *Die Welt*, 26 February 1964.

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ought not to be recognised, but that the decision to abstain from such recognition becomes worthless if taken by the new states on grounds of economic expediency? Correlatively, should West Germany refuse to pay a price for asserting its claim to exclusive legitimacy among neutral and non-aligned countries? Clearly this would be an absurdly purist view to hold.

The new nations are faced with political and economic problems of their own, which to them have a great deal more meaning and weight than has the division of Germany. There is nothing surprising or shocking in the fact that German economic or military aid to a new state can be used to impress upon that state the importance of political interests which the Federal Republic considers vital. The only sensible criteria for judging whether or not such a 'bribe' for political ends is worth the price seem to be its political success and the value put on that success. The critics who attack the Hallstein doctrine because it renders the Federal Republic vulnerable to economic blackmail fail to recognise that such vulnerability would exist even in the absence of the doctrine, so long as both West and East Germany in pursuit of their respective political interests are willing to offer 'bribes' in the form of aid. The GDR cannot hope to match West Germany's economic resources, but in giving aid to Africa it occupies the third place among the communist countries, preceded only by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

In vying with the Federal Republic for diplomatic recognition abroad the GDR has failed, but it has made determined efforts to assert its presence in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, if only below the ambassadorial level. To the extent that these efforts have been successful they testify to the gradual, partial erosion of the Hallstein doctrine; paradoxically they testify also to its efficacy. Wherever the GDR established a legation, a consulate-general, a consulate, a trade mission, or a lesser foothold, Ulbricht would have preferred to have an ambassador accredited. Conversely, whenever the GDR did succeed in making its presence felt, if only in the form of a trade mission or a consulate, the Federal Republic would have preferred total failure of the GDR.

In addition to the twelve communist states in which the GDR has embassies, and to Yugoslavia where it maintains a legation, the GDR has established its presence in the form of consulates-general in Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Iraq, Yemen, Cambodia, and the United Arab Republic; a consulate in Syria; trade missions with consular rights in Algeria, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, and Mali; trade missions without consular rights in Lebanon, Morocco, and Sudan; a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Trade in Tunisia; representatives on the basis of agreements between the state banks in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay. In addition, the 'Chamber for Foreign Trade with the GDR' is represented in the following countries: Belgium, Denmark,

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Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Sweden, and Turkey.[10]

Nor does the list of countries in which the GDR is represented in some form reveal the full extent of East German influence abroad. For example, in Algeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and the UAR, more persons are assigned to the GDR missions than to the respective embassies of the Federal Republic.[11] In Africa the GDR exerts influence also through foreign correspondents, all of them members of the East German communist party; they are permanently assigned to Accra, Algiers, Bomaco, Dar-es-Salaam, Zanzibar, Cairo, and Alexandria. Furthermore, the GDR operates abroad through its labour unions and youth organisations; through invitations and stipends, at scientific and cultural conferences, and through printed materials sent to Africa in Spanish, French, English, and Arabic.

BY 1965 various inconsistencies had developed in the West German policy of defending its rights by means of the Hallstein doctrine and by using the carrot of giving aid or the stick of withholding it. For example, it was noted that West German economic aid to Ceylon amounting to DM13 million was suspended because the GDR had been permitted to establish a consulate-general in Colombo, whereas economic aid to Syria amounting to DM350 million continued despite the establishment of an East German consulate-general in that country. Some Germans considered the diplomatic reprisals against Tito in 1957 to be weak, since consulates-general in Hamburg, Munich, and Zagreb survived the diplomatic break; in addition, substantial German economic aid continued to flow to Yugoslavia. More recently, the case of Tanzania was especially puzzling.

Tanzania, newly formed by the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, announced on 19 February 1965 that the GDR embassy on the island of Zanzibar, where the Chinese have a strong foothold, had been closed and in its stead a GDR consulate-general had been opened in Dar-es-Salaam on the mainland. Although this measure did not involve diplomatic recognition of the GDR, as President Nyerere pointed out, and actually downgraded the GDR representation, the Federal Government took a jaundiced view of the change, since before joining the union, Tanganyika had had diplomatic relations only with West Germany. In an effort to thwart the first attempt of the GDR to establish itself in Black Africa, Chancellor Erhard had written to President Nyerere on 11 February 1965 that the establishment of a consulate-general would jeopardise the friendly relations between West Germany and Tanzania. The Federal Government had not taken

[10] The GDR Embassy on Zanzibar was closed by President Nyerere of Tanzania, after the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, and a Consulate-General was established in Dar-es-Salaam. In Cairo the GDR has also a 'delegate' to the Arab states. Cf. Jens Hacker, 'Zonen-Diplomatie', *Die politische Meinung*, February 1965.

[11] Harald Ludwig, 'Die "DDR" in Afrika', *SBZ Archiv*, March 1965, p. 84.

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retaliatory action against any of the states in Asia and the Middle East which had admitted consulates-general of the GDR, but when Nyerere disregarded Erhard's warning Bonn discontinued its *military* aid. Thereupon Dr Nyerere, concerned about his reputation of non-alignment, angrily announced that he would accept no further *economic* assistance from West Germany. And yet the Federal Republic did not break off *diplomatic* relations with Tanzania. *The Economist* (24 April 1965), reviewing Dr Nyerere's Easter visit to Great Britain and his statements on the West's relations with Africa, came to the conclusion that 'Bonn seems to Tanzanians to look silly'. In West Germany at least one leading newspaper considered Bonn's action against Dar-es-Salaam to be the result of frustrations which Colonel Nasser had inflicted upon the Federal Government. 'In their quarrel with Egypt they had manoeuvred themselves into a corner, and so Tanzania suddenly became a welcome lightning conductor for Bonn's wrath.'[12]

The crisis of 1965 in West Germany's relations with the Arab states revealed that the original Hallstein doctrine had become a blunt instrument. In order to induce President Nasser to cancel Walter Ulbricht's visit to Cairo, the Federal Government discontinued West German military aid to Israel, but Nasser, not content with having embarrassed the Federal Government, proceeded to humiliate it by upholding his invitation. When Ulbricht arrived in Egypt at the end of February he was treated like a head of state, although Nasser maintained that he had not recognised Ulbricht's regime. He had recognised it *de facto*.

After Ulbricht's visit to Cairo, ominous warnings were uttered in Germany about the future of German foreign policy. Franz-Josef Strauss declared that Ulbricht could be expected to visit Jakarta before the end of the year, and Rainer Barzel considered it possible that Ulbricht would soon visit Latin American countries as well. Until 7 March the sixteen members of the German Cabinet were almost evenly split on what to do. Those who counselled caution argued that if Bonn were to apply the Hallstein doctrine and break diplomatic relations with Cairo, West Germany would lose the right to sole representation of the German people in the Middle East, since Nasser would establish diplomatic ties with East Berlin and at least five other Arab states would follow suit. The cautious policy was championed by Gerhard Schröder, four CDU ministers, including the defence minister, and four of the five cabinet members belonging to the Free Democratic Party. This party, which had always been critical of the Hallstein doctrine, now contended that the doctrine immobilised German foreign policy and would lead to the gradual retreat of the Federal Republic from Asia and Africa. Caution was also strongly urged upon Erhard by Allied ambassadors, especially US Ambassador McGhee, for fear that a break with Egypt would disturb the balance of power in the

[12] Werner Holzer in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30 March 1965.

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Middle East.[13] Between 4 and 6 March Erhard was inclined to take drastic action against Egypt. He was supported by four Bavarian ministers, who followed Strauss, and by at least two CDU ministers—Paul Lücke and Ernst Lemmer. Adenauer, Hallstein, and Westrick were said to have urged the application of the Hallstein doctrine to Egypt, and many members of this faction pointed to the need to repair the damage done by the earlier German action against Israel.

After protracted cabinet deliberations, Erhard reversed himself on 7 March. His decision, which surprised many, including the Israeli mission in Cologne, was a compromise that could be supported by all the feuding factions in his government. Some were pleased because an open diplomatic break with Cairo had been avoided; others were pleased with the renewed refusal to give aid and credit guarantees to Egypt in the future; still others with the announcement that the Federal Republic would seek to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

Ten states of the Arab League broke off diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic; only Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya did not follow suit. Economic and cultural relations, however, were maintained, and the staff of the German embassies continued to work in the embassies of the western countries which assumed the functions of protective powers.

On 15 May the official Cairo newspaper, *Al Ahram*, declared that Egypt did not plan to recognise the GDR, since at best only Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen would follow suit and thus Arab disunity would be manifest. On the next day, in response to a letter that Erhard had sent to the Arab heads of state and government on 9 May, Nasser informed the Chancellor that Egypt would continue to support the striving of the German people for reunification and to be interested in preserving German friendship.

After many months of uncertainty and disquiet, during which individual officials and the government as a whole had been publicly criticised, it was almost an anti-climax when on 25 May 1965 Professor Carstens, Undersecretary of State, informed the Bundestag that the Federal Government expected diplomatic relations with the Arab states to be resumed in the not too distant future.

What had happened in the crisis to the Hallstein doctrine? Although many German politicians and observers maintained that the doctrine had always permitted a flexible application, it can hardly be disputed that according to its original meaning diplomatic relations with Egypt should have been severed in February 1965. Erhard left the initiative of making the break to the Arabs. Since he responded to Nasser's provocative acts only with economic sanctions and with the recognition of Israel, the original doctrine had been quietly put aside. But on 7 March, referring to 'the self-evident right of every people to self-determination', the Federal Government reasserted the Hallstein doctrine

[13] *New York Times*, 7 March 1965.

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in these terms: 'An upgrading of this despotic regime [i.e. the GDR] is regarded by the Federal Republic of Germany as an unfriendly act to be answered by appropriate measures in each individual case.'[14]

THE demise of the Hallstein doctrine, so ardently desired by the communists, will not result from alleged inconsistencies in its application to one or the other new state. A mortal wound can be inflicted on it only by a Western power, or by a future Federal Government finding it politically prudent to do so. In the latter case the German 'right' to reunification, which the doctrine helps to assert, would expire. To be sure, rights are not subject to the judgment of history, but world events affect the political worth attached by friend and foe to the moral and legal rights of others. In the sixties, the insistence of the Federal Government that the Allies take an active interest in reunification—an 'initiative'—no longer occurs in the political climate of the early fifties, but in the face of hardened Soviet determination not to change the status quo in Europe, of American interest in avoiding acute political conflict with the Soviet Union, and of French defection from NATO. The claim that Ulbricht's regime lacks legitimacy did not then, but now does, refer to the government of a country that has had remarkable economic success and boasts many political and economic contacts with the Federal Republic and its allies.

The Hallstein doctrine could fall into abeyance if the Western powers, without necessarily changing their declaratory policy on German reunification, were to abstain from the active pursuit of this policy over a long period of time. It may, in fact, be argued that such inactivity has prevailed ever since the end of the Geneva conference of 1959. At the end of 1964 Secretary Rusk in a background briefing urged the West Germans to re-examine their own ideas on reunification. Without withdrawing American support of the German interest in reunification, he passed to the Federal Government the responsibility for taking the initiative which Bonn had so often demanded of her powerful allies. Only a few months later, General de Gaulle attempted to remove the cornerstone of Western policy in Central Europe by viewing the reunification of Germany as a purely European concern. Had he been successful, the principle of four-power responsibility for German unity would have been abandoned. Erhard declared at the time, 'A Europeanisation [of that responsibity], with the practical consequence that the United States would have diminished rights and a lesser rank in respect to guaranteeing the restoration of German unity, is firmly rejected (*indiskutabel*) by the Federal Government'.[15]

In 1965, when relations between the Federal Republic and Egypt deteriorated sharply, puns about the 'Hallstein epoch' gained currency

[14] *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 9 March 1965.
[15] *Berliner Morgenpost*, 1 May 1965, republished in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 4 May 1965, p. 610.

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in West Germany, suggesting that the doctrine had become as remote as the prehistoric Hallstatt epoch. Several prominent members of Erhard's cabinet were known to favour the establishment of diplomatic relations with communist states of eastern Europe. In particular, Vice-Chancellor Erich Mende urged that the Federal Government abandon the Hallstein doctrine in its relations with the communist regimes in Europe,[16] and many other Germans in positions of authority regarded such a development as the desirable extension of Schröder's trade policy. On this issue as well the orthodox principles of West German diplomacy prevailed. Moscow remained the only communist capital with diplomatic representations of both German states.

While the modified Hallstein doctrine still is officially held to provide some guidance for the future foreign policy of the Federal Republic, it has become increasingly evident in the past years that Bonn is pondering the obstacles to Western action on the issue of reunification. Early in 1965, Gerhard Schröder hinted in somewhat obscure language at these obstacles when he said:

> Today the predominant and general interest in preserving peace has gained pre-eminence over the specific interest in reunification. True, agreement on the goal still exists; but it has become more difficult for German foreign policy to conserve the close interdependence of the two problems down to their practical consequences.[17]

[16] Interview in *Der Spiegel*, 14 April, 1965.
[17] Speech at the CDU Conference in Düsseldorf, 30 March 1965; cf. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31 March 1965.

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THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN POLICY

William E. Griffith

IN September 1965, twenty years after Nazi Germany's total defeat, Ludwig Erhard, symbol of postwar German prosperity, was triumphantly re-elected its Chancellor. Have West Germans once again opted for peace and prosperity, for their amazingly successful postwar concentration on making money rather than for a nationalist foreign policy—a course which has made them the second trading and the third industrial nation in the world? With their dynamic industrial growth, massive social services programmes, and lack of interest in political radicalism, either neo-nazi or communist, have Germans again become, as they were in the eighteenth century, the most peaceful, least nationalistic nation in Europe?

Probably not. Appearances deceive, but history can correct them. Germany has been in our times, as in our fathers' and grandfathers', the most dynamic force for change in Europe; it is not likely to slumber much longer. Not that the blundering nationalism of the first or the satanic drive of the second world war is about to return: for Germans, as for most other people, nothing fails like failure. West Germany's problems today, and the dilemmas they pose for American foreign policy, are new and different ones. They arise out of a new combination of economic prosperity, foreign policy passivity, the lack of German unity, and the transformation of the bipolar into a multipolar world, made increasingly complicated by the existence of thermonuclear weapons.

First, the German Federal Republic is a new Germany. It is no longer, as it was until 1945, predominantly Prussian and Protestant, a proudly different, 'middle' Europe between East and West. Rather, it is a truncated West Germany. It has fifty instead of eighty million inhabitants; it has become as much Catholic as Protestant; its historic capital, Berlin, is divided and walled inside the hostile East German state. Given this division and West Berlin's isolation, it consciously wants to be part of a united Western Europe dependent on the United States for its national security. It wants this because it knows that the thermonuclear missile age has decisively changed the world military balance. Neither Germany alone nor Western Europe together can overtake the strategic military and space lead of the United States and the Soviet Union—the more so since the dream of European unity is disappearing into Gaullist mists.

For twenty years West Germany has concentrated on reconstruction and industrial growth at home and foreign trade abroad. It has abstained from any major international initiatives. Its postwar need

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for American support has made it normally a faithful follower of Washington on the international scene. Its older and middle generations, still caught in the collective shame when not the individual guilt of the nazi period, have been understandably reluctant to play any specifically German role in foreign policy. Finally, until recently Russia appeared so overwhelmingly powerful that any thought of getting out of Moscow what it clearly would not give of its own volition, reunification with East Germany, seemed quixotic. The West Germans were therefore content to cultivate their own prosperous gardens.

But now, in 1966, this situation is changing—still largely under the surface, to be sure, but with increasing rapidity. America should beware of letting its comfortable acceptance of its former enemy's passivity blind it to the stirrings in West Germany of things to come. No great, proud nation—and the Germans have always been that—will long tolerate passively the division of its country. This is the more true of a state such as West Germany, which is such an economic and technological giant, which has now the largest land army (12 divisions) in western Europe, and which knows very well that its economic potential and conventional power can easily be converted, as France, for example, has begun to do, into thermonuclear delivery capacity.

Of all European states, West Germany has a unique additional incentive to resume an active foreign policy role. It alone is a nation divided. One-third of it is a semi-colonial tyranny, occupied by 22 Red Army divisions and ruled by Walter Ulbricht, who maintains communist power by means of the secret police, the Berlin Wall, and the barbed-wire Iron Curtain run through the heart of Germany. Moreover, in the last few years three new factors have added to the potential for mobility in German foreign policy. First, an increasing proportion of Germans—those under thirty, at least—who were not personally and knowingly involved in nazi crimes and tyranny feel no personal responsibility for nazism or for not having resisted it. They therefore have none of the inhibitions of their elders about resuming the role in the world to which West German economic, technological, and conventional military power, they think, entitles them. In other words, German patriotism is on the rise. Second, particularly among the German youth, the German political ideal of the postwar years, European unification, has been increasingly shattered by General de Gaulle's nationalism; and his recent flirtation with Moscow has largely ended his political influence in Germany. Third, the Sino-Soviet split and Gaullism in Europe are increasingly transforming the cold war East-West bipolarity into a multipolar, differentiated world, in which France is trying to keep on at least passable terms with almost all other major powers; in which America, many Europeans think, is moving towards a détente with the Soviet Union (the more so because it is increasingly tied down in East Asia); and in which—more and more Germans think—Bonn should not be the only major power to remain passive.

As German public opinion polls convincingly demonstrate, these

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developments have resulted in a constantly increasing commitment in West Germany, particularly among the youth, to German reunification as the primary goal of West German foreign policy, and to an increasing dissatisfaction with Bonn and Washington for the lack of progress towards this goal.

THIS has not led, at least not yet, to any serious German questioning of the alliance with the United States; but it has resulted in a questioning of certain American policies and in a wish for a more forceful assertion of West German national interests within NATO in general and the German-American relationship in particular. This new West German assertiveness centres on three areas: first, and most long-term, German reunification; second, and in large part as a result, policies towards West Germany's eastern neighbours and in particular towards East Germany; and third, and perhaps the most serious, towards the problem of West Germany's access to nuclear weapons.

Reunification, most West Germans increasingly realise, is both the main and unchangeable German national goal and, given the adamant Soviet unwillingness even to discuss the problem, the one which is least likely to be achieved in the near future. West German motives in the commitment to reunification are twofold: national and humanitarian—and the two sometimes conflict. As the Soviet attitude removes reunification into the distant future, many West Germans increasingly concentrate on improving the lot of their brothers to the East. Yet such improvement often can come only at the expense of concessions to Ulbricht that strengthen his position and thus make reunification even more unlikely.

Finally, official West German policy on reunification is, it is fair to say, still more legalistic and declarative than realistic: it calls for the reunification by free elections of all of Germany within the territorial boundaries of 1937. This would mean that what is now western Poland (between the present frontier on the Oder and Neisse and the 1939 frontier, part of northern Poland, most of former East Prussia) and part of the Soviet Union (the area around the former city of Königsberg, now Kaliningrad) would all return to Germany. Furthermore, Bonn supports the right of all Germans expelled from the territories east of these boundaries to return to their former homes. This would also mean the return of some two and a half million Sudeten Germans to Czechoslovakia, from which they were expelled in 1945.

To list these claims is, to anyone except an extreme German nationalist, to demonstrate how little they have to do with practical, attainable political goals. Is it really likely that in any foreseeable future the Soviet Union, short of its total defeat in war (a defeat which would mean the thermonuclear devastation of most of the Northern Hemisphere), would ever allow these claims to be realised—to say nothing of the Poles and the Czechs? The first thing to say therefore about the official Bonn position on reunification is that it is so

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unrealistic that it is not credible—and that it cannot therefore be taken very seriously by any of its allies. Why, then, does Bonn maintain it?

First, there live in West Germany twelve million people expelled from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line and from Czechoslovakia; and no freely elected German government is likely to risk their electoral displeasure in order, by abandoning these claims, to make more credible a policy for reunification which in any case has no chance of early success. Second, most Germans, expellees or not, hope that in this question, as it has until now in others, time will work in their favour; and, making a virtue out of necessity, they are prepared to wait. Third, they see no point in surrendering in advance claims for which they think they may get something in return if and when serious negotiations with the Russians on reunification ever do get under way.

That they will get a price—from Warsaw, for example—is, however, a German illusion. Gomulka does not want Bonn to recognise the Oder-Neisse line, since its refusal to do so is his best proof to the Polish people that they need the alliance with Moscow, and therefore must tolerate communism in Poland in order to save Poland from West German territorial revanchism. Bonn's recognition of that boundary would take this card out of his hand and thus help to prepare the way for eventual Polish popular acceptance of German reunification. Gomulka's violent attacks on Cardinal Wyszynski after the exchange of letters between the Polish and German bishops has recently illuminated his policy in this respect.

West Germany's allies, although committed by treaty to support her reunification, have to date done so formally and verbally rather than vigorously. France has already de facto recognised the Oder-Neisse line, because de Gaulle wants German reunification only if Russian power recedes to its own borders, thus giving France, in a newly-independent east Europe, a counter-weight against a reunited Germany; pending reunification, he opposes any West German access, multilateral or national, to nuclear weapons. Great Britain, which would prefer the permanent partition of Germany, gives at best lip-service to its reunification. The United States does favour reunification, and is prepared to accept a multilateral, but not national, nuclear status for West Germany; but it has in recent years increasingly tended to subordinate that goal to its détente with the Soviet Union, specifically in the area of arms control and disarmament measures.

Until recently West Germany had no relations with east Europe because it refused to establish them with governments which have diplomatic relations with East Germany—the so-called Hallstein doctrine. Two developments have modified this attitude: the great changes in east Europe itself, and pressure from Washington, plus competition from London, Paris, and Rome.

During the last few years West Germans have realised that eastern Europe has changed. Rumania has become at least as independent of

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the Kremlin as Yugoslavia: in fact, Tito, passing the Rumanians on the way, has gone back towards Moscow, while Bucharest has been moving away. Albania has exchanged its Soviet for a Chinese alliance. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have seen extensive internal liberalisation, and Prague's relations with Moscow are not so good as they once were. Above all, Moscow's failure to overcome Peking's challenge to its leadership of world communism, and, since the 1962 Cuban crisis, America's pulling ahead of Russia in military power and industrial and agricultural growth, have resulted in a continuing decline in Soviet authority in east Europe as elsewhere. Finally, Western failure to act during the 1956 Hungarian rising made clear to West Germany and east Europe that western military force would not be used to push back Soviet power in eastern Europe. The logical implication, embraced by President Kennedy and, largely under American pressure, by the Adenauer government, was that the West, including West Germany, should follow a policy of peaceful engagement towards east Europe, promoting trade and cultural exchanges in order to encourage domestic liberalisation and greater independence of Moscow.

Until 1964 this policy was hotly debated in West Germany. The new Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, and the Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, advocated West German flexibility towards east Europe. Their opponents, the 'German Gaullists', led by Franz-Josef Strauss and ex-Chancellor Adenauer, denounced this policy because, they claimed, it would weaken Germany's chances for reunification, because it meant giving into American pressure when Washington was more interested, because of its Asian commitments, in reaching a détente with Moscow, even at the cost of recognising the status quo in East Europe, and thereby the permanent division of Germany, than in fulfilling its obligation to Bonn to support German reunification. Moreover, they (somewhat paradoxically) maintained, such a policy should in any case be wholly subordinated to Franco-German comity, west European unity, and a European (not a multilateral or Atlantic) nuclear force. (That is, they want a united Europe, including Great Britain, as an economic, agricultural, technological, and military equal of the USA or the USSR. But this is at best a distant prospect.)

Four recent developments have taken some of the wind out of the 'German Gaullist' sails. First, de Gaulle's flirtation with the Russians and his rapprochement with east Europe, particularly with the Poles, have disillusioned his former German admirers, who are now convinced that he envisages the permanent division of Germany. Second, Rumania's move away from Soviet influence has gone so far that Germans cannot now deny that Bucharest is much more independent of Moscow and more favourable to Bonn. Third, Schröder's policy of flexibility has led to the establishment of West German trade missions in every east European capital except Prague, and German businessmen are anxious to resume their traditional ties with

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east European markets. Fourth, Washington, particularly under President Johnson, has made it increasingly clear that the United States is not prepared to sacrifice fundamental West German interests in Berlin or elsewhere for the sake of a détente with Moscow.

THIS brings us to the major disputed area of West German policy: relations with East Germany. It is a cardinal principle of West German foreign policy, endorsed in formal treaty by Washington, London, and Paris, that it alone legitimately represents the German people and that Ulbricht's government is a foreign-imposed colonial one. Conversely, it remains a cardinal principle of Soviet and East German foreign policy to achieve international recognition of East Germany as the 'second German state', and, since 1958, to have West Berlin recognised as a third such state, thus cutting the city's ties both with West Germany and the western Allies.

In 1961 the building of the Berlin Wall caused a fundamental change in the West German view of the East German problem. Cut off from personal contact with their friends and relatives in East Germany, and feeling that the Wall had frozen the East German tyranny in power for many years to come, West Germans became increasingly anxious to maintain personal and political contact with their East German brothers and to do whatever could be done to ease their lot. A natural feeling: but it has to a considerable extent played into Ulbricht's hands, for now that he has the Wall, only he can grant passage through it for West Germans and West Berliners, and he can and does exact a political price for passage.

Furthermore, since 1962, West Germans, particularly left-wing intellectuals, have increasingly realised the great changes under way in Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and quite naturally have asked themselves, if it can happen there, why not in East Germany as well? If America and West Germany are rightly carrying on a policy of peaceful engagement towards east Europe, then why not towards East Germany as well? To put it in the terms of current West German political discussion, cannot change come about in East Germany, as elsewhere in the east European communist states, by small steps (*kleine Schritte*), through increased contacts (*Wandel durch Annäherung*)? And even if liberalisation does not set in soon, is it not better, even at the inevitable price of concessions to Ulbricht in terms of accepting institutionalised government-level relationships between Bonn and Pankow and his resultant inevitable political upgrading, to *do something*: to maintain human contact with the East German population and try to alleviate their lot?

This is an understandable and, on the surface, politically sophisticated policy—but, in my view, also a potentially dangerous one. Why?

First, it can, I think, easily work contrary to German as well as to American interests. The fact alone that Ulbricht (and Moscow) is so anxious to get concessions from Bonn and Washington which

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increase his political status in the world should make West Germans highly suspicious of such a policy. Second, the history of the negotiations between West Berlin and East Germany about granting West Berliners passes to go through the Wall to visit their relatives in East Berlin can best be termed, as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* recently put it, one of 'little steps backward'. Slowly but surely the West Berlin and Bonn leaders have made concessions to Ulbricht: the pass negotiations, for example, at East German insistence, are now not between West and East Germany but between West Berlin and East Germany, thus giving support to Ulbricht's thesis that West Berlin should be a third state, not tied to West Germany, that East Berlin is a part of East Germany, and that therefore the latter, not the former, is the appropriate negotiating partner.

Third, any such policy of greater government-level contacts with East Germany inevitably affects the whole Berlin situation. In that divided city the policy of little steps is exactly what Ulbricht has been using in order to undermine Western rights in all of Berlin without at any one time challenging (as Khrushchev vainly did in 1958–1962) the so-called 'three essentials' of American policy towards the city: free access, the presence of American troops, and the maintenance of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Unlike West German or American negotiations with, say, Poland or Hungary, any government-level negotiations by Bonn or West Berlin with East Germany occur in a context where Ulbricht (and Moscow), not Erhard or Brandt, has the best cards, since only he can give what the West Germans want, more contacts with East Germany, and he can also at any time put Berlin under pressure and thus blackmail Bonn into concessions. Such blackmail, by 'small steps', can not easily be countered either by Washington or by Bonn.

It must also be frankly said that the course of these pass negotiations to date has clearly demonstrated that Ulbricht is a more calculating and able negotiator than either Chancellor Erhard or Mayor Brandt. Time and again Bonn and West Berlin, under the pressure of humanitarian and election considerations, have eventually given in to Ulbricht's blackmail. The result is for the West a humiliating paradox: during the last two years, when Soviet prestige and authority has been falling throughout east Europe, Ulbricht has constantly been politically up-graded. Moreover, in spite of some economic reforms and a decline in mass terror, no political or cultural liberalisation has occurred in East Germany; on the contrary, as recent events there have once again demonstrated, it is increasingly becoming a tyrannical exception in the midst of a liberalising and more independent east Europe.

There is one final reason why the policy of small steps is dangerous to West German and American interests: for several reasons it inhibits effective American response in West Berlin to Ulbricht's challenges. First and most important, it is psychologically very difficult for

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Americans to respond promptly and firmly to West German requests to stand up to Ulbricht's challenges (when he flew East German helicopters over West Berlin, to cite a recent example) when these same Germans are making concessions to him. Second, precisely because Ulbricht's challenges are so limited, it is difficult for the West to find an equally limited response. Third, as the United States becomes increasingly committed in Vietnam, it is unlikely to risk a crisis with the Russians in Berlin unless the challenge is major and unmistakable.

But, proponents of the small-steps policy reply, what is the alternative? Can one expect the West Germans to sit idly by and let their relatives and friends in East Germany suffer without making any attempt, even if a risky one, to better their lot? The alternative, in my view, is a policy of isolating the East German government, with the object of eventually convincing the Soviet Union and the other east European states that East Germany has become such an anachronism in a differentiated east Europe and such an obstacle to a genuine settlement with the West that it must be forced by Moscow to move towards liberalisation and reunification. Such a process is not beyond the bounds of possibility: Ulbricht is already perceptibly displeased, for example, by the improvement of relations between Bonn and Bucharest; and it is likely that the main reason why he agreed to the pass arrangement in Berlin was the desire of the Russians and other east Europeans to do something to counteract the damage they were all suffering throughout the world by the prison symbol of the Berlin Wall.

Furthermore East Germany, unlike the other east European states, is not a national state. Rather, it is the smaller and poorer part of one German nation; and, since it is not a nation, it cannot become a national communist state. The 1953 Berlin rising proved to the Russians what Ulbricht had known: once political liberalisation in East Germany starts, it cannot be stopped at the stage of national communism (because it is not a nation). Rather it will lead directly to the collapse of communism in East Germany and to German reunification. Therefore the small-steps policy will always be one-sided: when Bonn offers Ulbricht small steps, Ulbricht will win his political up-grading, but East Germany will not get political liberalisation or greater independence of Moscow. Not surprisingly: why should Ulbricht, or his successors, risk liberalisation or moving away from Moscow? They would be signing their own death-warrants, for only the Soviet army maintains them in power. Conversely, only Moscow can decisively change the situation in East Germany, and therefore only pressure on Russia, by convincing it, and Poland and Czechoslovakia as well, that changes there are in their interests, can bring such changes about.

One final argument in favour of the small-steps policy must be considered: isolation of East Germany is impossible anyway since the British, French, and Italians will not accept it; therefore we must

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try small steps, because there is no feasible alternative policy. But isolation does not mean preventing cultural exchange, which is desirable because in this West always on balance wins over East. Nor does it mean cutting off western trade with East Germany, because neither Bonn nor Washington can force west Europe to do this. Moreover, non-strategic West German trade with East Germany is desirable because it gives Bonn, and Washington, levers on Ulbricht to counteract his blackmail tactics. What isolation does mean is preventing the political upgrading of Ulbricht, even at the cost of hindering exchange of persons or trade.

IT is too early to tell how far General de Gaulle is prepared to go in his withdrawal from NATO and his plans for the reunification of Europe, and how far Moscow will reciprocate. (Nor is it clear how Washington will react.) Insofar as de Gaulle may encourage more independence of Moscow in eastern Europe, Bonn may benefit; but he seems more likely to contribute towards a further rise of nationalism in West Germany. De Gaulle's hope is for a reunified Europe, with Americans and Russians gone home, under French leadership and with a reunified Germany extending only to the Oder-Neisse and condemned to a second-place position by its lack of access to nuclear weapons. But we are still far from such a situation, and in the meantime, except for Adenauer and Strauss, West Germans prefer, if they must be subordinate, to be so to the United States, a stronger guarantor of their security. Even so, de Gaulle's emphasis on a reunited Europe and on a reunited but militarily restricted Germany shows both a vision of change (and thus appeals to the hopes of most Europeans) and a sense of realism on the question of German reunification. The United States can learn from both these aspects of French policy.

Certain clear policy implications for Washington follow. In the first place, West Germany will be increasingly committed to reunification; and, if we wish to maintain our alliance with Bonn, so must we. Second, if our commitment to German reunification, and Bonn's, are to be, as they increasingly will have to be, more than just declaratory, they must be credible and realistic, i.e. they must be such that they will eventually be acceptable to the national—as opposed to communist—interests of Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The world is changing rapidly, and over the decades to come Russia will be faced by a resurgent China along its long Asian borders as well by its own domestic, economic, social, and ethnic problems. It can hardly wish to have a powerful but hostile West Germany to its west, allied with and influencing against it the American super-power across the Atlantic. Moreover, West Germany's economic and technological resources are such that, if converted into nuclear weapons capacity, they would further change the balance of power against Russia.

Conversely, West Germany cannot realistically hope for, nor should

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the United States favour, a return to the 1937 German boundaries. It is not in West Germany's real interest, and certainly not in America's, to have Germany set out, alone if necessary, on a course towards regaining territory which Russians, Poles, and Czechs would defend to the death. America's permanent national interest, like Great Britain's in the nineteenth century, one for which we have fought and won two world wars, is that neither the European nor the Asian continent should be dominated by any single hostile power. Rather, our national interest indicates that the security interests of all, including Russia and east Europe, should be taken into account, and traditional European rivalries subdued and contained in multinational associations.

Specifically, therefore, a credible, active American policy for German reunification should have two aspects: it should take into account the security interests of West Germany, Russia, and east Europe (and it must therefore continue to urge on Bonn a policy of peaceful engagement with eastern Europe), and it should preclude concessions to Moscow which would work against its achievement. This would mean that, given reunification, the United States would commit itself to support, first, the present East German-Polish border; second, some verifiable military status for what is now East Germany, as well as for an equivalent area to the east, which would preclude West German armed forces from advancing from the Elbe to the Oder (this would probably include the removal of offensive nuclear weapons from both the reunited Germany and from Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the continued inclusion of these countries in western or eastern anti-ballistic missile [ABM] defences, and in some kind of European security system); and, third, economic compensation to Russia and east Europe for the loss of East German trade, if any, attendant upon German reunification, plus some attractive form of association of east Europe and, if Moscow desired it, of Russia with the Common Market.

The United States should not publicly proclaim this policy against the will of its West German ally. But we should make clear to Bonn that we would be unwilling to intensify our support of German reunification except within this context; and we should encourage public discussion, in America and Europe, of the issues involved, the more so because the West German Evangelical and Roman Catholic hierarchies have recently in effect done the same.

The other part of this policy, that of not sacrificing German reunification to a détente with the Soviet Union, raises a crucial issue of West German and American foreign policy: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

THE non-proliferation issue has come to the fore again because of the resumption of disarmament negotiations in Geneva. Many West Germans, notably ex-Chancellor Adenauer, have maintained that

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the American position there, as expressed first by William Foster, our Disarmament Agency head, in a *Foreign Affairs* article, and then in our draft non-proliferation treaty, went far towards surrendering the principle of the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) and looked towards a treaty which would permanently deny to West Germany any access, multilateral or otherwise, to nuclear weapons, in order to get Moscow to sign a non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, these Germans declare, even if Moscow were to sign such a treaty, which is unlikely, neither the Soviets nor we could permanently enforce it against West Germany, because no powerful nation can be forced, but only persuaded, not to have nuclear weapons, and because other nations may follow the example of France and China and obtain nuclear weapons, if necessary on their own.

But in any case, it seems highly unlikely that Moscow will agree to it or any other treaty which does not bar any and all access to nuclear arms to West Germany. That Moscow fears West German nuclear arms is both true and understandable. After the destruction the nazis wreaked on Russia in the war, Russians naturally fear a revival of German military power, and the conversion of West German economic and technological into nuclear potential would swing the strategic balance strongly against the Soviet Union and would give nuclear weapons to a nation one-third of whose territory is occupied by the Soviet army.

One of West Germany's aims, on the other hand, is to escape from its present second-class status, i.e. to be treated on equal terms by Washington, Paris, and London, in order thereby more effectively to press for reunification. Furthermore, Germans increasingly realise that the possession of nuclear weapons increases any power's leverage against the predominant power in its own alliance system and its protection against its enemies. Moreover, West Germans increasingly understand that American nuclear and space expenditures, plus its high industrial and agricultural growth rate, create an incomparably greater scientific and technological 'spin-off' than they (or even all of western Europe) enjoy, and, thereby the danger of an American economic and technological 'take-over' in West German industry and agriculture. Yet for many reasons, including its own treaty commitments against their manufacture, the strong world-wide opposition to its obtaining them, and the realisation that their acquisition would probably be an additional barrier to any eventual West German-Soviet détente leading to reunification, the West German government is not, at least not yet, in favour of the acquisition of national German atomic weapons. Faced, however, with the threat of a non-proliferation treaty inimical to its interests, it is reviving its own support of the multilateral atomic principle initially proposed by the United States.

Washington alone can give Bonn any kind of access to nuclear weapons in the near future, since neither Britain nor France will. Given the history of the last hundred years, there is much to be said

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for a non-nuclear Germany. Yet if we deny now to a democratic Germany multilateral participation in nuclear weapons, we are not likely indefinitely to be able to prevent, without using force (which we certainly would be most reluctant to do), a much more nationalistic Germany getting national nuclear weapons on her own—and within a context of a greatly intensified German nationalist drive for reunification which would be indeed a danger for world peace. 'Politics', Bismarck rightly remarked, 'is the art of the possible'—and since it is probably impossible in the long run to deny Germany at least multilateral access to nuclear weapons, we should both be receptive to any German wishes for participation in a multilateral but not bilateral German-American nuclear force, and we should make clear to the Soviets that, since in our view (as, realistically, in theirs) this is the best hope of preventing national German nuclear weapons, we will refuse to sign any non-proliferation treaty which forbids such a step, and after a treaty is signed we will not abandon the multilateral access principle. This does not mean 'giving' the Germans nuclear weapons; on the contrary, it is in effect the best guarantee that they will not eventually have sovereign access to them. Moreover, the nuclear interdependence between the allies may be confined to a multilateral defence system (of anti-ballistic missiles), which should be established as soon as possible. The possibility of establishing such a system should now be actively explored.

The alternative may be far worse from the Soviet and east European point of view, because it may sooner or later lead to a revival of German nationalism. Once again, as in the time of the EDC, Soviet opposition to a multilateral interdependent participation of the Germans in a European defence system may produce the effect which will be precisely contrary to the proclaimed intentions of Soviet policy, and instead of keeping the German forces in a system of mutual controls, it may give them greater independence in the matter. But this time it will be in the field not of conventional forces, but of nuclear ones. Of course, there is always the possibility of playing with German nationalism in the tradition of Rapallo or the Soviet-Nazi Pact, but this in the nuclear age is playing with fire indeed.

Non-proliferation of atomic weapons is, for those powers like ourselves who already have them, a natural policy; but since it condemns them to permanent second-class status, it is opposed to the interests of all other major powers, particularly those menaced by outside threats. We cannot prevent proliferation any more than King Canute could keep back the tide. Therefore to pay a price to Moscow for the ostensible prevention of something which will happen anyway is naive; and to pay for it the price of antagonising one of our major allies, West Germany, making impossible the long-term continuation of our present alliance with it, and, what is worst of all, pushing it towards the acquisition of national nuclear weapons, is foolish indeed. Moscow cannot stop proliferation any more than we can. We can, if we

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are wise, by making proliferation multilateral, further our own and our German ally's interests and decrease its danger. That Moscow has no allies with West Germany's power, or to whom it would give even multilateral access to nuclear weapons, is its problem, not ours; it is the price of the Soviets' inability to solve the problems of moving from empire to alliance. In any case, surrendering West German interests on the multilateral nuclear issue would only strengthen Soviet appetites and thus weaken their containment, and, in addition, awaken West German appetites for national nuclear weapons. It is true that Moscow and Washington have a joint interest in preventing West German national nuclear weapons—but so have London and Paris. What we do *not* share with Moscow is our decisive interest in West Germany—the maintenance there of a stable democratic government friendly to us and to the West—just the contrary of Moscow's German policy. We may hope that Bonn will decide to forgo access, even multilaterally, to offensive nuclear weapons—and in terms of its own interests it may eventually decide to do so. Moreover, we should make clear now that in our view a reunited Germany will have to forgo such access, within the context of a more positive American policy in favour of German reunification. Finally, and above all, we should clearly and constantly take a position on this issue, as on all others, which gives priority to our western alliance over a bilateral Soviet-American deal at its expense.

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BRITISH OPINION AND THE ODER-NEISSE LINE

Donald Cameron Watt

AT first sight the attitudes of the British government and of British opinion towards the Oder-Neisse line seem to have been simple and consistent since 1950, the year when the question of Germany's eastern frontiers first began to bulk large in British policy and attitudes towards Germany. So far as the British government is concerned, it was agreed at the Potsdam conference in July 1945 that Poland and the Soviet Union should between them administer the lands of pre-war Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line, but that their final disposition should be settled at the conference which was to conclude a treaty of peace with a united Germany. This position has been maintained ever since. So far as British opinion is concerned, the Oder-Neisse line should be accepted *and* recognised as Germany's eastern frontier: Federal Germany's refusal to do so is an important obstacle to a European settlement.

On second inspection, however, the position of the British government has changed rather subtly since 1945. In 1945, it will be remembered, the British were bitterly aggrieved to find that the Soviet authorities had already installed a Polish administration in the Oder-Neisse territories. Their action greatly diminished the territorial area of Germany which they were insistent should be treated as an economic whole. The Soviet refusal even to allow their zone to take part in and contribute to German economic rehabilitation caused this lesser grievance to be swallowed in the greater. Soviet action meant that Britain had to feed and finance her zone: the effort did a good deal to stultify the contribution expected from the American loan of 1946 towards Britain's economic recovery. In the long and fruitless negotiations for a German settlement which followed, British statesmen were inclined to suggest occasionally that part of the rural areas of Brandenburg might be returned to Germany to contribute to its economic strength; Mr Bevin advanced a proposal of this nature at the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947. But on the final disposition of the Oder-Neisse lands, they accepted that nothing could be done to oust the Poles from the territories they had occupied.

This gradual acceptance may be traced in the changing terms with which British policy has been outlined in the House of Commons. In 1950, Ernest Davies outlined the policy in a written answer to a parliamentary question as follows:

> His Majesty's Government still consider that, as agreed at the Potsdam Conference, the final delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland should await a peace conference (Hansard, vol. 476, cols. 231–32, 28 June 1950).

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In 1951, Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, repeated that he was

> unable to give any undertakings regarding the possible provisions of an eventual peace treaty with Germany (Hansard, vol. 478, col. 177, 4 April 1951).

By this date the 'two Germanies' had already come into existence. The Americans had proposed German rearmament, the French the European Defence Community. At the end of 1951 the Conservative Party was back in the electoral favour they had lost in 1945. Winston Churchill, bereft of power and office in the midst of the Potsdam Conference, returned to 10 Downing Street. Determined to regain the diplomatic initiative for Britain, he seized upon Stalin's death in 1953 to launch the idea of a central European security pact on the lines of the Treaty of Locarno as a framework within which the reunification of the two Germanies might be achieved. With it there came inevitably the question of the eastern frontier of a united Germany. On 5 May 1953, speaking in the House of Commons, he repeated the official view in his own words:

> The question of the German-Polish frontier was specifically reserved at Potsdam for the general peace treaty which to put it mildly seems no nearer now than it was then (Hansard, vol. 515, cols. 883–98, 5 May 1953).

But he continued to animadvert to the need to keep Poland happy, independent, friendly towards Russia, and secure, aims which bear directly on Poland's western frontier; Russia had the right to feel assured that the terrible events of the Hitler period would never be repeated, that Poland would remain a friendly power and a buffer, though not a puppet state. . . .

Here may be seen the germ of an idea which was to agitate public opinion in later years, the need to reassure Poland as part of the process of loosening up the solidarity of the Soviet world. It took on much more importance, of course, after the Polish 'October'; still more with the onset of the second Berlin crisis in November 1958 and Mr Macmillan's drive for a second summit conference.

Thus, in July 1957, Mr Selwyn Lloyd was still using the 1950 formula:

> Her Majesty's Government stand by the Potsdam agreement of 2 August 1945 that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the Peace Settlement. Pending such an arrangement the present boundary line between the Soviet zone of Germany and the territories administered by Poland must remain provisional (Hansard, vol. 573, cols. 352–54, 10 July 1957).

He repeated this in November 1958 (Hansard, vol. 595, col. 143, 19 November 1958). In April 1959, after President de Gaulle had declared French recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, Mr Macmillan began to be evasive (Hansard, vol. 603, cols. 23–24). In July 1959,

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after Mr Macmillan's visit to Moscow, Mr Allan abandoned the old formula entirely:

> The frontiers of a reunified Germany can only be settled with the agreement of an all-German Government. My Right Honourable friend is working at Geneva and elsewhere for an easing of tension in central Europe (Hansard, vol. 608, col. 124, 7 July 1959).

He denied reports that the British authorities had been reviewing the terms of the Potsdam agreements concerning the territories of the German Reich.

His denial must be accepted. All the same a new formula was in the process of gestation. It emerged in November the same year. In reply to a question from Mr Zilliacus, Mr John Profumo said: 'The final delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland cannot be *formalised* until there is a peace settlement' (Hansard, vol. 163, col. 394, 11 November 1959). This identical formula was employed by Mr Heath in June 1961 (Hansard, vol. 642, cols. 926–27, 19 June 1961), Mr Butler in July 1964 (Hansard, vol. 699, col. 218, 27 July 1964), and Mr George Thomson for the third post-war Labour government in December 1964 (Hansard, vol. 703, col 131).

It will be noticed that this answer has changed in one important if subtle respect. Before 1953, parliamentary answers spoke of 'the whole question' of the German-Polish frontier being reserved until the peace settlement. In 1957 this had become refined to the 'final determination' of the frontier. From 1959, the 'formalisation' of the final delimitation is all that is mentioned. To put it more crudely: before 1953, the picture painted was one of postponement of all the issues, including presumably that whether the Poles had any claim whatsoever in the Oder-Neisse territories, until the final peace settlement. After 1957 the picture changes to one of general acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line with some marginal alterations to be agreed between the German and Polish authorities, perhaps by a boundary commission; from 1959, the picture given is one of the translation of the actual state of affairs on the ground into formal treaty terms.

THIS gradual change in the tone of official British statements towards the Oder-Neisse line has, of course, been governed by external influences and events as much as by domestic opinion. Since 1953 the British government has had to pay due regard to the statements and policies of the Federal Republic. And alongside this change from 'reservation' of the whole question to 'formalisation' of the final delimitation have gone statements designed to demonstrate British support of Federal Germany. In his speech of 11 May 1953 referred to earlier, Churchill said 'we shall assure Dr Adenauer that western Germany will in no way be sacrificed or cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreements we and the other NATO countries have made with them. . . .'

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In 1959 and afterwards successive British governments have consistently refused to associate themselves with President de Gaulle's recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. In March 1959 the following exchange took place between Mr Healey and Mr Macmillan:

> *Mr Healey*: Is the Prime Minister aware that General de Gaulle has publicly announced his view that a unified Germany should accept the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's frontier with Poland? Is he also aware that this view is strongly held by the majority of the British people? Will he therefore associate himself with this view as nothing would do more to improve the prospect of successful negotiation on German rearmament?
> *The Prime Minister*: I must leave that to the decision of some future Gallup Poll . . . (Hansard, vol. 603, cols. 23–24, 7 April 1959).

In June 1960, after the breakdown of the Paris Summit Conference, Mr Allan said that 'Her Majesty's government did not consider that the final delimitation of Poland's frontier with Germany in anticipation of a peace treaty can be one' of the specific issues on which Britain would continue to seek agreement with the Soviet Union (Hansard, vol. 535, cols. 415–16, 22 June 1960). And in June 1961, with the Berlin crisis building steadily up to a new peak, Mr Macmillan answered similar pressure in the House of Commons by remarking that at that moment the question of the Oder-Neisse line was not 'really the most important issue we have to face. If we ever get—as I hope we shall—into some kind of negotiation that is another thing' (Hansard, vol. 642, col. 1173, 20 June 1961). In December 1961, Mr Peter Thomas somewhat disingenuously said that the British authorities were 'not aware of any West German demand for the recovery of their eastern territories' (Hansard, vol. 651, col. 88, 14 December 1961). In June 1964 the new Conservative premier, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, repeated Mr Macmillan's standpoint: 'The frontier question would be part of a complete settlement but that has not arisen yet. We have first to find a way of giving self-determination to the East Germans' (Hansard, vol. 697, col. 621, 25 June 1964). The point was repeated by Mr Wilson in March 1965 four months after the Labour government had taken over:

> Of course a lot has happened in the last 20 years [in the Oder-Neisse territories], especially in the establishment or re-establishment of dwellings, factories and so on, but there is no peace settlement and that question [the Oder-Neisse line] cannot be settled until there is . . . (Hansard, vol. 709, col. 319, 23 March 1965).

These government statements were nearly all made in reply to specific questions in the House of Commons. The bulk of these were designed to elicit the opinion, or at the very least embodied the view, that the issue of the Oder-Neisse line was one on which Britain could and should force the Federal German government to give way. Behind

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this view, which is common to elements of all political persuasions, one can trace the following ten propositions:

1. The final peace settlement with Germany should contain a strong punitive element. This should include the abandonment of the Oder-Neisse territories.
2. The loss of their homeland by the former German inhabitants of the Oder-Neisse territories is a just recompense for the sufferings inflicted on the Poles under the German occupation. (A tone noticeable in the various reviews of Miss Elizabeth Wiskemann's book *Germany's Eastern Neighbours* (London 1956).)
3. It is only right that Poland should be compensated for the loss of her 1939 territories which are now part of the Soviet Union. In June 1964, Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens, a respected figure in City of London circles, caused no little stir by attacking the unfortunate Vice-President of the Berlin House of Deputies, who was the guest speaker at a meeting of the European Luncheon Club in London, on these lines (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 June 1964. See also Auberon Herbert's letter to *The Times*, 26 February 1957, and a similar letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, 16 September 1957).
4. It is in any case too late to reverse the expulsion of the German population and the Polish settlements. By assenting to this expulsion, the British government virtually recognised the Oder-Neisse line anyway.[1]
5. German claims to the Oder-Neisse territories represent a revival of the old German nationalistic Adam.[2]
6. The refugee organisations speak only for a small section of the older generation of refugees. Even if they were offered the chance, few would wish to return.[3]
7. The issue of the Oder-Neisse territories is kept alive in West German politics only by the cowardice of the political leadership of the two main parties. It in no way reflects the real opinion of the German electorate and could easily be jettisoned if the two parties would agree.[4]

[1] 'In a sense the Allies recognised the frontier when they allowed the occupation zones to halt on the near side of it and when they agreed in principle to the transfer of population': *The Times*, 8 June 1956.

[2] A line much favoured by the Left in British politics; but cf. also Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens' comments above, and Lord St. Oswald's letter in the *Daily Telegraph*, 31 January 1959.

[3] Richard Lowenthal wrote in the *Scotsman*, 14 January 1954, of the 'glaring discrepancy between the shouting and flag-waving of a few professionals and the real popular energy behind it'. On 6 January 1959 the Bonn correspondent of *The Times* wrote 'the ordinary expellee does not reflect the extreme views of their supposed leaders'. On 17 September 1965 Neal Ascherson, also reporting from Bonn, wrote in the *Observer Foreign News Service*, '9-10 million Germans expelled from these lands are content to stay where they are in the West'.

[4] See for example the *Manchester Guardian's* Bonn correspondent, 4 May 1956; *The Times* Bonn correspondent reporting on the annual Anglo-German conference at Königswinter, 9 April 1962.

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8. In keeping the issue alive, the West German government is standing in the way of a European settlement.[5] They should be persuaded, urged, or forced to adopt more realistic policies.[6]
9. Recognition of the Oder-Neisse line would 'deprive the Soviet Union of a trump card'.[7]
10. In supporting the West German government and in agreeing that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line could, one day, be used as a bargaining counter[8] in negotiations for a settlement in central Europe, the British authorities are simply indulging in unrealistic and optimistic fantasy.[9]

Behind these propositions, which seem to have retained their validity ever since 1950, the attitude of British opinion towards the Oder-Neisse line seems to have gone through at least five distinct stages as the international situation developed. The first stage covers the period of the emergence of the West German state and the proposals for German rearmament. German claims to the 'lost territories' were regarded as a kind of irredentism; and in the Bevanite opposition to West German rearmament and to British involvement with the European Defence Community, fear that this would involve a British commitment to the course of that irredentism was one of their strongest arguments. In 1950 the signature of the treaty recognising the Oder-Neisse line by Poland and East Germany had been regarded as a piece of Soviet chicanery. 'Nothing could better illustrate the cynicism of Soviet policy', wrote the *Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1950. 'The Treaty derives its validity . . . from the will of the Russians alone',

[5] At Königswinter in 1960 the late Mr Brooman-White, a Conservative Whip, said that the prevailing mood in Germany seemed to be 'to treat all changes in tactics as if they were treason'; not to be outdone, Mr Richard Crossman accused Germany of obstructing all British proposals for ending the deadlock in central Europe: *The Times*, 28 March 1960.

[6] See for example Sir William Hayter, writing in *Der Stern*, reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, 5 January 1960, and Hansard, *passim*.

[7] Letter by A. Bregman in the *Daily Telegraph*, 19 January 1959.

[8] Visiting Berlin in March 1965, Mr Wilson, as Premier, said that from his own experience of negotiating with the Russians he knew that 'you don't declare your own position before you start negotiations': *Times*, 8 March 1965.

[9] In October 1960, following a speech made by Mr Nixon as Republican candidate for the United States presidency, recognising Polish unity in determination to 'defend their new western frontier', a leader in *The Times* commented: 'In future it will be much harder for the Americans and their allies to continue the pretence that the Oder-Neisse line is a purely temporary arrangement which will be scrapped or continued or adjusted when a peace treaty with a united Germany is eventually negotiated'. In September 1965, a leader in the *Guardian* bitterly attacked the refusal by Mr Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, then visiting Poland, to recognise the Oder-Neisse line, as based on 'feeble excuses' for 'pedestrian inaction'. 'There can only be one reason for our failure to recognise the Oder-Neisse line. It lies in the mistaken belief that one day we should be able to use the act of recognition as a bargaining counter in negotiations about the future of Europe. This optimistic picture ignores the fact that we no longer live in an age of secret diplomacy. Recognition has no conceivable value as a bargaining counter since public opinion in every European country—with the exception of Germany—has already accepted the permanence of Germany's eastern frontiers'. *Guardian*, 22 September 1965.

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said *The Times*, 8 June 1950; 'in future years this treaty will be much more difficult to justify than, say, the Danzig corridor before 1939', commented *The Scotsman*, 8 June 1950. But the issue of German rearmament made things much more difficult. Characteristic of this period is the resolution passed by the British Legion's London area at its annual conference in February 1953, 'viewing with grave concern the new signs of German territorial claims'.

This view merged very easily into the next stage as the Churchill government began to bend its energies towards a European settlement to be based on an East-West Locarno-style security agreement. This is perhaps best illustrated in an exchange between Harold Wilson, then one of the leaders of the Bevanite group in Parliament, and Mr Eden, in February 1954. British support of EDC would, Mr Wilson said,

> import irredentism into NATO. A new element would be imported which was thirsting for revenge, an element which, at the least, was conscious of lost territories in the east.

In his reply, Mr Eden admitted that there was a danger of irredentism being introduced into NATO, but added that in his view there would be much greater danger of German irredentism in a neutralised Germany with a German army:

> Did Mr Wilson think that from within NATO, twelve German divisions would launch an offensive attack against the Soviet Union in a spirit of irredentism in spite of the marked disapproval of the United States, Britain and France? . . .

This 'arms control' element in NATO and in EDC continued to be a very strong point in the internal discussions in both political parties on German rearmament. And that rearmament itself was of course linked both with generalised suspicions of German nationalism as an essentially bellicose force, and specific anxieties about the Oder-Neisse territories. Their existence and the claims of German refugees acted as the final clinching argument in a long chain of contention, the burden of which was the desirability of keeping Western Germany disarmed, both for itself and as a means of allaying Russian anxieties and achieving a settlement in central Europe.

These hopes were largely disappointed by the failure of the Berlin conference and the Geneva summit to move the Soviet Union out of the position of maximum security which a divided Germany, with part of it firmly under their control, already afforded them. German rearmament was duly carried through, supported by a slight majority within the Labour Party. The next stage in the development of British opinion came with the Polish October revolution of 1956. For the first time the Polish viewpoint came to weigh heavily in British discussion of a settlement in central Europe. The Polish October seemed to hold out the prospect of a loosening in the cohesion of the Soviet bloc, and it was immediately realised that Polish anxieties over their title to the Oder-Neisse territories was the strongest tie between Poland

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and the Soviet Union and the strongest weapon in the hands of a communist government. To encourage the Poles, two lines of advance found public support: the 'thinning out' or disengagement of forces in central Europe on either side of the 'iron curtain', or, in its extreme form, the establishment of a neutralised disarmed belt; and, inevitably, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line.

THE lead in this was taken by the Labour leadership, beginning with Hugh Gaitskell's speech to the NATO parliamentarians of 21 November 1956. On this occasion he was reported as saying: 'One of the factors which had to be faced was the Polish fear of Germany; if the question of the Polish-German frontier could be settled this fear might be removed. Although he had always been an opponent of the idea of a neutralised Germany, it was now time to look at the possibility of a wider neutralised area in Europe' (*The Times*, 22 November 1956). He continued and enlarged the theme in his Godkin lectures at Harvard University in January 1957. This is not the place for a historical exposé of the development of the doctrine of disengagement, except to notice that it tended to be supported by two somewhat inconsistent types of argument. The first of these rested on the unchallengeable syllogism that the division of Germany could be ended only with the agreement of the Soviet Union and its Polish and Czech allies, to the diminution of their security which the appearance of a unified Germany would constitute. Their fears would have to be allayed, their agreement purchased. Germany, to achieve reunion, would have therefore to accept formally the Oder-Neisse line as well as the diminution in her own security caused by the withdrawal of American and NATO ground forces from her territory. At Königswinter in April 1957 'the only point on which British Conservative and Labour members appeared to agree was on the need for the formal acceptance by Germany of the Oder-Neisse frontier if . . . any . . . plan for German reunification were to have a chance of success'. This first line of argument was aimed therefore at the end so loudly proclaimed by all German political elements of achieving German unification.

The second line of argument seemed to stem from the belief that the division of Germany was itself a major threat to stability and security in central Europe. This division would have therefore to be ended. But to end it the American and NATO forces called into central Europe to counter that instability would have to be withdrawn, and German security to that extent greatly diminished. The inconsistency in the argument reflected the continuing distrust of Germany in western opinion, a distrust which tended to focus on the Oder-Neisse line. But just as one may take leave to doubt whether even formal German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line would allay Polish anxieties unless it was accompanied by the total repression of all refugee organisations in Germany, so one may equally doubt whether

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British fears of German nationalism would be diminished if a unified Germany, independent of NATO, were to be re-established in central Europe. Fears, anxiety, and suspicion feed on issues such as that of German non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse territories, but they do not perish if such food is withdrawn; they find other issues and other anxieties to sustain them.

The 'disengagement' period left British opinion with one connection firmly established: that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was an important card in the western hand which Germany was preventing the West from playing. This conviction was to build up to heights of near hysteria in the next phase, that of the Berlin crisis of 1958–62. Recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and 'to a limited extent' of the East German government seemed an essential part of a deal with Khrushchev over Berlin. This became increasingly important as the achievement of a summit conference became an essential element in Conservative electoral strategy in 1959 after Mr Macmillan's visit to Moscow. The violence of the comments made by the British delegation to Königswinter in 1960 have already been quoted. British opinion remained exceedingly pessimistic as to the chances of standing off Soviet pressure on the Berlin issue, and inclined to revive proposals for disengagement and recognition as the only *quid pro quo* by which an end to that pressure could be achieved. A typical comment is that of Lord Boothby in the *Sunday Times* (16 July 1961):

> We can, I believe, negotiate a temporary settlement, which will guarantee access to Berlin on the part of the West perhaps by means [of a corridor] . . . in return for the abandonment of the Dulles' policy of liberation, the *de facto* recognition of the East German state and the firm acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line.

One element in this increasing impatience with Germany was undoubtedly a continuing propaganda effort on the part of the Polish authorities directed at opinion leaders, members of parliament, academics, and journalists in Britain.[10] The Rapacki Plan of November 1957 for a denuclearised zone in central Europe was received with wide support and sympathy in Britain. And the success of Polish efforts was perhaps naïvely testified to by Mr Ellis Smith in the Commons in November 1959 when he spoke of the deep impression left on M.P.s who attended the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in Warsaw in September that year by the Polish case and asked, 'Has not the time arrived for Her Majesty's Government to associate themselves with General de Gaulle's statement which has given widespread satisfaction throughout Europe?' (*Hansard*, vol. 613, col. 1160, 18 November 1959). Mr Ellis Smith stands on the left of British politics. But the Polish effort was equally successful in winning support on the right, as the following question from Sir Cyril Osborne

[10] The most widely distributed seem to be the hectographed Information Bulletin of the Western Press Agency Z.A.P., and the excellently produced monthly review, *Polish Perspectives*.

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indicates: 'Does my Right Honourable friend agree that there can be no reunification of Germany until the legitimate aspirations of Poland have been met?' (*Hansard*, vol. 697, col. 621, 20 June 1964).

As the Berlin crisis eased itself out of international politics and disappeared entirely in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, so the Oder-Neisse question was seen as the main obstacle to any exploitation of polycentrism within the Soviet bloc and the general post-Cuban détente. When Mr Wilson emerged as successor to Hugh Gaitskell in the Labour leadership, in his first public speech at Cardiff on February 21 1963, he repeated Mr Gaitskell's willingness to accept the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier as part of a deal over Berlin. This speech brought a flying visit from Herr Erler of the SPD, to whom he apparently explained that the West must be ready to show 'flexibility' in this direction in order to obtain what was wanted over Berlin.[11] The need to support the SPD, however, caused Mr Wilson soon to moderate his position. In August 1963 he visited Hamburg for the SPD conference. In an interview at Hamburg airport he was quoted as saying, 'The policy of the Labour Party is recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary at a final peace conference on Germany. This is the way *de facto* recognition would be given'.

This is a long step backward from the suggestion that German or British recognition of the Oder-Neisse line should be given unilaterally as a kind of sweetener before any such 'final peace conference' could be convened.

The present state of British opinion on the issue could perhaps be described as one of general acceptance of the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line coupled with the feeling that for the moment it is not *aktuell*, not of immediate importance. The gradual change in emphasis of West German policy and the signs of change in German policy towards Poland and East Europe generally are, of course, very welcome in London. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Mr Gomulka felt impelled in May 1965 to accuse Mr Wilson of 'having changed his mind' over the question of recognition of the line. A Foreign Office spokesman explained that, in the British view,

> any fresh redistribution of population in these areas is clearly out of the question; but in Whitehall it is felt that the Federal German government has the right to reserve recognition of the Oder-Neisse line until a reunified Germany is given a peace treaty.

At the annual conference of the Anglo-German association at Königswinter, the Oder-Neisse issue played a far smaller part, being raised mainly by the presence in the British delegation of no fewer than five persons who had just returned from participation in a very similar Anglo-Polish conference in Warsaw.

These feelings can, of course, alter easily. The activities of refugee

[11] The *Guardian's* Bonn correspondent reported that Herr Erler was left in a 'very misty' state by Mr Wilson's explanations (*Guardian*, 1 March 1963).

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organisations in Germany and the somewhat heavy-handed methods employed by West German propagandists to underline Germany's refusal to accept the frontier in advance of a peace settlement (special issues of stamps, protests over the *Times Atlas* and BEA flight charts failing to distinguish the Oder-Neisse territories which were part of Poland in 1939, the taking of advertisements in the Irish press, etc.), irritate British opinion and provide grist to the mill of the ideological opponents in Britain of the Federal Republic. But most of the British opinion would probably agree with the dispatch from Bonn to the *Observer Foreign News Service* (17 September 1965): 'The Oder-Neisse Line is the most boring dispute in Europe. It drives good men to mendacity and bad men to threats. It is also dead.'

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BERLIN IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE

Fritz René Allemann

IN the course of the last eight years West Berlin has been faced with a succession of difficulties and tribulations such as no other comparable city has had to endure. It has, in one way or another, for the moment at least, overcome them all. Yet it has not remained unscarred by the experience.

The long drawn-out conflict provoked by Khrushchev's ultimatum of November 1958 was suspended by the old Kremlin chief himself after the Cuban missile crisis and was not renewed by his less impulsive successors. Though Moscow still insists on considering West Berlin as a 'separate political entity' and on denying to the Federal Republic any rights in the Western sectors, it does not look like forcing this issue at present. It seems even less inclined to undertake any attempt designed to drive the western Allies from their Berlin outpost. The four-power status of the former German capital, it is true, has been practically abolished: it has paled into a virtual fiction ever since the break-up of the Allied *Kommandatura* and of the city's original administrative unity; it has seen its last props demolished by the hermetic closing of the frontiers between the Eastern and the Western sectors and by the militarisation of East Berlin. Yet the four essentials proclaimed by the western powers have not been touched by this process, and the practical connections between West Berlin and the Federal Republic remain intact. Even the monstrous Wall itself has become—though intermittently and one-sidedly—somewhat less impermeable by the succession of pass agreements that allow West Berliners, at least during high holiday seasons, to visit their relatives in the 'capital of the GDR'.

Thus the situation of the surrounded city looks, on the surface anyway, certainly more 'normal' than it did four years ago, and infinitely more assured than at the beginning of the Berlin crisis. It is, of course, a strange and rather uneasy sort of normalisation, punctuated with grisly regularity by the shots killing or maiming unfortunate refugees who are still foolhardy or desperate enough to try crossing over illegally from East Berlin. The Wall is even being steadily extended in depth and 'modernised' in structure in order to plug the last loopholes by the erection of a vast, many-tiered system embracing, besides the original construction itself, wire fences, trenches, watchtowers, pillboxes, and watchdog wires; the long-evacuated houses standing too near the borderline have been pulled down. At the same time, there appears a certain tendency to 'beautify' the whole fortification zone so as to give it, to observers from the West, a less forbidding and barbarous though even more formidable air. These changes are, in a way,

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characteristic of the present political tendencies in the GDR: while still anxious completely to isolate the Soviet Zone from all 'inimical influences', the regime does its best to put up some facade of respectability and to lessen the impact of its gruesome measures upon the outside world.

West Berlin, in the meantime, looks very much like a boom town. It has finally caught up with West German prosperity: figures of production, investment, and social product are going up by leaps and bounds, much more rapidly actually than in the Federal Republic as a whole. New business enterprises, many of them of foreign origin, are settling again in the city or setting up branch offices, attracted above all by an ingenious system of tax reliefs and other incentives. The dangerous outflow of population, too, has been reversed: in the course of the last few years more people have come to Berlin from the Federal Republic to live and work there than have left the city, and workers—mostly young workers—from West Germany have found out that Berlin is worth not only a journey (as the tourist slogan has it) but that it may even be worth settling down there for some years, paying less taxes, enjoying additional social benefits, maybe evading conscription, and, on top of all that, savouring the attractions of what is still Germany's first and most lively metropolis. Thus, the political climate of regained confidence has been reflected in economic progress, and has in turn been strengthened by the excellent prospects of production and trade.

But this bright side of the Berlin medal, while it should certainly be kept in mind, has also its less shiny reverse. Strange as it may seem, the betterment of material conditions and the optimism engendered by prosperity go hand in hand with some symptoms of psychological crisis, with an ill-defined and generally rather inarticulate malaise. It may be worthwhile to take a closer look at this phenomenon, hard as it may be to describe it.

WHAT lies beneath and behind these mental changes is a crisis of adjustment to a new and not yet fully mastered situation. Since the building of the Wall, West Berlin has to some extent lost its formerly all-pervading sense of purpose. In the fifties—as before, during the blockade of 1948–49—it had firmly withstood all the accumulating difficulties because its people had felt strongly that they were performing a useful, even a vital function in the context of the divided nation as well as of the divided world. Twice, they had defied communist threats and harassments. They had stood firm in face of a challenge that might easily have daunted a less self-assured population. They felt themselves to be the democratic vanguard and to represent, by their perseverance, the hope for German reunification; this gave them a sentiment of much more than local importance, a certitude of standing at the centre of things, and this in turn enabled them psychologically to cope with the hardships and potential dangers.

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But there was more to it. As a matter of fact, Berlin upheld not only the *hope* of national unity but even, to a large extent, the living *reality* of this unity. So long as the 'Berlin hole' in the iron curtain was kept open, so long as people from East Germany could easily come there, either for good or as regular visitors, this unity was more than just a pious wish: it was demonstrated every day, and the city, exposed and uncertain of its future as it may have been, was not really isolated so long as it could serve as a link between the two Germanies. Bound firmly to the West, but in close and unbroken contact with the East, it represented not only the foremost Western bridgehead within the Eastern power zone, it was also a peaceful bridge, keeping alive the sense of belonging together and, in doing so, maintaining the will to overcome an artificial and cruel division. For many people in the Soviet Zone, it was the one place to which they could come as often as they wanted to read western newspapers, see western movies, buy western goods, keep in touch with the world from which they had been severed by a foreign-imposed dictatorship—and above all the German part of this world. At the same time, what went on beyond the Brandenburg gates was, for the Berliners, not a closed book but a vivid part of their own everyday life. The fact that families lived in the different sectors of the city under most unequal conditions and inimical regimes did not become all-important so long as they could meet when they wished. And this meant, basically, that the nation still subsisted as a whole; the parts were interconnected by the existence of a divided but still functioning city organism, integrating, in a unique way, its two separate halves.

All this went when the Wall went up and when, a few days later, West Berliners—as opposed to West Germans—were barred from entering the Eastern sector of their own city at all. At one stroke, West Berlin was left on its own, without the contact with the East by which it had thrived and which had formed an integral part of its existence, thrown back into a position of forced self-containment, reduced, in a sense, to conditions which only now were felt as really anomalous and basically artificial. The city—or rather the city fragment, left over when it was cut off from its Eastern part—suddenly found itself without a task to perform apart from the task of resistance—and even this residual function became more and more abstract. As time went on and the Berlin conflict subsided, the challenge was less immediately felt, and it could no longer give real substance to the people who, in the midst of the totalitarian sea, only now had become islanders in the complete sense of the term.

It is true that this danger was immediately realised, and many projects were elaborated to develop a new function for the city that had lost its old one. Out of this sense of loss, the idea was born of making Berlin into a cultural centre, of channelling its energies (with outside financial help) more than ever into the field of science and the arts. But not very much has come of this. Some new institutes of learning

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and research have been set up, some new artistic ventures have attracted some writers and artists to the banks of the Spree—but none of these measures was of the scope to inject a new sense of importance into the population at large. And many of the original impulses have already dried up, deadened by bureaucratic formalities or prohibited from growing into something strong and lively by lack of means; with the call for stricter economy governing the West German budgets, these impediments seem likely to have even greater impact in the future. Thus, while some initiatives have certainly produced useful if limited results, they have, as a whole, missed their wider target by touching only the fringes of the problem—either from lack of imagination or from lack of finance, or from a combination of the two.

Now the lack of success (or, at best, the much qualified success) of such schemes is, in itself, not so important. But the fact that very little—and nothing of a spectacular kind—has come out of all the big (or big-sounding) ideas has deepened a feeling of scepticism and even of resignation that makes itself felt politically as well. Whoever surveys the Berlin scene today and remembers the state of mind of the Berliners five years ago will be struck by the difference. While the people now feel much more assured of their future, and the status quo is certainly under no acute threat, their old cocky self-assurance has lost much of its intensity and its glamour. They no longer doubt that they will go on living their lives—and, outwardly, even improving their position—without dramatic outside interference. But other doubts are cropping up instead: the old combative mood is no longer there, the posture of defiance has grown as stale as the rhetoric of those leaders who are still repeating the old slogans. At the top as well as the bottom, people are beginning to realise that they have to do some new thinking if they want to carve out a new position for their city in a changing world and within the context of a new international situation that has left the old (and for a long time highly effective) myths high and dry.

ACTUALLY, the change that has occurred can be measured even by the yardstick of current political slogans. When the impact of the Wall was still new, and therefore more strongly felt, everybody on its Western side agreed that no easing of tensions was possible while this structure still stood. *Die Mauer muss weg* (The Wall must go) was, for a time, the recurrent refrain of every speech made and fervently applauded by Berlin politicians of every political label. Today you rarely hear these words. The Berliners as well as the outsiders, in and out of Germany, are coming more and more to realise that the shocking construction and all it stands for is there to stay and cannot be cursed away; and they have come, slowly and reluctantly, to adjust themselves to this thought. Willy Brandt himself, the city's popular Mayor, has coined a new phrase that reflects this realisation: the Berliners, he has said for some years, must learn to 'live with the Wall'—which, of

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course, does not at all mean accepting it and ceasing to protest against it, but which makes clear that these protests are bound to remain futile and that therefore the energies once devoted to them must be redirected to the task of trying to mitigate the effects of what occurred in 1961 rather than to attempts to turn the clock back and undo what has been done.

This may be a perfectly realistic attitude (and the present writer certainly thinks it is). But it cannot be denied that this spirit of realism, the search for 'little steps' to ease the division of Germany, even the hope of 'change through rapprochement' first formulated by Willy Brandt's aide Egon Bahr (the press officer of the City Government), basically express nothing more than the impotence to alter hard and unpalatable facts by any other way than by compromise. That is, however, tantamount to saying that the Wall—originally a defensive instrument designed to prevent the well-nigh catastrophic outflow of the most active part of the population from the GDR and to ease the strain which had brought the Soviet Zone system near to collapse—has, in the meantime, changed its significance: it has become an offensive weapon, too, a means for blackmailing and badgering the West Germans and the West Berliners and for extorting concession from them. So long as the Ulbricht regime holds its own subjects, as it has done since 1961, in a state of practically complete isolation, it can use the West German's and West Berliner's urge for unity and the desire to make living conditions for the East Germans easier, to further its own political aims, to obtain some measure of recognition, to press Bonn more effectively in the direction of 'negotiations between the two German states', and to promote the impression that this is the only way left if they wish to avoid the complete drawing apart of the two Germanies and their people.

These tactics, of course, apply to the whole German problem. Their particular relevance to Berlin, however, is clearly demonstrated by the history of the passes agreements. It had been clear for a long time that something had to be done in order to allow the split families within the two parts of the city to come together again at least temporarily and intermittently. This was, fundamentally, a simple act of humanity. But the GDR government was strong and clever enough to lay down political conditions for its agreement to such a move. Its Bonn counterpart having failed in the attempt to solve the question within the framework of the interzonal trade machinery, and a formidable pressure in favour of agreeing to Ulbricht's conditions having built up in West Berlin, the Federal Republic had to yield, just before Christmas 1963, to some at least of the GDR's wishes, even if this meant renouncing some principles which had until then been considered as irrevocable. They had to accept negotiations not simply on the local government level (i.e. between the administrations of East and West Berlin) but between the Senate of Berlin and the GDR state authorities. By doing this, they went some way in the direction of accepting *de facto* the

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Eastern contention that this was a purely Berlin matter outside the scope of the Federal Government—even if, in actual fact, the Senate and Bonn acted in close concert. They had, further, to allow GDR officials (though disguised as 'non-political' postal officials) to function within the territory of West Berlin. And, finally, they had to consent to a text on the passes which formally styled East Berlin the 'Capital of the GDR'—in flagrant contravention of the city's four-power status as well as of the Bonn custom of shunning the term 'German Democratic Republic' like a mortal sin.

In the end, these formal concessions proved justified in so far as they were certainly offset and probably far outweighed by the political effect of the agreements; actually, the settlement arrived at in 1963 has since been several times renegotiated and renewed; the last visiting period took place at Whitsuntide this year. The movement of many hundreds of thousands of West Berliners streaming across opened barriers to meet again their relatives beyond the pale, was a forceful and massive demonstration for the world at large, which only now came to realise what the artificial division of a metropolis of four million inhabitants really meant: the crude severing of the closest family ties, the splitting off of parents from children, of brothers from sisters, and husbands from wives. The result was indeed so striking that much of the original opposition to the agreements, based mainly on juridical arguments, has in the last year or so melted away. Some of the original fervour, it is true, has also gone out of the regular family meetings made possible once more; but even this is all to the good, because it diminishes the political pressure and allows the Western side to stand firmly on the ground to which it retired in 1963 without paying a new and steadily higher price for every new settlement.

It is clear, nevertheless, that the present mood of Berlin is one of readiness to make concessions rather than of combativeness. The old ideas that West Berlin had to be a thorn in the flank of the communist East German regime, that it had an offensive task to fulfil, that it was a 'front line city' in the cold war, bearing the brunt of an unceasing struggle—these ideas have been on the wane for quite some time, and people are looking round for new justifications of their insular existence more in tune with an era of détente (it is characteristic that the very term 'front line city' is no longer employed in West Berlin and is retained only as a term of abuse in the communist leaders' polemical utterances). More than that: people—and this refers to the politicians as well as to the man in the street—are beginning to reflect on how their city might be integrated into the new trend towards 'coexistence'. The political parties themselves are thinking more and more along these lines; not only the Social-Democrats but, in an even less orthodox way, the Free Democrats, too, are groping around for new conceptions based on the belief that an approach to unity both on the German and on the Berlin level can be found only through a loosening of tensions.

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THIS search for new paths—implying the search for a new position for Berlin in the present world—is reflected, for example, in a new project devised by Willy Brandt which, though it is still in its formative stage, seems typical of the present tendencies. Brandt obviously has felt for quite some time that it was not enough for Berlin just to hold its own by resisting communist inroads, but that something should be done to create a certain interest even within the East itself in its continuing free existence; this would also avoid the danger that the slow and painful but inevitable drawing together of eastern and western Europe might by-pass the city. From these considerations he advanced the idea—vague as it still may be—that Berlin should take on a new function as an entrepôt in East-West trade, that it might create a Free Zone which could offer facilities for the ever-expanding commercial interchanges between the two blocs and so become a meeting place for the two Europes in the economic sphere where eastern goods might be displayed for sale to the West and western merchandise could be made accessible to the buyers from the Soviet bloc.

The interest of the plan, the outlines of which are still rather blurred, lies not so much in what may come of it but rather in its symptomatic character: in the realisation it reflects of the need for Berlin to take an active part in the process of reconciliation and peaceful contact rather than continue as a kind of hedgehog showing its pointed barbs to its surroundings. Thus, it is hoped, the city might again, in this respect, revert to its former bridge function, if not between the two Germanies then between the two camps in which they are embedded. It is true that this suggestion, made last year, has aroused little enthusiasm and found only a lukewarm response both in the Federal Republic and the GDR: the Bonn government has not yet been convinced that the scheme is practicable or even desirable, and in East Berlin there is some mistrust that it might, if it bore fruit, detract from the importance of Leipzig as the meeting ground for East-West trade. But it shows the lines along which the leading politicians and administrators of West Berlin are thinking at present—lines far removed from any offensive or missionary spirit.

There is, however, another development on a very different plane that has to be taken into account if we want to gain an all-round picture of new trends in Berlin—and that is the growing alienation of parts of the Berlin intelligentsia not only from the old Berlin myths but from western ideas and values in general: the emergence of a new left radicalism outside the established party, based on a relatively small but highly articulate and vocal nucleus of opposition and led by some influential student groups mainly at the Berlin Free University. It may seem strange that precisely this institution, founded back in 1948 by professors and students protesting against the political *Gleichschaltung* of the old-established East Berlin Humboldt University, has now developed into a centre of radical socialist and, in some instances, even near-communist and revolutionary thought. But, ironical though

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it may appear, this is certainly the case: more than any other German university, the Berlin *alma mater* has become a hotbed of protest against not only the German '*embourgeoisement*' but western policies and ideologies as well, of violent anti-Americanism engendered by the Vietnam war, and of a non-conformism bordering on a state of permanent revolt.

IT would be wrong to ascribe this phenomenon mainly to influences from East Berlin. The 'official' communist line as exemplified by the East German SED exerts little attraction upon the unruly and rebellious spirits of the academic youth, even though many of their pronouncements are couched in Marxist, Leninist, and sometimes even Maoist terms. What is more to the point is the youthful dissatisfaction with a society based upon an ever-widening political consensus, with an official opposition that has long ceased to oppose but is concentrating on attempts to worm its way into the government machine, and with a pragmatism tempered by a whole system of political taboos. In its own way this New Left, gathered around the Socialist Students' Union (SDS) and the very active Debating Club but exerting its influence even upon the SPD-fostered Social-Democratic High School League (SHB) and the Liberal Students' Union (LSD), reflects the search for new ideas (which, in this case, turn out to be the old utopias), as opposed to the aspirations of the affluent society: while the general malaise felt so widely in Berlin at present tends towards accommodation with 'reality', the students' movement seems inspired rather by the denial of reality in favour of ideal aims, of wholesale social change, and of revolutionary fervour.

The world took notice of this movement for the first time in February of this year, when some thousand students demonstrated in the streets of West Berlin against American Vietnam policy, a demonstration which degenerated into an attack on the US Information Centre where they tried to haul down the Stars and Stripes and had to be dispersed by the police. In fact, these incidents were just the culminating point of an agitation that had been going on for a long time but had been restricted, up to then, to the University itself. The Vietnam issue is important because on this matter the leftist ultras of the SDS and the Debating Club have been joined by representatives of the moderate student left (SHB and LSD) as well (though the members of these groups, as far as can be ascertained, did not join in the attack on the Information Centre): it has provided a rallying point for all intellectual discontent with the West in general, and the fact that the political leaders and the parties in Berlin had, up to the moment of this demonstration, rather shunned discussion of this issue and had not tried to make their own attitude clear, certainly contributed to give free rein to this anti-USA campaign. It is obvious that many of the Berlin politicians feel uneasy about American policy in Asia but are reluctant to express their misgivings because, in their exposed position,

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they feel too dependent on the goodwill of the United States; on the other hand Willy Brandt himself expressed his solidarity with official Washington policy only when he felt forced by the incidents to do so.

Long before these events took place, however, something like an acute crisis had already developed on matters of University policy. In order to understand this constant struggle, it has to be kept in mind that the Free University has, from its foundation, tried to associate its students much more closely with its organisational structure than other academic institutions in Germany do: according to the original idea, it was conceived as a 'community of those teaching and learning'—which, in practical terms, meant that the *Studentenschaft* (i.e. the official body representing the students as a whole) was given a large say in all organisational and administrative matters, even including a voice in the appointment of professors, a representation on the University Senate —the governing body—and on the faculties. This arrangement, known and much discussed as the 'Berlin Model', can, however, be made to work only so long as both professors and students consider themselves as partners in a common venture; as the radical student movement gained ground and exerted a wide influence within the *Studentenschaft*, this precondition no longed existed. Actually, the spokesmen of the New Left developed an entire new ideology, according to which the students' struggle was some sort of a class struggle and the University itself a battlefield where the forces working for social change had an opportunity to impose their will by attacking uncompromisingly all 'reactionary influences'. Starting from these premises and trying to put these theories into practice, they obviously came up against the resistance not only of conservative professors but of liberal ones as well, and this naturally led to constant friction which has engaged public attention for years on end.

Now it is certainly true that the partisans of the New Left constitute only a minority of the students; their hard core may number a few hundreds only, while more than 16,000 students are enrolled in the Free University alone. Yet, by cleverly choosing their ground and, above all, by provoking the University authorities to measures that were not always wise and well-advised, they have managed to spread their influence far beyond their organised ranks. Apart from which, they profit from the fact that many students of more moderate outlook carry their lack of interest in 'political squabbles' to the point of taking no part in *Studentenschaft* elections (the participation in these votes rarely exceeds 50 per cent)—with the result that the Left, both the extreme and the more moderate, practically always retain control of the student bodies and can continue their attempts to use the University as a political battleground.

These symptoms should not, of course, be over-rated. They are not representative of the Berlin mood as a whole. But if academic leftism may still be regarded as a fringe phenomenon, somewhat divorced from the tendencies within the population at large, it is, for all that, not

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unimportant, because it demonstrates in a particularly striking manner how far the estrangement of some of the German elites (and the Berlin elites in particles) from the basic attitudes characteristic of post-war Germany has already gone. The vacuum of ideas and the lack of wider perspectives left by the new situation of Berlin is being filled, in this part of the body politic at any rate, by a curious relapse into utopianism of a Marxian or rather pseudo-Marxian kind, and while this may be harmless in itself it becomes potentially dangerous so long as the Establishment (of which the social-democratic opposition forms an integral part) finds no convincing and more constructive way of filling the vacuum.

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THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The Role of Technocrats in the DDR

Thomas A. Baylis

A RECURRING theme of political speculation from Saint-Simon onward has been the possibility of joining industrial and technological skill to political power; the suggestion has been that an age moulded by scientific and industrial revolution might see fit to grant political authority to the elite making that revolution. No group has been more diligent in trying to fit such a hypothesis to empirical reality than writers on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There the very orientation of the regimes towards rapid industralisation and technical modernisation has made plausible the proposition that an elite of scientists, planners, managers, and engineers might successfully challenge the ill-trained party bureaucrats and professional revolutionaries originally in power. With the change in leadership personnel, so the argument proceeds, we may also expect changes in policy, from heavy-handed bureaucratism and emphasis on both internal and external class struggle, to economic pragmatism directed towards technical, and with it societal, rationalisation.

The assumption of power by the ex-engineers Brezhnev and Kosygin in the USSR, and that country's somewhat hesitant turn towards Liberman-inspired economic reforms, have given this argument new interest. My purpose here is to examine the evidence for a similar, and perhaps more pronounced, development in East Germany. There, a steady increase in the representation of highly-trained planning, managerial, and other technically or scientifically oriented officials in the higher party and state organs was followed in 1963 by the introduction of a broad set of economic reform measures known as the New Economic System (*Das neue ökonomische System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft*—NÖSPL). The New Economic System became, and has remained, the centre of the SED's attention; except for the customary imprecations against the 'fascists' and 'militarists' in West Germany, public life and party propaganda in the DDR have been dominated by its demands. The hypothesis presents itself that a technocratic elite has indeed quietly taken power and has been translating its group interests into policy. It is the validity of this proposition I wish to examine here.

First it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term 'technocrat'. No argument assuming a rigid dichotomy between technical experts and 'the party' in East European countries deserves serious attention, for the simple reason that virtually all leading technical officials are party members, often with long experience in organisational or agitational work, while an increasing number of leading party functionaries have had at least some technical training. The distinction I shall

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draw will be a more narrow, essentially functional one. Those whose training and experience have been primarily in technical, scientific, or economic fields, and whose present responsibilities lie in one of these areas, will be labelled 'technocrats'; those whose training, experience, and present functions lie primarily in party organisation, agitprop, security, or other fields will be labelled, somewhat crudely, the apparatchiki. It is well to remember, however, that *both* groups are composed of loyal party members who have been thoroughly schooled in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and who deeply resent this sort of classification as overlooking, among other things, the essential dialectical unity of the political and economic spheres in a socialist society.

Classified according to their present functions (see Table I), the

TABLE I

Composition of SED Central Committee after 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th party congresses, according to present function

	1950 %	1954 %	1958 %	1963 %
Agitprop-culture-education ...	10·0	14·1	14·2	17·7
State functionaries	25·0	19·6	18·9	14·9
Mass organisations	13·8	12·5	10·8	8·8
Party bureaucracy	32·5	17·2	25·0	21·0
Workers	3·8	5·5	1·4	1·1
Economic functionaries ...	15·0	31·3	29·8	36·5

representation of economic functionaries among Central Committee members and candidates has increased from 15 per cent after the third party congress (1950) to 36·5 per cent after the sixth (1963). What is at least equally important, however, is the character of these functionaries. Most of those so classified in 1950 were in fact long-time party members without technical training, pressed into service as planners, economic ministers, factory managers and the like, in an era when political loyalty was more important to the regime than specialised expertise. Of those classed as technical functionaries in 1963, however, the majority have university or technical school diplomas; at least fourteen have the doctorate. The proportion of university graduates among the candidates is particularly high, and a large number of both candidates and full members are actively engaged in production or research, rather than belonging to the economic bureaucracy.

For the top members of the party, it is well to make the first distinction more explicit. Particularly among the older generation, many leading technocrats were in fact old party members whose technical careers date only from after the war, and who acquired their expertise, and often with it a rational economic outlook, on the job. The prototype of this sort of functionary was Bruno Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission from 1952 to 1961. Trained in sales work, Leuschner joined the German Communist Party in 1931, and spent the

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Hitler years in underground work in a series of prisons and concentration camps. Only after the war did he turn to economic affairs, first as Central Committee secretary and in 1947 as director of the planning division in the provisional East German government. The younger generation of technocrats have more often climbed to prominence on a series of economic and technical rungs; their political work has always been secondary. Erich Apel, Chairman of the Planning Commission from 1963 until his suicide in December of last year, is perhaps an extreme example of this type. While Leuschner was sitting in Mauthausen, Apel was at work on German rockets at Peenemünde; captured and exported to Russia, where he worked as an engineer, he returned to the DDR in 1952 to become Deputy Minister of Machine Building, and joined the SED only in 1957. Some of the younger functionaries (e.g. Mittag and Jarowinsky) have been educated and lived their entire adult lives under communism, and thus are without any attachment to the revolutionary and underground struggles of the past. They are the purer technocrats, and as a group are probably lower on ideological identification—but also on political skills and interest—than the older men. We shall see, however, that the differences between them are probably less important than their affinities.

THE record of East German politics since at least 1956 is one of continuing conflict, sometimes latent, sometimes overt, between policies justified by the requirements of ideology or politics, and others answering to the demands of economic rationality. With few exceptions, politics emerged victorious from each of these encounters until the adoption of the New Economic System at the sixth congress. Then the situation becomes more blurred: the NES itself becomes the ground on which the struggle continues. The suicide of Erich Apel is a benchmark of this struggle.

The prehistory of the NES really begins with the 1956 heresy of the economist Fritz Behrens. Taking advantage of the relative intellectual freedom that flourished in the DDR that year, Behrens put forward a series of proposals which, while similar in some respects to those made by Liberman and parts of the New Economic System itself, went beyond the detailing of economic reforms (e.g. decentralisation, price reform, use of profitability criteria) to their underlying political and ideological implications. He saw a 'contradiction . . . between the form of state direction of the economy and the *content* of the quickly developing economic substructure', suggested that the state ought to begin withering away, and urged greater play for the 'spontaneity' of the working masses. The implicit conflict between economic rationalisation and highly centralised political control thus emerged openly, as the regime was quick to recognise. Behrens was charged with 'underestimating the significance of political power for the working class', ignoring the 'leading role of the party', and minimising the menace of imperialist saboteurs. Not the withering away, but the

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consolidation (*Festigung*) of the socialist state was necessary at the present historical stage. After months of extravagent and bitter attacks on his 'revisionism', Behrens in 1958—and again in 1960—performed the obligatory self-criticism.

One of Behrens' harshest critics in the massive campaign launched against his ideas was Fred Oelssner, a leading party ideologist who had turned his attention to economic problems; it was his class at the Institute of Economic Sciences that was reportedly the centre for the diffusion of the 'revisionist' ideas of Behrens and several colleagues. However, it was quite clear that Oelssner shared Behrens' premise that DDR planning could not afford to ignore objective 'economic laws', even when they appeared to contradict political imperatives.[1] This view predominated in the DDR's powerful Economic Council, created in April 1957 as the central body for economic decision-making. The Council was headed by Leuschner and included in its membership Oelssner, two other old party functionaries turned economic specialists, Fritz Selbmann and Heinrich Rau, the head of the agricultural commission Paul Scholz, and the Finance Minister Willy Rumpf; Heinrich Ziller, the Central Committee's secretary for economic policy, while not a formal member, shared their pragmatic orientation. This orientation led some of the Council's members to increasingly open confrontations with Ulbricht: Oelssner and Scholz proposed following the Polish example and dissolving unprofitable collective farms, while Selbmann and Oelssner opposed Ulbricht's plan to imitate the decentralisation measures undertaken by Khrushchev in the Soviet Union.

The opposition of what came to be called the 'managerialists' coincided with an unsuccessful attempt by the chief of cadres Karl Schirdewan and the State Security Minister Ernst Wollweber to replace Ulbricht, an undertaking which culminated in their own removal at the thirty-fifth Central Committee plenum in February 1958. Only Ziller, who committed suicide before the plenum, has been directly identified as one of the *frondeurs*, but Oelssner was accused of supporting them and removed from the Politburo, while Selbmann was fired as Deputy Premier. The latter bore the brunt of the attack on those accused of adopting a 'Western managerial ideology'. 'For Fritz Selbmann', one party critic declared, 'the new era is not socialism and communism, but the new technology and atomic power.' Other presumed 'managerialists', like Rau and Scholz, were not punished, but at the next party congress numerous economic officials, most notably the high planning official Grete Wittkowski, were removed from the Central Committee or demoted, and economic functionaries were purged in the party organisations of seven of the DDR's fifteen regions.[2]

Following the purges, Ulbricht was able to implement his own

[1] Fred Oelssner, 'Staat und Ökonomie in der Übergangsperiode', *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, 1957/3, pp. 321–31. Behrens' original article was published in *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (3. Sonderheft, 1957), pp. 105–40.

[2] Martin Jänicke, *Der dritte Weg* (Köln, 1964), p. 94.

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economic reorganisation on the Soviet model. The central economic ministries were dissolved, certain planning functions were assigned to regional bodies, and power at the centre was concentrated in the Planning Commission under Leuschner, who, though he had sympathised with the outlook of the 'managerialists', had avoided lending them open support. The focus of the SED's economic policy became the *ökonomische Hauptaufgabe*: overtaking the Federal Republic in per capita consumption of 'all' important foods and commodities by 1961. This programme, with its initial emphasis on the expansion of consumer goods production, housing, and the like, followed a similar pronouncement by Khrushchev in the USSR, and was accompanied by new pressures for recognition of the DDR and the neutralisation of West Berlin. Ulbricht hoped to establish the legitimacy and viability of the DDR by increasing its attractiveness while liquidating the Western 'show-window' within it.

Achieving the *ökonomische Hauptaufgabe* would have been problematic in the best of circumstances. In early 1960, however, Ulbricht decided to complete the collectivisation of the countryside, and forced the remaining one-half of the country's agricultural acreage into the 'socialist sector' in the astonishingly short time of three months. Circumstantial evidence, as well as economic logic, suggests that collectivisation was carried out only in the teeth of opposition from the Planning Commission and Minister-President Grotewohl.[3] Immediately before the collectivisation drive, several agricultural officials, regional party secretaries, and Grotewohl himself, had renounced the use of force in bringing farmers into the collectives. At the eighth Central Committee plenum, summoned only towards the close of the drive, the Planning Commission official Wunderlich and the party secretary of the Magdeburg district Pisnik both expressed their surprise at developments. Since Pisnik was a candidate member of the Politburo, it may well be that even this body was not consulted before the campaign was initiated. In any case, forced collectivisation upset the delicate balance of the economy and provoked a sudden growth of the refugee stream which was stopped only by the building of the Berlin wall.

The primacy of politics over economic rationality enjoyed still another triumph in the year of the Wall. In order to free the DDR from dependence on trade with West Germany, *Aktion Störfreimachung* was initiated; the attempt was made to put into production thousands of items previously imported, and to convert East German facilities to the utilisation of materials from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Once again, this unrealistic attempt at partial autarky was opposed by leading planning and factory officials. In July 1961 Leuschner left the Planning Commission to become 'coordinator' of the entire economy and subsequently DDR delegate to Comecon. Later events

[3] Ernst Richert has assembled the evidence on this point in his *Macht ohne Mandat* (Köln & Opladen, 1963), pp. 60–62, esp. fn. 179, p. 61.

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strongly suggest that he was kicked upstairs, probably for opposing *Störfreimachung*. His functions as Planning Commission head were divided between two veteran apparatchiki without technical experience, Alfred Neumann and Karl Mewis—the latter notorious for his leading role in the collectivisation drive. The plan worked out under Leuschner's direction was rejected because it took too little account of the demands of *Störfreimachung*: the 'wanderers between two worlds' in economic posts, said Mewis, would have to change their ways. Neumann added a criticism of the 'confused leadership principles' of the old Commission. Only a year later, however, *Aktion Störfreimachung* was quietly dropped; six months after that, so was Mewis.

In the critical decisions of the 1956–1963 period, then, political considerations consistently triumphed over economic ones. It would be an error, however, to regard these years as ones of complete impotence for the technocrats. Their numbers in prominent positions in party and state increased; even when the Planning Commission was divided and placed under the leadership of political functionaries, the advisers and staff immediately below them remained largely unchanged. In these years demands for technological rationalisation crept increasingly into party propaganda; and the very fact that the crucial issues we have discussed could be formulated as a choice between political and technocratic alternatives testifies to the growing influence of the second perspective. Perhaps unconsciously, the ground was being prepared for the New Economic System.

WHAT seems to have led to the actual introduction of the System was the convergence of practical problems with the discussion of new ideas and with changes in personnel, although it is difficult to assign to each the exact weight it deserves. The death of *Störfreimachung* may be taken as symbolic of a recognition on the part of the SED leaders of the failure of previous economic policy. Total growth had slowed, investment had fallen drastically behind plan figures, and the DDR suffered from serious economic disproportions. In mid-1962 Erich Apel moved to the Council of Ministers, and Günter Mittag, who had already expressed unconventional ideas concerning the usefulness of market devices in a planned economy, became Central Committee economic secretary. It seems probable that these, together with Leuschner, were in a particularly favourable position to promote measures of economic rationalisation, given the evident failure of Mewis and Neumann. The publication of Liberman's 'Profit-Plan-Premium' in the DDR towards the end of September prompted a discussion among DDR economists encouraged by Ulbricht himself. It is noteworthy that one of Liberman's most enthusiastic advocates was the ex-'revisionist' Behrens. By November, the draft programme of the SED was ready, containing important elements of the NES. The essentials of the System were spelled out at the sixth party congress in January, and after some months of further discussion and a giant

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conference of managers and economic functionaries in June, the Council of Ministers published a lengthy set of directives putting the NES in relatively definitive form. The emphases and details of the System, however, have fluctuated considerably in the ensuing years.

Official East German descriptions of the NES begin (and often end) with a series of highly generalised slogans. Since the NES has itself become a kind of reigning domestic ideology in the DDR, little is proposed or carried out in the economy that is not claimed to belong to it. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the general orientations, organisational changes, and some of the specific economic reforms that constitute it.

Perhaps most important is the insistence that in the present stage of the DDR's development the critical problem of socialism is an economic one, which must be solved by economic means: 'It is an irrefutable truth that the most effective political argument in the long run is the economic facts that the workers of our republic create in tireless labour', Mittag has written.[4] Ulbricht has adopted the slogan of 'thinking economically' as the desideratum for DDR citizens; others speak of 'rationalisation' and 'leadership on the basis of economic principles'. What must be promoted is the 'scientific-technical revolution', which represents a *qualitative* change in the forces of production fully possible only under socialism.[5] Its success entails a struggle against 'bureaucratism' and 'administering' in favour of 'scientific leadership', increased responsibilities for lower-echelon economic officials, and 'creative' worker participation in production and planning decisions. The chief mechanisms of rationalisation are to be the 'economic levers', i.e., interlocking incentives intended to maximise efficiency, quality, and quantity of output. These are to be based on the 'material interestedness' of workers and functionaries, for (in a slogan that seems to stand Adam Smith on his head) 'what profits the society must also profit the individual factory and the workers in it'. The principal lever consistent with the need for making planning simpler and more flexible and production more efficient is *profit*, though there are numerous others.

The basis of the reorganisation of party and state organs is the 'production principle', which is intended to allow 'all questions to be decided . . . where they can best be resolved'. More specifically, it means organisation divided along vertical, functional lines rather than territorially, with a concomitant delegation of responsibilities away from the central organs to those 'closer to production'. This, it is held, will strengthen 'democratic centralism', not weaken it, because it frees the central authorities from the burden of trivial details and permits them to concentrate on the more basic problems and long-run perspectives (another much-invoked slogan) of the economy. Beneath the

[4] Günter Mittag, 'Wir brauchen jetzt ein durchdachtes System der ökonomischen Leitung', *Die Wirtschaft*, 28 January 1963, p. 6.

[5] This argument is developed in Erich Apel and Günter Mittag, *Wissenschaftliche Führungstätigkeit—neue Rolle der VVB* (Berlin, 1964), pp. 11–13.

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National Economic Council (*Volkswirtschaftsrat*) authority is divided among over 80 'socialist concerns' (VVBs), each of which bears responsibility for the plants of a particular branch of the economy. The NES converted the VVBs into 'economic' (rather than 'administrative') organs, with profit and loss accounting and major responsibility for investment, sales, planning, and the distribution of incentives. The general directors of the VVBs, according to Ulbricht, are the key figures of the New Economic System. Nevertheless, the NES also provides for increased responsibility for the individual plant (VEB) managers.

Party organisation has also been reformed in accordance with the production principle and also, in part, with Khrushchev's reorganisation of the CPSU. Bureaus of industry and building and for agriculture (under Mittag and Gerhard Grüneberg) were formed at the Politburo level, and imitated on the district and local levels; these were given direction of the basic party organisations in the VVBs, factories, collective farms, etc. The effect of this is to put the party secretaries in these economic units under the authority of technically-oriented party leaders; they are instructed to concentrate their efforts on promoting the principles of the NES. Thus the potential frictions and rivalries between economic and party functionaries are to be transformed into cooperation based on mutual interests and goals.

THE most significant of the specific NES reforms is undoubtedly the revision of the prices of DDR goods to correspond with their actual costs of production (or 'the socially necessary expenditure of labour', as it is officially put, in accordance with Marxist theory). Such a reform was indispensable in order to make the economic levers of profit and cost effective in maximising efficiency. As before, however, prices are fixed by the state; no flexibility, i.e. direct responsiveness to supply and demand as proposed for some prices earlier by Behrens, is permitted. Thus the revision of prices, while initially carried out in three stages to end in 1966, is expected to be a continuing process. The revaluing of existing capital and of its depreciation rates, along with the *Produktionsfondsabgabe*, which amounts to an interest charge on that capital, similarly have the purpose of producing comparable cost structures throughout DDR industry and thus making the profit criterion usable.

'In principle', new investment is to be financed out of the profits of the VVB and the individual VEB itself, or else from credit extended by the state bank and expected to be repaid from future profits. Since the regime is far from ready to relinquish its control over investment emphases, however, state subsidisation remains extensive, all major investment decisions must have central approval, and profit not devoted to approved purposes is skimmed off, as before, by the government. Special funds are at the disposal of the VVB director for investment

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in new technology and for instituting premiums as incentives for fulfilling the particular needs of his industry. 'Performance-determined' wages and premiums are regarded as the principal economic levers spurring on the individual; while nothing new for the East German worker, they are now being extended to the higher economic functionaries, including the VVB directors.

Although the New Economic System falls short of adopting the more radical proposals of Liberman and Behrens, and has recently been outstripped by the Czechoslovak and perhaps the Hungarian and Bulgarian reforms, at the time of its initiation it gave the DDR the most liberal economic programme of the Soviet bloc. It represented an unmistakable triumph for the technocratic wing of the SED, and an unwelcome innovation for its bureaucrats. The very introduction of the system at the sixth congress was coupled with a thinly-veiled threat against the apparatchiki: Ulbricht remarked that even those party functionaries who had performed faithfully in the past would have to be removed if they did not acquire some technical education and adjust themselves to the requirements of the System. A year later he repeated his warning, noting that some had failed to abandon outdated work habits and to overcome antiquated conceptions of economic problems. While few ventured to oppose the NES openly, the complaints of the DDR press and of high party officials make it evident that many resisted its implementation in practice, or expected its effect to be only nominal, permitting the continuance of the traditional modes of bureaucratic party control. Meanwhile, Apel and Mittag were becoming its chief propagandists, bringing out a series of books and numerous articles justifying and elaborating its proposals.

It must be understood that from the outset the New Economic System was considerably more than a set of economic reforms; it soon came to acquire something of the status of an official domestic ideology, and became the focal point of party activity and organisation. As ideology, it sought to enlist the adherence of the DDR citizen to a 'revolutionary' programme of change, seizing the new in technology and science for the purpose of developing a genuinely new society of unprecedented material well-being. The virtues of this approach for the DDR are apparent: it counters the appeal of the West German *Wirtschaftswunder*, presents an attractive set of material goals to a population still largely hostile or indifferent to formal Marxism-Leninism, appeals to the interests of the growing, important class of engineers and managers, and partakes of the universal appeal of the scientific and modern, while also seeming consistent with the Marxian Utopia.

THE result of turning the NES into ideology has been a blurring of the economic and the political in the DDR. Party members are urged to press the cause of economic rationalisation as part of their political duties, while failures in economic performance are laid to

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the 'ideological' omissions of state functionaries. Much of the accompanying propaganda has stressed the need for party officials to qualify themselves technically; almost as frequently, though with less success, economic functionaries have been urged to exert 'political' leadership. It may be supposed that leading technocrats utilise this ambiguity to press economic reforms in political guises. But there is also persuasive evidence that the apparatchiki have in considerable measure adapted their own work methods to the vocabulary of the New Economic System, and under its banner continued substantial interference with economic rationalisation. The struggle between technocrats and apparatchiki, then, continues, but has moved *within* the ample framework of the New Economic System.

Two symbolic figures here are Günter Mittag and Alfred Neumann. Mittag is head of the Central Committee's bureau for industry and building, holds a doctorate in economics, and with Apel's death probably may be called the DDR's leading technocrat. One of his principal functions, however, has been to explicate the role of the *party* in the NES. He has repeatedly exhorted it to assert leadership in the promotion of economic rationalisation, where necessary even against the will of economic functionaries who for one reason or another are reluctant to accept innovations. In one characteristic passage he argues:

> . . . a very important side of the *political-ideological work* of the party organisations consists of patiently analysing mistakes, eliminating their causes, and helping people step by step to *develop an economic way of thinking* and to learn to *observe the requirements of objective economic laws* in all their activity, and thus to wage a determined struggle for the implementation of the decisions of our party.[6]

This view of the role of the party must be coupled with his observation elsewhere that 'the class struggle in the German Democratic Republic is carried out today above all in the field of production'.[7] For Mittag, the party is to become the helpmeet of the New Economic System.

Alfred Neumann, by contrast, is an old communist apparatchik who has since 1961 headed the important National Economic Council, a body responsible for short-term planning and for the direction and coordination of the VVBs. A reading of his speech at the seventh plenum of the Central Committee (December 1964)[8] will reveal his essentially bureaucratic mentality in collision with the New Economic System: detailed reports on all possible subjects are repeatedly demanded, and the creation of several new and probably redundant economic bodies announced. The work of the Economic Council

[6] Mittag, 'Wir brauchen . . .', p. 7. My italics.
[7] Günter Mittag, *Fragen der Parteiarbeit nach dem Produktions-Prinzip in Industrie und Bauwesen* (Berlin, 1963), p. 126.
[8] Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1964.

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has been frequently criticised as a result—Ulbricht once accused it of 'bureaucratic perfectionism' and complained that preparing its reports kept technical specialists 'bound for weeks to their desks'. For Neumann and those like him, the NES represents one of the periodic organisational shakeups of the communist bureaucracy, not a 'revolution'; its instruments merely change the form, but not the extent, of apparatchik dominance.

It is too early to judge whether the conception of Mittag or of Neumann has triumphed. Some retrenchment apparently set in by the seventh plenum, when Central Committee speakers once more emphasised the "territorial principle' of party organisation alongside the NES-oriented 'production principle'. Kurt Hager, Central Committee secretary for ideology, complained that while, earlier, economic questions had been neglected in favour of more general political propaganda, now ideological work had been pushed partially into the background. The increasing importance accorded his ideological commission and the commision for party and organisation questions was probably intended as a counterweight to the influence of the bureaus for industry and for agriculture.[9]

The NES may have suffered much more profound a blow with the suicide of Erich Apel at the end of November 1965. The immediate impetus to this act was given by the signing of a long-term trade agreement between the DDR and the Soviet Union, providing for the exchange of some 60 milliard marks worth of goods in the next five years. Reports circulating in the West claim that the agreement forces the DDR to accept prices below the world market level for some of its exports and to pay excessively high prices for Soviet imports; even without open price discrimination, however, the agreement ties over 50 per cent of DDR trade to a country in many respects on an inferior technological level. Apel, it is said, wished to transfer much of the DDR's trade westward, and felt the agreement would greatly damage the potential of the NES; he fought a long battle with Ulbricht over the issue, who contended that political necessities demanded the signing of the agreement.

Whatever the truth of these reports, and of the less credible and more sensational ones that proliferated in the days after Apel's death, the official account—that Apel had suffered a nervous breakdown owing to overwork—also has much to recommend it. The transition to the New Economic System brought with it strains and confusions that kept him habitually working into the early morning hours. The reorganisation of party and production produced conflicts over spheres of responsibility, for example, between the VVBs and VEBs; some VVBs took advantage of their new powers to further their own narrowly-conceived self-interest at the expense of the whole economy, while others fell considerably below planned output; the planning

[9] See Peter Christian Ludz, 'Die "DDR" im Jahre 1964', *Hinter dem eisernen Vorhang*, January 1965, p. 15.

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process became so snarled that the perspective plan, originally intended to cover the years 1964–1970, is only now being submitted for discussion; finally, certain major economic results, notably the productivity of new investment and the growth in national income, have proved disappointing.

ALL these problems were brought up at the eleventh plenum (15–19 December 1965), meeting less than two weeks after Apel's death. While Apel was not criticised directly, the State Planning Commission was, for falling behind in the adoption of modern planning methods and particularly for failing to resist the 'frequently unreal' demands of individual branches of the economy in favour of the more general interests of society; the Chairman of the Commission had the duty above all of maintaining 'balance' in the economy. Ulbricht showed himself particularly concerned over the lag in national income growth, and demanded the steering of investments into areas which would improve it. Since the NES was intended in part to shift emphasis from purely quantitative to qualitative economic development, this lag should not have been terribly surprising; Ulbricht's complaint seems to indicate he is reluctant to accept all of the system's implications.

Nevertheless, he proclaimed 1966 as the beginning of its 'second stage'. This second stage will include the completion of the price reform, the partial introduction of the *Produktionsfondsabgabe*, and strengthened emphasis on the financing of investment in the VVBs from their own profits and borrowed funds. All these are important components of genuine rationalisation, although they do not go beyond what had been laid out earlier. The emphasis in Ulbricht's speech on VVB 'egoism' might seem to suggest a curtailment of the prerogatives of their general directors, and some Western observers have so interpreted it.[10] In fact the responsibilities of the directors are claimed to have been expanded, and indeed may have been, particularly in the planning process.

The abolition of Neumann's National Economic Council as 'superfluous' points in this direction; it was criticised for overproduction of paperwork and for trying to decide all questions itself. The nine new industrial ministries replacing it, together with the new Planning Commission, are expected to employ fewer officials than the Council and the old Commission; this may be illusory, but of the new ministers, only two (Neumann and Fritz Scharfenstein) are apparatchiki; the other seven are managers or economic experts. Apel's successor as chief of the strengthened Planning Commission is Gerhard Schürer, a 45-year-old technocrat with long planning experience in both party and state organs. The day of the technocrat in East Germany is far from over.

[10] See Peter Christian Ludz, 'East Germany: The Old and the New', *East Europe*, April 1966, p. 26.

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In fact, what has emerged from the eleventh plenum is a Council of Ministers—and here, according to Ulbricht, will major economic decisions increasingly be made—dominated by economic officials. Not all, to be sure, may be identified as technocrats: Rauchfuss, Wyschofsky, Schürer, Balkow, and Zimmermann are; Ewald and Scholz are agricultural experts, Rumpf is an old communist who has been Finance Minister for many years, and Max Sefrin is Health Minister. Neumann, now Minister for Material Economy, is a member, and the chairman and Premier is Willi Stoph, an apparatchik with some economic experience who has often been regarded, without much evidence, as a relative 'liberal'.

The membership of the Council is particularly interesting in contrast to the composition of the SED Politburo, which remains dominated by apparatchiki, if not Stalinists. None of the twelve full members of the Politburo, and only two of its seven candidates, Mittag and Werner Jarowinsky, may be regarded as full-blown technocrats. Three other candidates, Gerhard Grüneberg, Ewald, and Margarete Müller, have their principal responsibilities in agriculture, but have not been known to align themselves with the technocrats. Of the full members, only Neumann performs primarily economic functions.

The peculiar division of labour between the 'political' Politburo and the 'economic' Council of Ministers may be seen as reflecting the present unstable equilibrium of East German politics. In a crisis, the apparatchiki are in a position to enforce political requirements at the expense of economic ones; the signing of the new trade agreement is testimony to the ultimate primacy of the former. Moreover, given the present structure and balance of forces, the apparatchiki should be able to control the choice of Ulbricht's successor when the dictator retires or dies. At the same time they are publicly committed to an ideology of modernised production which lends legitimacy rather to the technocrats than to themselves. In spite of the undisguised Stalinism that characterised the pronouncements on cultural policy at the eleventh plenum, there was no basic tampering with the New Economic System. Even the apparatchiki appear to recognise that at its present stage of development the DDR can do neither without its technocrats nor without their economic reforms. It is further noteworthy that the ages of the full members of the Politburo range from 52 to 73 and average over 60; the technocrats on the Council of Ministers and Politburo range from 37 to 57 and average 44.

The question remains whether the technocrats have the will as well as the ability to assume political power. Here it is well to recall the caution with which I began: there are no pure technocrats or pure apparatchiki. In many respects the two groups share more in terms of training and outlook than the foregoing analysis may imply. Moreover, within each group divisions on other lines may sometimes be as acute as those between the two. There is also some tendency

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for the technocrats to regard politics as the special province of the apparatchiki, just as their own province is the economic sphere.

The history I have recounted demonstrates, however, that if the technocrats are to achieve their economic purposes they cannot remain aloof from politics or avoid some challenge to the apparatchik's pre-eminence. The years since 1956 have witnessed a steady expansion of their numbers and their influence on policy. It would be foolish to expect the technocrats to seize power in a spectacular *coup d'état.* But through the continuing quiet expansion of their presence and their influence, and without the abandonment of the forms or the vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, they may one day become the effective ruling elite of the DDR.

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ULBRICHT AND AFTER

Ernst Richert

WALTER ULBRICHT is an elderly man, seventy-three years old and to all appearances worn out. To many East Germans he is the living symbol of Sovietisation; to many of those who champion a planned socialist economy of eastern provenance between the Elbe-Werra and Oder-Neisse lines he represents, at best, an unwelcome adjunct to and burden on the system. He enjoys little of the paternalistic status to which he aspired as head of the *Staatsrat*, the German Democratic Republic's collective head of State. His pallid pedantry, his philistine manner, his high-pitched Saxon voice and sing-song Russian intonation, the prolixity of his speeches (compulsory reading for all whose membership of the party is a paying proposition)—all these things are unendearing in the extreme. They are found equally unendearing by the heads of fraternal parties in the other People's Democracies, who are national leaders as well as party chiefs. This has not, of course, prevented Ulbricht from gaining a reputation among the leaders of the People's Democracies as an 'elder statesman' whose advice counts with the Russians in the same way as Gomulka's still does. It is customary in West Germany to write him off as a 'creature' of the Kremlin, and only a relatively small number of political analysts and journalists speak of him as the representative—if not the father—of the second German *Wirtschaftswunder*, or even, like Sebastian Haffner, as the author of 'the first revolution on German soil'. Ulbricht may be spoken *of*, but (and here the West German political establishment, almost down to the entourage of Mende and Brandt, is unanimous) no man of his type can possibly be spoken *to*.

Ulbricht's image, though all too often over-simplified, is thus a comparatively simple one. Ulbricht the man and politician presents a considerably more complex picture. We now know, thanks to Carola Stern's biography, that this bloodless, immensely hard-working bureaucrat with the retentive memory and marked aptitude for trimming his sails to the wind, has never, for all the plots he helped to hatch, been the embodiment of evil which legend has made of him. A manipulator of power whose tactical skill enabled him to survive years of political impotence unscathed, Ulbricht has failed in his two main objectives: he has never managed to create a sense of nationhood in East Germany, nor has he convinced the East German people that he is the one to make a reality of traditional socialist aspirations. An eternal 'centrist', he has even failed to found a personal dynasty, and all his tentative steps in that direction have come to nothing. 'Crown Prince' Schirdewan's prospects evaporated in 1956–57, Alfred Neumann, the next heir-apparent, was ground down by problems of economic administration and fared not much better, and the position of Erich Honecker, the SED 'No. 2' of recent years, is still problematical.

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One should not, however, minimise the achievements of this stiff and inartistic Prussianised Saxon. Building upon the ruins of an East German bourgeois society which was destroyed by him and his supporters in conjunction with the Russian forces of occupation, he has created a modern, efficiency-conscious industrial society which is largely indifferent to politics and obsessed with practical problems.

The 'New Economic System for the Planning and Direction of the National Economy' (NÖS), the first serious attempt to introduce economic categories into the communist planned economy, has been more consistently implemented in the GDR since 1963 than in any other People's Democracy. This system, which is principally based on the ideas of Soviet economists such as Liberman and Trapeznikov, represents an attempt to combine over-all planning with wider scope for initiative on the part of industrial concerns, of those who work in them, and of society as a whole, the aim being to achieve a permanent balance between government policy and social requirements. For communists, the basic novelty of this approach is that only products which can be disposed of, and disposed of at prices commensurate with the investment of capital and labour, represent an accretion to 'value'. The very same theories were, in fact, espoused in the years immediately following upon Stalin's death—especially after the 'thaw' phase of 1956—by leading economists in the People's Democracies. However, these heretical ideas were not given the go-ahead until 9 September 1962, when Liberman was allowed to publicise his line of thought in *Pravda*, i.e. with the supreme authorisation of the Soviet Communist Party. This signified a move away from a centralised economic administration of the war-economy type, such as had remained in force practically without interruption since 1917, and towards a 'reform communism' whose implications the communist leaders have carefully refrained from embodying in their canon of dogma to this day.

And now comes the strange part: of all the People's Democracies, the GDR was the first to introduce the NÖS principle and is still the most consistent in its application. The rest of the Comecon countries were chary of joining in the process (though Czechoslovakia also adopted a similar approach towards socialist market-economy), and the USSR itself only did so in 1965, under Kosygin's aegis. Disregarding matters of detail, there are three points to be considered here:

first, that a People's Democracy which represented the weakest socio-political component of the 'international Bolshevik empire' (Brzezinski) had made the first undeniable constructive contribution to the workings of communism under modern technological conditions;

second, that those who evolved this form of economic pragmatism and thereby insinuated themselves into key positions in the major repositories of power (Politburo of the SED, Central Committee secretariat, Presidium of the Council of Ministers) sprang from an entirely

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new stratum of the leading cadres—men like Erich Apel (who subsequently committed suicide for somewhat obscure reasons), Gunter Mittag, Werner Jarowinsky, and Georg Ewald;

and, third, and—in the present context—most notably, that Ulbricht himself lent strong support to the NÖS, especially after the fifth plenum of the Central Committee in February 1964, i.e. while Khrushchev was still in power.

EVER since then, the theory of 'primacy of the economy in politics' has been championed in its purest form in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, whereas the Soviet Communist Party under Brezhnev's and Kosygin's leadership still tries to preserve a sort of balance between the purely political (embodied in the party) and the economic (for which the administrative machine bears principal responsibility).

This has led to two crucial changes in East Germany: first, a swift rapprochement between the pragmatists of the administrative hierarchy and the broad masses employed in industry, in agriculture (rationalised under Ewald's guidance), and in the technical and commercial fields; second, the isolation of the political hierarchy within the party machine, of the ideologists and agitators, and, last but not least, of the most traditionally militant and 'progressive' group, the Free German Youth leaders and those in positions of power who were moulded by its teachings. The heads of these groups form a sort of opposition party which has frequently claimed a hearing, first at the seventh plenum of the Central Committee in late 1964, but more especially since October 1965 and with particular vehemence at the eleventh plenum in December of the same year. For the first time since 1956–57, a genuinely pluralistic element seems to have once more entered the struggle for power, and in a People's Democracy this can occur and find expression only at the highest level.

The arguments enlisted by the two sides merit careful analysis.

In the first place, neither faction casts any doubt on its essential belief in the future of Moscow-style socialism or on its espousal of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Honecker, Fröhlich, Alfred Kurella and Paul Verner, to name only the most outspoken opponents of the pragmatists, all lay great stress on the ties between the USSR and their party. Although they cannot simply be labelled Stalinists, they are equally unambiguous about their anti-liberal attitude, which prompts them on all occasions to take a firm stand against intellectual toleration in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Nor can many signs of liberalisation be discerned in the managerial and technological group. Dr Werner Jarowinsky, in his late thirties, and a Politburo candidate since 1963, is probably their most intellectually considerable spokesman; in his own words, the party must adapt itself to a 'new functionalism'. Functionalism (but not liberalisation) versus ideologisation—this is the crux of this controversy. This, in its turn, is a product of the GDR leaders' awkward position, of the drain on

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intellectually active resources imposed by the mass exodus of the years before 1961, of the regime's lack of national tradition, and of the fascination still exercised by West Germany on a society whose growing albeit qualified loyalty to the system reposes on a *faute de mieux* attitude. For let us be clear about this: what happened in June 1953, in the autumn of 1956, and in 1961 with the building of the Wall, has banished the East German people's hopes of a link-up with the western world. They realise that they must cut their coat according to their cloth. The factitious is becoming increasingly accepted, especially as the new educational system introduced in 1958 (and radically tailored to the needs of a modern high-productivity society) has now produced almost fifteen age-groups whose educational make-up differs entirely from the traditional bourgeois mould of Federal Germany. Equality of opportunity does exist in practice, and the only bounds imposed on choice of career—though these are often painful enough in themselves—are the preordained *numeri clausi* governed by the actual availability of teaching facilities and students' places (universities and technical colleges receive more than 70,000 new entrants annually), the volume of which often conflicts with personal choice.

However, none of this alters the fact that it is relatively easy (especially for members of the intelligentsia and skilled workers) to fit into this refurbished system—a system to which people must perforce adapt themselves now that all lines of escape have been cut and all dreams of a general revision have faded. Productive activity can purchase a man freedom from socio-political 'mobilisation', whether he be a nominal member of the SED or not. (His task is even simpler in the latter instance, because the party makes a number of demands on its members in respect of behaviour, personal conduct, 'vigilance', perseverance at one's place of work, etc.) As a political artefact, the GDR represents a sort of marriage of convenience, a make-the-best-of-it relationship between society and its leaders. With a current intake of academic new blood which embraces far more than 20 per cent of the age-groups in question, of which about three-quarters are receiving technical, economic, and scientific training; with an administrative (but not political) ruling class numbering between 700,000 and 800,000; with an intelligentsia of whom about two-thirds were trained during the communist era; and, finally, with approximately 60 per cent of the working population employed in industry, construction, non-private trades, and government distribution services, the new high-performance society has a mass *corps d'élite* whose essential tactic is to use economic efficiency to buy a wide measure of freedom from the constraints which the party, with its doctrinaire ambitions and would-be monopoly of political sentiment, still seeks to impose. Totalitarianism is being replaced by authoritarian leadership—indeed, not even the authoritarian pattern can be called in question without good reason, in so far as it is defined in terms of a basic convention between society and its leaders on a fundamental canon of values, style of behaviour, and cultural unity,

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with the concomitant arsenal of standards, rituals, and over-optimistic norms.

And this is precisely what distinguishes this society so irritatingly from the other People's Democracies. Since 1956, their party leaders have in increasing measure become national leaders, leaders of nations united by a long history of national and social oppression and subjection to alien influence. This applies not only to men like Gomulka, Kadar, and Ceausescu but also, in the main, to the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic. (That it applies to Tito goes without saying.) And this provides a second channel for the people's more or less qualified approval: leaders can be respected not only as leaders of the party but as leaders of a nation or an association of nationalities which has been sanctioned by history.

This is what is lacking in the GDR. Whatever one's doubts about the continuing existence—judged by existential criteria—of a German nation, the GDR certainly does not rate national status. East German society has evolved differently from that of West Germany, and the trend towards estrangement has gained increasing momentum, especially since the building of the Wall in 1961 paralysed travel, made contact more difficult, and set the seal on differences in educational training. In 1960, on the death of Wilhelm Pieck, first President of the Republic, Ulbricht assumed the leadership of the Council of State, the newly-introduced 'collective head of State' which was manifestly tailored to his personal requirements. His assumption of this paternalistic pose remained an empty gesture, however. The fragment of Germany east of the Elbe and Werra has not become a fatherland, even though its population has found it equally impossible, since 1953–56, to regard the other, larger fragment in the West as a genuine homeland to which it can simply annex itself at some future date. East Germany has not become a fatherland, even though the increasing loyalty of the population, especially the above-mentioned groups of young and middle-generation 'producers', in the specific sense of the word, should not be doubted.

Thus, East Germany represents an extreme example of a society indifferent to higher values, ensconced in a spiritual no-man's-land, still fascinated by the 'West', its liberalism and standard of civilisation, but focused upon utilitarianism, on intrinsic values lacking in positive content; tolerably well provided for by crudely visible criteria of concrete achievement, anxious to preserve and where possible enlarge the scope of its petty liberties (including those of the undemanding consumer), and, in particular, to seal off the private sphere, which is assuming the character of a 'protected enclosure' within a society in which everything is done—more and more as a matter of course—on a collective basis.

IN a controversy which seems, purely on the surface, to be a rather tasteless dispute between various diadochi over who is to inherit

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the mantle of a still far from moribund Ulbricht, the fundamental point at issue appears to be this:

East Germany is the Soviet Union's strongest junior partner, with a 19 per cent share in Russia's foreign trade. She accounts for between 8 and 9 per cent of Comecon's total industrial output and is at least the ninth most powerful industrial country in the world (even with a productivity rate equal to no more than 80 per cent of the Federal Republic's and a consumer-goods rate barely three-quarters as high). Yes, despite this, she still needs the presence of up to twenty Russian divisions whose function is less to fulfil strategic requirements than to bolster up the regime. A smaller number of Russian soldiers would undoubtedly achieve the same object, but total withdrawal is impractical for the time being. The situation in East Germany is utterly different from that prevailing in the Federal Republic, where a withdrawal of Nato troops would not affect the balance of domestic political power in the least. In the GDR, where feelings of frustration are still strong, the result might well be anarchy. The men at the top still retain their alien aura, and the presence of the Russians reinforces this impression just as the image of people like Ulbricht, Hilde Benjamin (Minister of Justice) and Mielke (State Security chief) helps to maintain it: all are reminders of an era of occupation which has yet to be overcome.

None of this—be it noted—implies the continuing existence of intellectually-based opposition of the sort which originally emanated from social-democrat, bourgeois, and, possibly, Christian sources. The trauma is a purely negative one. People could not come to terms with the early phases and manifestations of a revolution which had been forced on them. Remote control by Moscow, a party hierarchy enthroned by the occupying forces, 'cold' revolutionisation, heavy reparations payments (estimates of their total range from 30 to upwards of 40 milliard DM), and coercive indoctrination by mass-media and other organs of 'partisan' instruction—all these things have combined to perpetuate the trauma with what one can only call truly grandiose ineptitude.

Viewed in this light, the East German leaders' problem amounts to this: how to live down their revolution's ill-starred beginnings. In essence, three different methods are either being tried out or submitted for discussion by various groups in the upper reaches of the leadership, many of which overlap: first, an all-out continuation of the educational dictatorship, rigidly administered by the central authorities; second, development of the GDR's national image (including a revision of its relationship with the Federal Republic and West German society); and, third, all-out construction of an autochthonous high-productivity society.

The first is the traditional method which was common to all the People's Democracies until 1956 and essentially remained in force in the GDR until 1961–62. Fundamentally, this method implies a

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renunciation of the 'separate road' taken not only by Tito but also, up to a point, by Gomulka, Kadar, the Czech leaders, the Rumanians (wholeheartedly), the French Communist Party and, above all, the Italians. 'Learn from the Soviet Union', and 'The party is always right', are the principal slogans of this group, which wants to sail on steadfastly in the lee of Big Brother, aspires to a new society sustained by the 'Ten Commandments of Socialist Morality', aims to preserve the doctrinal 'unity and purity' of the Diamat and Histmat, and would like (wholly in the spirit of the old totalitarian Stalinism) to steep the entire population in it—particularly the younger generation. Media of communication would be developed to their fullest extent and carefully manipulated, and all utterances would be harnessed to the task of training and perfecting the 'new man', whether through the medium of journalism or of art, which would conform strictly to the standards of 'socialist realism'. Conflicts, where they were tolerated at all, would be analysed and resolved 'at the highest level'.

These views are espoused by almost the entire agitprop organisation within the party leadership, by a substantial number of senior local SED officials (first district secretaries!), by almost all those members of the leadership who come from the higher ranks of the Free German Youth, headed by its founder, Erich Honecker, by a further series of senior figures in the central party machine, and by some of the KPD 'old guard' inside the SED centres of power. Among those who can unhesitatingly be included in this group are Hanna Wolf, Director of the party's Training College, the first secretary of East Berlin (Paul Verner, a former member of the Free German Youth leadership), of Leipzig (Fröhlich), and of Halle (Sindermann, formerly the Central Committee's director of agitation)—all of whom belong to the Politburo—as well as the Central Committee's director of organisation, Dohlus, and the Central Committee's *éminence grise* in matters of art and cultural policy, Alfred Kurella, a product of the bourgeois youth movement in the 1914–18 war period who subsequently emigrated to Moscow. This faction manifested its solidarity in the dispute between doctrinairism and the trend towards rationalisation which emerged, concomitantly with the NÖS, at the seventh and eleventh plenary sessions of the Central Committee in late 1964 and late 1965. As Ulbricht's immediate deputy and controller of the organisations responsible for securing the authority of the regime, Honecker established a base of operations for use in the power struggles of the post-Ulbricht era—a vantage-point on which some doubt has since been cast. His arguments and those of his supporters centred principally upon the fact that the 'second, scientific-cum-technological revolution', as tackled by the new educational system and the NÖS, entailed a risk of forfeiting the substance of the original revolution, i.e., that it might be accompanied by a sense of conflict, by Kafkaism, scepticism, libertinism, and opportunism, notably among young people, students, and artists.

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This attack was directed principally against exponents of rationalisation within the economic administration, and more especially against those in the mid-thirties/early-fifties age-group, who, represented on the Central Committee secretariat by Dr Mittag and Dr Jarowinsky, both of them Politburo candidates, control the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (headed by Premier Stoph), the Planning Commission (with Dr Apel and his successor Schürer), and almost the entire economic executive including agriculture (Ewald), supply (Wittkowski), and the senior posts in industrial concerns. The departments of higher and technical education, vocational training, and finance are also being moulded by those who share this spirit, which has infiltrated the party secretaryships in State enterprises, increasingly manned by men of 'academic' stamp. Co-operation with senior personnel in the appropriate technical training colleges and university faculties (e.g. the Karlshorst School of Economics) is excellent. Steady industrial growth at an annual rate of 6–7 per cent, satisfactory progress in investment policy despite a tight capital market, notable NÖS successes in agriculture, for so long a weak sector, a substantial improvement in the variety and volume of consumer goods, and a fair degree of growth in foreign trade with the 'capitalist' West—all these developments, coupled with the budding rapprochement between management and productive workers, have worked in favour of the economic innovators. The latter lay stress on adaptation to climatic functionalisation (Jarowinsky), on observance of empirical data, which are now the object of serious study (Wittkowski), on bureaucratic relaxation (Jarowinsky), and on the necessity for establishing a permanent correlation between the will of the State and that of the people (Mittag). The knowledge which they are successfully mobilising in practice can never be obtained deductively by party dogmatists (and deduction is their only available method). Indeed, the mere maintenance of the present trend will be enough to call the substance of the party in question.

EVERYTHING depends on whether this schizophrenia, this conflict between a party hierarchy which proceeds dogmatically and deductively and a government administration (and the industrial managers subordinate to it) which operates pragmatically and inductively, turns out to be a practical *modus vivendi*. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team is attempting to preserve the same sort of balance in Russia, it is true, but the Soviet Communist Party—and, by analogy, the communist parties of the other People's Democracies—is also the integrator of national unity. A team composed of Honecker (often tipped as Ulbricht's successor within the party) and Stoph would not be comparable with the current Russian solution. Honecker, probably possessed of personal integrity but colourless, stiff, mentally inflexible, and lacking in general appeal, would find it difficult to assert the party's claims to leadership in the special circumstances surrounding East Germany's fragmentary existence. Were he to commit himself to the

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primacy of ideologisation and the 'creation of national awareness', it might endanger the truce that has grown up between rulers and ruled under the auspices of the NÖS, as well as the purely economic weight which the GDR carries with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact and Comecon countries. (This does not, of course, imply that the Kremlin could afford to 'emancipate' the GDR—or however some people in the West envisage the process—by allowing it to break the twenty-year pact.) Every party leader has very good reasons for wanting to see the Russians' interests preserved in full, and this can be achieved only if the East German economy continues to function efficiently.

Does this mean that the style of party authority must be functionalised to the limit, i.e., that men in the mould of Stoph, Jarowinsky, and (probably) Mittag, must come forward when Ulbricht's post as first secretary falls vacant?

One thing which appears to have a bearing on this problem is the new initiative, associated with Ulbricht personally, towards reviving the 'German question'. The official East German version (which is naturally in tune with that of the GDR's allies) is that, although there are two German political entities which have been moulded by divergent types of social development since 1945, national unity still exists in a loose form. Even though unification (defined by the Russians as 'a matter for the two German States') would have to be based on 'the subordination of the national to the social' (Khrushchev), and the immediate objective would be limited to confederation, the Ulbricht group's recent abortive proposal for all-German discussions, conducted principally by the 'working class', is not without significance. Apart from a realisation of the confused situation which has arisen in Western Europe, mainly as a result of French policy, and apart from any genuine apprehensions about an over-direct 'Bonn-Washington axis', what really underlies this new initiative is a highly erroneous conception of West Germany's social structure, of the position and mentality of the West German working class, and, consequently, of the operative potentialities of the SPD and the trade unions. It seems not unlikely—especially when one recognises the false picture of conditions in West Germany entertained by the SED leaders—that East Berlin senses the long-term possibility of a popular front in the Federal Republic, and that it would like to align itself with the ultimate objectives for which the French and Italian communists are manoeuvring. (It is, of course, equally conceivable that the whole suggestion of talks with the SPD was merely a tactical manoeuvre undertaken in the hope that it would fail, but it would have been more logical, in the latter case, to make a well-publicised approach to the Federal Government itself.)

Does this 'stirring of the pan-German pot'—for it cannot amount to anything more, at least in the short term—represent a third method of reconciling doctrinairism with economic pragmatism? It would

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undoubtedly fit in with Ulbricht's traditionally centrist tactics. Although he gave his unqualified backing to the NÖS and placed certain restraints on the zealots grouped round Honecker and Kurella, both at the eleventh plenum and thereafter, this does not affect his belief that political considerations are pre-eminent and that economics and ideology are both means to an end. The transformation of society by the working-class movement under party leadership and the 'solution of the national question' by the same means undoubtedly represent two of his most heartfelt and long-standing desires. The purely domestic venture went awry, as we have seen, but it would be erroneous to infer that Ulbricht and his principal associates embarked on their new experiment in the belief that their mission in respect of the GDR had failed. On the contrary, not only has Ulbricht himself radiated increasing self-assurance in recent years, but some of the very men who have gained strength from the new venture, e.g., Axen (co-opted into the Central Committee secretariat with responsibility for foreign policy and pan-German questions), and Florin (Central Committee departmental chief responsible for foreign policy), who outlined the new tactic in *Einheit* (No. 1, 1966), have taken the line that the other People's Democracies are beginning to learn from the GDR in regard to economic organisation.

VIEWED against this paradoxical background of strength and impotence, this antithesis between budding self-confidence and the disagreeable sense of being a fragmentary nation, of not having dispelled the tension between leadership and society, of still representing a second-class Germany, Ulbricht's move becomes plausible. He, too, would like to inject some colour into his isolated political structure, as the Poles, Rumanians, Hungarians, and others have done before him. Protected by his wall and his barbed wire, he is risking a few tentative steps in that direction, flanked—not coincidentally, it would appear—by various comrades of the old guard. These include the former social-democrats Mückenberger and Ebert, and the old-time communists Warnke, Matern, and Neumann—that doctrinaire foreign body within the economic administration of the NÖS. Chief ideologists Hager and Norden, also members of the old guard but coerced into a rather anomalous role, seem to be in on the act as well. Both were reared on traditional ideas of Germany, and Hager, as secretary for ideology and science, is faced with the insoluble problem of how to reconcile the diametrically opposed claims of the party and the economic revolution.

There is something unquestionably weird about the spectacle of an elderly Ulbricht calling for another popular front and imagining that the situation now has anything in common with the thirties. For the SPD leaders, the barrier to such discussions has now become too great, even though many people in both parts of what used to be the German Reich cherish the secret hope that something permanent may yet result—

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something more, for instance, than an intensification of the East Germans' longing to visit the West. There are virtually no signs of a realisation that everything is overlaid by the shadow of two world powers and the nuclear balance of power, or that relaxation of tension must necessarily be a slow and infinitely laborious process demanding great tact and discretion; or, alternatively, that all that can be done is to plumb the depth of the gulf between the two sides—a proceeding which would probably benefit neither.

With the failure of the SED-SPD debate, the Ulbricht leadership modified the details of its tactics. The SPD congress in Dortmund showed them that the cohesion between SPD leaders and the rank and file is far closer than the East German communists, using their out of date class model, expected; the adherence of the mass of the West German workers to the state cannot be doubted. And so now the men around Ulbricht want to appeal directly to the SPD rank and file, and to establish contacts with other groups (intellectuals and the middle classes), who are tired of Bonn's immobilism, of the failure of the government to provide leadership, and who fear its increasing self-isolation. The proposal about safe conducts for the SED officials who were to have taken part in the discussions in the Federal Republic was used as a pretext to break off the negotiations. But Ulbricht and his colleagues will not abandon their plans; nor has the affair meant any serious loss of face for them.

For the present, things remain as they were before, with the position of both sides rigid. But it is unlikely that the 'national' key can in future be effective in its old form. The new leaders will have to find new roads.

It seems, after all, that Ulbricht's departure will go hand in hand with a change of generation, since none of his old and weary rivals—Dahlem, Ackermann, or Schirdewan, for instance—would stand a chance. The antithesis between ideologisation in the purely party sense and rationalisation, between the deductive and inductive principles, seems to be irremovable, while to adopt the Soviet pattern would be inopportune for reasons already stated.

The two rival factions have not committed themselves on the question of Ulbricht's 'Germany' initiative. The Honecker-Verner-Fröhlich group are even said to have offered open opposition, but Stoph and the other 'managers' have been comparatively reticent, and Jarowinsky, it is worth noting, has implied that it will be an extremely lengthy and complicated process. Pisnik, the relatively 'democratic' first secretary of Magdeburg, who does not get on with Ulbricht, is among those who have intimated their readiness to accept the 'small (or medium) steps' policy with which the SPD and Mende have countered Ulbricht's tactical move (a policy which Ulbricht has himself recommended from time to time). Taking into account the Russian interest in Ulbricht's relaxation initiative, the pressure upon SED leaders to pursue the NÖS

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course, the GDR's acute and enduring shortage of capital, and—possibly—the popular desire to travel freely, it is quite conceivable that a combination of these factors may one day wrest the GDR from its relative isolation, even if Ulbricht's image (which is not, as we have already said, identical in every respect with the man himself) has to be withdrawn from circulation. There is no doubt that the Federal Government and public opinion in the Federal Republic have a key role to play here. If it came to it, Bonn might very possibly be confronted, not by the party leader, but by the GDR's head of State. This is merely an additional reason for making Ulbricht's successor a 'strong man' who can lend conviction to the background power of the party. None of the zealots, neither Verner, Fröhlich, Neumann, nor even Axen, a man of undoubted shrewdness and one who has involved himself deeply in the 'Germany' initiative, has yet revealed this sort of stature. Since the party chief of the SED cannot combine his office with the image of national leader, the party itself, the Russians, and the East German people will have to make do with a man who, apart from being 'sound' in matters of principle, has proved his organising ability and not squandered his reputation by becoming the spokesman of a vociferous minority. However one regards the problem, provided the choice of a successor is governed by political common sense, the only likely candidate among those currently in view is Willi Stoph, with his technical background and his experience as an organiser in the fields of economics, armaments, and government administration. This, however, would mean that the SED had ceased to be a revolutionary hierarchy and become a sort of central power-directorate—a wholly logical step for the GDR to take, a complete innovation where the government parties of the People's Democracies are concerned, and a promising move towards relaxing tension in central Europe. Although one can envisage the SED swallowing such a change, just as one can imagine the Soviet party leaders instigating or sanctioning it, a faint aura of improbability still clings to the hypothetical exercise of so much common sense.

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SOVIET UNION AND DDR

Ilse Spittmann

THE relationship between the DDR and the Soviet Union has changed slowly but steadily in recent years. The SED is no longer a vassal but a partner in a joint venture. It no longer copies blindly every change of Soviet policy but selects what it can use. It even exports its own experiences, particularly in the economic field. A political slogan of the Stalin period illustrates the change. Whereas once the catch phrase went: 'To learn from the Soviet Union is to learn how to be victorious', today it goes: 'To be allied with the Soviet Union is to belong to the victors'.

Three factors have assisted the process of emancipation: the economic growth of the DDR (it is the biggest trading partner of the Soviet Union and of most of the people's democracies), the conflict with Peking, and the signs of a softening in the eastern bloc. Ulbricht has cleverly exploited the weakening of Moscow's central authority in order to advance his own interests and to receive a reward for his alliance. The value of an ally who not only has respectable economic resources but wishes to establish his existence on a sound basis increases as the structure of the eastern bloc becomes less rigid.

However, the DDR's emancipation efforts are strictly limited, on the one hand by the Soviet Union which has twenty divisions stationed there, and on the other by the SED leadership itself. The communist regime in East Germany cannot survive without the Soviets. An 'away-from-Moscow' movement, an independent national communism for example, could not survive. In this respect the imperial interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of the SED leadership are identical. For the SED it can only be a question of extending its scope within the existing set-up. Because it has greater need for protection against the West than the other people's democracies, it is more interested in having close ties with the eastern bloc. However, there is disagreement about the extent of this involvement. The suicide of the chief planner, Erich Apel, in December of last year showed that there are two groups in the SED leadership. One holds the view that only a maximum of dependence can offer safety, whereas the other would like to strengthen the autonomy of the DDR so that it should not be the object of future developments but a party to them.

Ups and downs of destalinisation

The process of emancipation began in 1956 in the form of resistance to Khrushchev's destalinisation. Reading out the telegram of the SED to the twentieth party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Walter Ulbricht concluded with the words: 'Long live Marxism-Leninism'. Two days earlier, however, the same telegram had been

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published in East Berlin—ending with 'Long live Stalin'. Nobody can say definitely whether this was a mistake or a provocation. At any rate, the SED sabotaged destalinisation for five years. The politburo announced after the twentieth CPSU congress 'that in spite of objectively existing opportunities for the development of the cult of the personality, no such excesses existed in our party leadership in this period'. With reference to the 'special German conditions', the 'parrot-like imitation' of the Soviet example was rejected:

> There has been no break in our development, caused either by internal events or produced from outside, and no break is necessary. All decisions of our party leadership are collectively discussed and taken, and the same is true of the decisions of the Council of Ministers. We have had no trials like, for example, the Rajk or Kostoff trials, and therefore have no need for far-reaching corrections.[1]

Various groups inside the party, in the central committee, and even in the politburo who were in favour of destalinisation in the DDR were cold-shouldered: the friends of the philosopher Wolfgang Harich, the economists Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary, the scientist Robert Havemann, the agricultural expert Kurt Vieweg, politburo members Karl Schirdewan and Fred Oelssner, central committee secretaries Gerhart Ziller and Paul Wandel, and central committee members Erich Wollweber and Fritz Selbmann.

It was not until after the twenty-second CPSU congress at the end of 1961 that Ulbricht cautiously changed his tactics. He publicly condemned 'Stalin's mistakes and crimes' and admitted that 'the consequences of the cult of the personality had affected the DDR'. The central committee of the SED had however quickly overcome these consequences, 'without allowing the enemy to make inroads into our territory'. At the same time Ulbricht personally claimed credit for having opposed Beria in 1953—not, however, Beria the secret policeman but Beria the politician, who allegedly wanted to sell the DDR to the West.

The outcome of the Cuba crisis brought a decisive political change in the DDR. With the Cuban adventure the Soviet offensive in Germany, initiated by Khrushchev in 1958 with the Berlin ultimatum, finally collapsed. The SED turned towards the problems of internal stabilisation. Such Stalinist practices as were unsuitable for the purpose were revised. At a party conference in Leipzig at the beginning of December 1962, Ulbricht turned against the dogma of the absolute priority of politics over economics:

> It is correct that in the field of economics we are somewhat retarded. This is partly a result of the Stalinist cult of the personality which had delaying and harmful effects, particularly in the sphere of economics, but also in other spheres. If we take

[1] *Neues Deutschland*, 29 April 1956.

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> Lenin's ideas as the starting point we must admit that under Stalin, particularly during his last years, a number of economic questions, of the theory and practice of socialist economic direction, have been distorted. The effect of this has also been felt to some extent in the DDR, though not as much as in the Soviet Union and in some other countries. What are the main signs of dogmatism in economic policy? They are a one-sided interpretation of the correct thesis of the priority of politics over economics. Everybody must understand that during the time when the struggle between the socialist DDR and monopolist-capitalist West Germany took place with open frontiers, the political struggle was bound to come first. Since the frontier of the state has been assured the situation has changed. Naturally we continue the political struggle for the peaceful settlement of the German question, for the peace treaty and the solution of the question of West Berlin. But in fact economic issues now take precedence.[2]

Thereafter negative effects of dogmatism and of the cult of personality were discovered in a number of spheres. However, the carefully administered criticism of Stalinism primarily served to place the burden of responsibility on the dead Soviet leader and to present today's SED leaders as victims and resistance fighters. The SED leadership needed to establish a certain distance between itself and Stalin's Soviet Union in order not to be involved in the problems of the past. Ulbricht said at the sixth SED congress:

> We, the members and leaders of the KPD, have also suffered under the Stalinist cult of the personality and its terror methods. And if some people want to have details: our politburo opposed Stalin's methods and found understanding and support among Soviet comrades and on the part of the general secretary of the Communist International, Comrade Georgi Dimitrov.[3]

On another occasion Ulbricht boasted that he had intervened with Dimitrov in order to protect the writer Johannes R. Becher from the secret police. What came in for the strongest attacks was Stalin's economic policy, because here the change of course was greatest and stood most in need of justification. In the spring of 1964 Ulbricht spoke to the central committee on the causes of red tape in the economic administration.

> In the last period of his activity Stalin used red tape as an instrument of administration. He did this because of his marked distrust of the abilities of the cadres and the masses. This distrust arose from a defensive attitude, from a lack of faith in the powers of conviction of communist ideas. It was one of the causes of red tape, of over-centralisation. If you regard everyone else as incapable you must take all decisions yourself and use the bureaucrats to carry out your orders to the last letter. If we managed to deal moderately well with the harmful effects of Stalin's measures it

[2] *Neues Deutschland*, 15 December 1962.
[3] *Neues Deutschland*, 17 January 1963.

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was because, in the main, our party leadership made its own analysis of the situation and acted accordingly. In this it received the full support of the comrades in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Correct leadership made it possible to open a new chapter in our economic policy with the sixth party congress, with the decisions on the programme and the directives on the new economic system.[4]

Dykes Against the Thaw

Stalinism survived longest in the cultural sphere. Here the DDR continues to be a kind of Stalinist game reserve, at any rate as far as the official cultural policy of the party is concerned.

Even the first wave of Soviet thaw-literature is only feebly represented in the DDR. In 1957 the Society for German-Soviet Friendship published such books as Ehrenburg's *The Thaw*, Kazakevich's *The House in the Square*, Nekrasov's *Home Town*, and Ovechkin's *Difficult Spring*. In the following year Nilin's *Cruelty* appeared, and in 1960 Nikolaieva's *The Battle on the Road*. But Dudintsev's name is not to be found on the list of any East German publisher.

The anti-Stalinist literary revelations of the sixties have been completely suppressed in East Germany. Two exceptions must be mentioned: Yevtushenko's poem against anti-semitism *Baby Yar*, and chapter 14 of Tvardovsky's destalinisation poem *Far Away*, which received the Lenin Prize. However, they were published by the liberal cultural journal *Sinn und Form* (1962, no. 5/6; 1963, no. 2/3), persecuted for years by the party, whose editor-in-chief Peter Huchel, one of Germany's most eminent lyric poets, was ignominiously dismissed in 1963.

In March 1963 the SED organised a conference of artists and writers at which the trend, encouraged by Soviet developments, towards artistic and political freedom was condemned *ex cathedra*. In particular Ulbricht rejected the demand that Solzhenitsyn's already world-famous novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and other Soviet concentration camp literature should be published in East Germany. He stated publicly that Soviet literature in the DDR was subject to censorship:

> To those artists and writers who, instead of grappling with socialist construction, demand that in publishing Soviet literature we should give preference to works which describe the sufferings of internees under the Stalinist terror, we say frankly: certain works of this kind may well be effective as far as the conditions inside the Soviet Union are concerned, but there is absolutely no reason why they should be published here. We concentrate our attention on the great constructive works of Soviet art, we study them and we learn from them. For example it was right to give the widest distribution to the novel and the film of the Soviet

[4] *Neues Deutschland*, 5 February 1964.

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> writer Nikolaieva. Her subject matter is suited to our age and our conditions. The demand of some people who, 'craving for knowledge', ask that Soviet 'camp literature' should be published here because it is published in West Germany, has no validity for us whatsoever. Many things from the socialist countries are published in West Germany in order to be misused for anti-communist propaganda purposes.

Central committee secretary Kurt Hager, in charge of ideological questions, explained on the same occasion what in this connection was meant by the 'special German conditions': revelations about Soviet concentration camps might provoke comparisons between national-socialism and communism.[5]

The most prominent victim of SED censorship, apart from Solzhenitsyn, was Ilya Ehrenburg. His memoirs, *People Years and Life*, which were to have been published in June 963, were not allowed to appear. To begin with it was only a question of the first two parts, 1891 to 1921. As late as February 1963 the publishing house *Volk und Welt* announced the work, describing it as 'a passionate chronicle of the human and literary development of this world-famous writer, and of the many historical and cultural events which he witnessed in the course of his unusual life'.

Yevgeny Yevtushenko unleashed a political scandal in the DDR. At the end of 1962 a volume of carefully selected poems by him was published. The first edition was immediately sold out. Overnight Yevtushenko became the idol of East Germany's youth. On the occasion of the first public poetry evening of the DDR, organised on the Soviet model, a young East German poet read a poem of homage to Yevtushenko:

> I wanted new lyrics but could not find that little book—everything was in short supply . . . I dreamt the other night we had a hundred Yevtushenkos: high-spirited, tender, reflective, shaping today and tomorrow.

The then President of the Academy of the Arts, Willi Bredel, said: 'I really wish that in poetry and prose we could produce real Yevtushenkos, who sometimes behave like a pike in a pond of carp but who bring movement and create something great.'[6]

The SED profoundly disliked the desire for change to which this enthusiasm bore witness. Yevtushenko's good-will trip through West Germany gave it an excuse to overthrow the idol. On 11 April 1963 the central organ of the SED, *Neues Deutschland*, published a sharp criticism not only of Yevtushenko's conciliatory behaviour in the Federal Republic but indirectly also of the Soviet Government which had officially sent him:

> It is not for us to give a Soviet poet a talking to. This the

[5] *Neues Deutschland*, 30 March, 4 April 1963.
[6] *Sinn und Form*, 1963, No. 1; *Forum*, 13 December 1962.

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> Soviet communists will no doubt do themselves. But he has appeared in Germany, at that sector of the front of the world-wide class struggle where we are primarily in charge. To put it mildly, his appearance has not helped us. . . . From numerous reports in the world press it becomes clear that in interviews he gave evasive answers to questions which concerned the DDR. Was it because, true to his views on ideological coexistence, he did not wish to say anything that might offend the enemies of the DDR? . . . We must be communists through and through when we participate in the struggle for peaceful coexistence. For us in the DDR there is a special point: we must be doubly vigilant, doubly firm in our political and ideological attitude, because, being in the front line against German imperialism, we are particularly exposed to its pressure and its propaganda.

It was not until this year that the book market of the DDR was opened up again to Yevtushenko for his *Kuriny Bog*.

Even Galina Nikolaieva was not spared the censorship of the DDR authorities, although Ulbricht had praised her *Battle on the Road* as a model. The film of the book was shown in the DDR in an abridged version only. The criticism of Stalinism was eliminated or made unrecognisable by cuts. At a reception in her honour in East Berlin, the author publicly protested against this. Wits rechristened the film, changing its title from *Schlacht unterwegs* to *Unterwegs geschlachtet*.

A comic example of SED censorship is the Soviet film *Ordinary Fascism*, shown this year. In the Russian commentary the chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, is included among the neo-fascists. The German version rescued him from this company. The Russian text establishes a relationship between the growth of the SA before 1933 and the roughly parallel growth in the sale of *Bockwurst*. This too was cut—*Bockwurst* being a kind of national dish in the DDR.

The hardening of official Soviet cultural policy has brought about a rapprochement and has somewhat eased the position of the DDR within the communist camp. The extent to which it has become isolated by its reactionary cultural policy becomes apparent at every international conference. The East German Writers' Association tried to break through this isolation by convening in December 1964 a conference in East Berlin on 'Two German Literatures', at which only East European visitors participated. The hosts, as their spokesman, Wolfgang Joho, later complained, 'were put on the carpet' and faced a running fire of accusations. Only the Soviet representatives took their side and their press was the only one to make any reference to the conference. In the other countries whose writers were present it was not mentioned at all. No wonder that the notorious doctrinaire Alfred Kurella said in December last year in the central committee that the DDR must fight against 'massive revisionist tendencies among its allies in the socialist and communist camp'.

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Krushhchev's fall

Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 marks a turning point in the relationship between the DDR and the Soviet Union. The politburo of the SED published an explanation on the subject, unique in the history of that party. It is a masterpiece of ambiguity; all roads to Moscow remained open but at the same time the DDR's own point of view was emphatically stated: the politburo was convinced that the decisions of the Soviet leadership 'were guided by the profound concern of the CPSU for the continuous practical pursuit of the Leninist general line'. The news of Khrushchev's dismissal had produced 'profound emotion' in East Germany.

> It is known that Comrade Khrushchev contributed to the execution of the Marxist-Leninist policy laid down by the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The plenum of the CPSU central committee obviously took these decisions because Comrade Khrushchev was no longer equal to his task.

The politburo recalled Khrushchev's last official act in the German question, the Treaty of Friendship of June 1964 by which the Soviet Union undertook to guarantee the frontiers of the DDR for twenty years. 'Jointly we shall work together to see that the Treaty is honourably observed.' Finally it was stressed that the Germans alone were responsible for German affairs: the successes of the DDR were 'the result of the creative initiative of the nation, the consistent policy of our party, the collectivity of its leadership, the firm unity of its ranks, and the friendly collaboration of all parties and mass organisations'. The work of the SED was based on the Leninist norms for the work of party and state and on the resolutions of the sixth SED congress.[7]

The main reason for this reserved attitude was fear of any dramatic change. Destalinisation had brought enough difficulties; it must not be succeeded by a 'dekhrushchevisation'. Moreover, the SED leaders had reason to feel obliged to Khrushchev. He had committed himself to an unparalleled degree in the German question and had mobilised the full power of the Soviet Union in the interests of the DDR. Although his last plan, to visit Bonn, had caused annoyance, the DDR had no reason whatever to be worried, being secure in its Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union of June 1964. Finally, it was Khrushchev who had made the emancipation of the SED possible and to whom it owed its most important achievement, the New Economic System, which was to make the DDR the pacemaker of economic reform in the whole of the eastern bloc.

Ulbricht was clever enough to make the most of the advantages of the hour. The new leadership in the Kremlin consisted of heterogeneous elements and had no outstanding personality. It faced difficult

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, 18 October 1964.

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economic problems and was in the midst of a decisive struggle with China. Ulbricht cleverly used the weakness of Moscow's central authority to promote his own interests. In three respects SED policy was modified at the end of 1964: in the relationship with the Soviet party, in the conflict with China, and in Comecon policy. Although this certainly did not occur against the express wish of the Soviets, they were not asked either.

In its delicate dealings with the population on the recent 'clean-up' in Moscow, the SED differentiated carefully between Soviet and German affairs. Khrushchev's fall was presented as an internal Soviet affair of no more concern to the DDR than, for example, the change of government in Czechoslovakia which occurred at the same time. Ulbricht said at a public meeting in Cottbus: 'Who becomes first secretary of a party, even if it is the leading party of the socialist camp, is decided by the central committee of that party, which also decides what part of its reasoning is published or not published.' There were things to Khrushchev's credit but he had also made mistakes.

> What the mistakes were in detail and how to remedy them is a matter for our Soviet comrades. I can only say that of the proposals which Comrade Khrushchev made, for example with regard to agricultural issues, none have been carried out by us. Therefore I am not in a position to discuss this question. We have carried out—and we are obliged to do so—what was decided at the party congress and at the farmers' congress. That settles the question. I think this is clear. Our Soviet comrades will themselves put right the mistakes that occurred in the field of Soviet agriculture as the result of arbitrary directives.[8]

Khrushchev's party reform, which the SED had incorporated at the last minute in the statutes to be placed before the sixth SED congress, was not abandoned. However, it had been introduced half-heartedly. Whereas Khrushchev had split the Soviet party machinery from the regional level downwards into two parts on the so-called production principle, the SED retained the territorial bases of organisation, thus maintaining uniform political leadership throughout; it merely established additional bureaus for industry and agriculture. After Khrushchev's successors rejected the party reform as a crass error, the SED simply dropped the formerly much-advertised production principle.

The most precise description of the new relationship of the SED to the Soviet Union came on the occasion of the forty-eighth anniversary of the Russian Revolution from politburo candidate Hermann Axen, then still editor-in-chief of the party paper *Neues Deutschland*. He fitted it as *primus inter pares* into a polycentric structure of the communist camp:

> It is obvious that the revolutionary forces in each country must

[8] *Neues Deutschland*, 5 November 1964.

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> themselves, under the leadership of their party, find the specific methods and forms of transition and that they must above all realise them together with the broad masses . . . It is a result of the fundamental changes in the world after the Red October, a sign of the higher stage of development of the international revolutionary movement, that in our day the centre of the revolutionary movement is no longer concentrated in one country or transferred from one to another. Today the socialist world system, this greatest achievement of the international working class, is the natural and invincible centre of all revolutionary movements of our age. The main force in this great community of fourteen socialist countries with equal rights is the socialist Soviet Union.

In the conflict with Peking the SED modified its unequivocal attitude towards China. It took up the non-committal position of a mediator. Ulbricht announced publicly that Khrushchev's plans for a communist world conference had 'met with resistance from a number of communist parties'. He thought that it was necessary first to create 'an atmosphere of understanding, an atmosphere of objectivity'. All 'spiteful public polemics' must be stopped. 'We have been asked how this will happen. It is very simple. We shall sit down at a table together and discuss these questions.' He absolutely rejected an 'intervention in China's internal affairs'. It was certainly possible 'to reach agreement on all basic questions'.

The Chinese immediately rewarded this attitude. Whereas in the summer of 1964 rude attacks from East Berlin and a Chinese flirtation with the Federal Republic had cast a shadow on East German-Chinese solidarity with respect to the German question, on the occasion of the celebration of the Russian Revolution in November 1964 in Moscow, the Chinese assured the SED delegation of their support on this question; they even made themselves the advocates of SED interests. They accused the Soviet leadership of pursuing a stand-still policy in Germany in order not to provoke the American imperialists, and of sacrificing the DDR to the policy of détente.

The SED did not object. At times at any rate it toyed with playing the Chinese card in order to remind Moscow of its obligations in Germany. For example, the DDR press suddenly discussed whether the East German population would be as helplessly abandoned to a possible American air attack as the population of North Vietnam, and whether the war in Vietnam did not signify the failure of the policy of peaceful coexistence. At the last Spring Fair in Leipzig the DDR displayed renewed interest in long-term trade agreements with Peking, whereas trade with China had decreased sharply between 1962 and 1964.

However, the SED is less interested in a rapprochement with Peking than in safeguarding its own autonomy. It is against the expulsion of China because—like many other communist parties—it is

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interested in the existence of a counterweight to the power of the Soviet Union in the eastern bloc. In contrast to its previous intransigent position, recent DDR statements on the Chinese problem are markedly conciliatory:

> As regards relations to the Chinese Communist Party, we are guided by the view that what unites the communist parties is stronger than what divides them at present. We must and can find ways of strengthening the unity of action of the socialist countries, of the international communist movement.[9]

The DDR in Comecon

In the economic sphere, too, the DDR tried to gain more freedom of movement. It sought to advance in two directions: it demanded more advantageous conditions in Comecon trade, and it tried to establish contacts with the world market.

Pointing to its New Economic System it demanded that the other communist countries should also replace administrative direction by economic incentives. Cooperation between the socialist countries, Ulbricht said in December 1964, must be based 'strictly on economic criteria'. It was necessary 'to overcome the bureaucratic elements in the administration of the economy not only within individual socialist countries but also in the relationship between the states'.

Three months later he openly attacked the Comecon partners for their economic backwardness. In the economic competition with capitalism time had been lost. 'Superficial or even false' explanations for this had been advanced by most of the socialist countries. 'It is not surprising that in those places where the people in charge have specialised in "alienation propaganda", productivity is unfavourably affected.'

Foreign trade 'based on economic criteria' meant an end to free brotherly assistance to developing socialist countries. A particular cause for irritation was the requirement, based on a Comecon resolution of 1949, to pass on scientific and technical documentation without charge. The DDR demanded suitable payment, not without pointing out 'that all socialist countries are ready to pay appropriate licence fees to capitalist enterprises'.[10]

What lends weight to these demands is the fact that after the Soviet Union the DDR is the strongest economic power of the eastern bloc. For Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria, it is the second most important trading partner after the Soviet Union, and for Hungary the third after Czechoslovakia. In Rumania it has meanwhile had to surrender the third place to the Federal Republic. Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria receive substantial development credits from East Germany.

[9] *Neues Deutschland*, 10 February 1966.
[10] *Einheit*, 1965, No. 4.

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The tendency to seek western markets had already become apparent earlier. The modern technocrats around the then chief planner, Erich Apel, presumably had more than the obvious economic reasons in mind. Without wishing to give up the links with the eastern bloc, they wanted to lessen the DDR's one-sided dependence in order to make it politically more mobile. At a central committee meeting in February 1964 Apel demanded self-determination in economic policy:

> We must clearly be guided by world levels. If the world level in one field or another exists in the Soviet Union then this becomes our standard; if it is found in West Germany or Japan then this is where we look. But if we have achieved it in our chemical industry then we need not look abroad but merely maintain our own standard.

At the Spring Fair in Leipzig in the same year Apel announced an expansion of trade with the capitalist countries and submitted an extensive programme for the import of installations and licences. This went hand in hand with a change—not very important but nevertheless noteworthy—in the regional distribution of the DDR's foreign trade. From 1962 to 1964 the share of the socialist countries fell from 79 to 76·4 per cent., the share of the Comecon countries falling from 75 to 72·4 per cent. Conversely, the share of the other foreign countries (capitalist and underdeveloped, excluding the Federal Republic) rose from 12·5 to 14·2 per cent.

With the conclusion of the new trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 3 December 1965, this development seems for the moment to have halted. Even greater demands than before are made by the Soviets on the economy of the DDR which, compared with West Germany, continues to be weak. (The Soviet Union accounts for more than 50 per cent of East Germany's foreign trade.) The treaty envisages a turnover of 60 milliard valuta mark between 1966 and 1970. Compared with the previous trade agreement, this means an increase of 43 per cent. More than 70 per cent of the imports from the Soviet Union consist of fuel and raw materials, whereas more than 50 per cent of DDR exports consists of machinery and equipment. This includes equipment for the food industry, light industry, and the printing industry, machine tools, numerous complete chemical installations and chemical equipment, 339 ships, 3,130 railway wagons, 5,250 refrigerated railway trucks, and more than 100,000 tons of rolling-mill equipment. At the signing of the treaty the Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Patolichev, pointed out that one third of all the machinery and equipment imported by the Soviet Union came from the DDR. This undoubtedly creates burdens for the East German economy, noticeably restricting its freedom of movement in other markets, and in most cases does not even bring it the world market price. Moreover, competition in the world market provides a considerable stimulus for technical progress which in the long run would undoubtedly be

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more advantageous to the economy of the DDR than 'the certainty of being able to sell' to the Soviet Union. Although the East German advocates of the agreement emphasise that more modern technical methods will be imported, they are primarily referring to the Soviet Union which in this field can hardly provide a satisfactory substitute for the variety available on the world market.

The change of direction which occurred with this treaty becomes clear from the words of Erich Honecker, particularly if they are compared with Apel's comments on the world level:

> Some scientists, technicians, and civil servants have not yet overcome the tendency to take the 'Western level' as their standard in all questions relating to new technical methods, without having made the effort to discover what the situation is in the Soviet Union. This is one of the main reasons why the demand for imports from the Western countries continues to increase . . . The leaders and all responsible employees in state and economic organs must always start in their practical work from the fact that close collaboration with the USSR is decisive in order to make our long-term prospects secure.[11]

There is no doubt that there was disagreement within the SED leadership on the question of the trade agreement and the resulting change of political direction. The dramatic struggle which took place behind the scenes was revealed by Apel's suicide just before the treaty was signed. Those of the SED leaders who stress the DDR's dependence on the Soviet Union have won the day. Their motto is no risks, no experiments. The consequences can be seen on every hand. The political climate in the DDR is clearly freezing over, recalling more and more the cold-war atmosphere at the time of the Korean war. Reluctant initiatives towards a policy of détente in Germany, such as for example the Berlin pass agreement, or the exchange of speakers with the SPD, were cut off. The SED is steadily isolating itself from other communist parties, which in the West are seeking partners in a coexistence policy and feel their position discredited by the retrogressive developments in East Germany. This again reinforces the ties with the Soviet Union, which provides a shield for the reactionary line of the SED and supports it in the international field. Nevertheless the process of emancipation cannot be reversed. The interests of the SED demand Big Brother's protection as much as the right to have a voice in German policy. Therefore the solution of their problems does not lie in satellite status but in an autonomy protected by the bloc.

[11] *Neues Deutschland*, 16 December 1965.

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WOLF BIERMANN: THE ENFANT TERRIBLE AS SCAPEGOAT

Margaret Vallance

THE fact that the eleventh plenum of the governing party of the DDR chose to devote two days to discussing the case of a young self-styled ballad-singer called Wolf Biermann, seems faintly ludicrous, especially as the original purpose of the conference was to consider urgent economic problems, but it serves to illustrate the state of the cultural climate at present prevailing in the DDR. One of the outcomes of the eleventh plenum of December 1965 was an intensification of the campaign being waged by the more dogmatic and conservative elements in the Central Committee of the SED against many writers, artists, and film directors who have manifested tendencies of independent thought or critical expression. Biermann seems to have become the focal point for the anger and resentment of the dogmatists who see 'scepticism' as the most damaging means of disrupting the unity of the working classes in their struggle to build socialism.

As Marcel Reich-Ranicki pointed out in an article in the West German weekly *Die Zeit* in December 1965, Biermann is feared by the party because he is in many ways himself a product of the SED *Kulturpolitik*. Of impeccable background—born in 1936 of working-class communist parents, his father was a Hamburg docker who was killed by the Nazis—Biermann left the West to go to live in East Berlin at the age of seventeen. He studied philosophy at the Humboldt University and spent two years under Brecht at the Berliner Ensemble as an assistant producer. He provided ideal material for the cultural functionaries; he was instructed in the duty of the young socialist author to write about the immediate present, *die unmittelbare Gegenwart*, about the lives of the workers in the DDR; it was impressed upon him that he must never ignore the political point of view—and of course it was understood that a poet of the Workers' and Peasants' State should always write in language that is comprehensible to the 'least educated comrades'. He was warned of the dangers of 'formalism' and other decadent tendencies that manifest themselves in bourgeois literature.

Biermann proved a good pupil. He wrote poems and songs about village life and the setting up of collective farms, ballads telling of the romantic experience of a tractor driver and the adventures of a lorry driver. He composed music with good, catchy tunes and often swinging rhythms, and he sang his songs to his own accompaniment on the guitar with vivacity and charm. He received encouragement from

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many quarters, including the late Hans Eisler, whose friendship Biermann valued highly. The influence of Eisler can be seen in some of Biermann's more militant songs, such as 'Ein deutscher Kommunist', which tells the story of a communist who escaped from Buchenwald concentration camp in 1939 and fled to Russia, only to be shot by the Russians, who believed a letter that was sent by the Nazis denouncing him as a Nazi in disguise, or the song written in 1963, on the execution of the Spanish communist, Julian Grimau. The strong, sometimes angry rhythm in the music for these songs is close to the 'agit-prop' compositions of Eisler in the 1920s and 1930s sung by Ernst Busch. But Biermann's themes were contemporary—he wrote songs for the CND movement and for the emergent Civil Rights movement in America, such as the Ballad of William E. Moore, the postman from Baltimore who set off alone for the Deep South, to protest against the persecution of the Negroes, and was shot dead after a week. After each verse comes the refrain

> BLACK AND WHITE, UNITE! UNITE!
> schrieb er auf ein Schild. (he wrote on a placard)
> White and black—die Schranken weg! (away with the barriers!)
> Und er ging ganz allein. (And he walked all alone.)

Biermann soon won great popularity amongst students and workers; the freshness and honesty of his approach, the element of healthy iconoclasm with which he treated his subject matter, had an immense appeal for audiences fed mostly with versified forms of *Neues Deutschland* reports. It soon became clear that he was in fact writing about the people of the DDR, and expressing some of their thoughts and feelings—and in terms that everyone, 'even the least educated comrade', could understand. Only the thoughts which find expression in his songs were not those calculated to please the more dogmatic functionaries, who frowned upon the flippancy with which certain subjects were treated. Some songs did indeed contain, by implication, an element of criticism—but only the most rigid teutonic dogmatism could construe it as harmful. For instance, the cheerful cycle of children's songs entitled 'Wir loben die guten Sozialisten', contains only constructive hints. The song of the family doctor who does not go over to the West, who enjoys having discussions with functionaries, and who says what he thinks. The song of the functionary who does not spend his time making long speeches but takes the trouble to find out what the people are actually thinking, who does not explain, when there is a shortage of onions, that onions are bad for us, but admits: 'we can eat only what we plant'.

BIERMANN began life in the DDR full of enthusiasm, he did his share in the hard work of harvest-time on the farms, of going around explaining to recalcitrant peasants the need for collective farming; he became candidate for membership of the SED. In 1961

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he was instrumental in the creation of a Students and Workers Theatre; he had written two plays, one of which, called *Berliner Brautgang*, reached dress-rehearsal stage, when it was banned and the theatre disbanded until it could be reformed on a basis more acceptable to the cultural functionaries. The banned play's theme was that of the love between a worker and a doctor's daughter in the divided city of Berlin. This, together with the doubts Biermann had expressed about protective measures being taken at the frontier (i.e. the building of the wall), was enough to provoke the anger of a decisive proportion of the Central Committee, and he received the disciplinary measure of *Auftrittsverbot*—he was forbidden to perform anywhere in the DDR until June 1963.

This disciplinary measure had the effect, of course, of turning the already impudent humour inherent in Biermann's talent as an entertainer, into something more like angry defiance. From this point on, Biermann was the subject of heated controversy in the university and influential circles of the party. On the one hand he was supported by the more 'human', liberal party members (and above all, those with a sense of humour), and on the other hand he was attacked for the subversive, anarchistic attitudes supposedly displayed in his songs (behind these attacks were also the offended moral feelings of those who did not appreciate the 'impudence' and eroticism of some of his love songs). Biermann became a concept used by the protagonists in a battle being waged over the amount of cultural freedom permissible in a country whose government still feels itself to be constantly threatened by hostile forces both inside and outside its borders. There are many who feel that a socialist country should allow itself angry young men who serve a useful function in spotlighting obvious stupidities and injustices in the system, who shatter complacency. The Austrian communist Ernst Fischer has praised Biermann's poetry, saying that it should be read 'wherever there is youth and life'.

The essence of Biermann lies in his sharpness and wit (the famous, pungent humour of the Berliner combined with the earthiness of Hamburg's dockland) and his irrepressible urge to be mildly outrageous. For he is fundamentally an entertainer in the strongly political tradition of the best German satirists, from Wedekind to Brecht to Neuss (the West Berlin political cabaret artist). At the same time he looks to the French *chansonnier* for his style; he likes to think of himself as close to Villon in spirit—and in appearance he resembles a French troubadour-clown: a deceptively mild-looking figure, small and slight, a round, pale face with tired circles under the eyes, a childlike, sometimes pouting, sometimes mocking mouth, and, inevitably, the long drooping moustache. The whole effect is faintly comical, until the singing begins and the mildness vanishes and the slight nasal Hamburg twang is lost in a great volume of sound as Biermann reaches a crescendo of passion and anger, then to sink to

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the soft voice of resignation or mockery. In 1964 he wrote 'Ballad to the poet Francois Villon':

Mein grosser Bruder Franz Villon
Wohnt bei mir mit auf Zimmer
Wenn Leute bei mir schnüffeln gehn
Versteckt Villon sich immer
Dann drückt er sich in' Kleiderschrank
Mit einer Flasche Wein
Und wartet bis die Luft rein ist
Die Luft ist nie ganz rein.
(My big brother Franz Villon
Is living with me in my room
When people come snooping
Villon always hides
He squeezes into the wardrobe
With a bottle of wine
And waits till the air is clear
The air is never quite clear)

Sometimes Villon sings songs or ballads, and when he forgets the words Biermann whistles to him from Brecht's poems; sometimes he tries to read ND (*Neues Deutschland*), but the German only confuses him:

Zwar hat man ihn als Kind gelehrt
Das hohe Schul-Latein
Als Mann jedoch liess er sich mehr
Mit neiderm Volke ein.
(They did teach him as a child
High-school Latin
But as a man he preferred to be
With the common people.)

When Biermann is visited by Marie, Villon goes for a stroll on the Wall, making the sentries nervous; the bullets go through him, but instead of blood, red wine comes pouring out . . .

Dann spielt er auf dem Stacheldraht
Aus Jux die grosse Harfe
Die Grenzer schiessen Rhythmus zu
Verschieden nach Bedarfe . . .
(Then for fun he plays the harp
on the barbed wire
The border guards shoot the rhythm
Differently, according to needs . . .)

Of course, the thing becomes known 'in our land of great order', and Biermann is woken one morning at three by three gentlemen from the great army of the people's police:

Herr Biermann—they said to me
You are well known to us
As a true son of the DDR

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The fatherland calls
Come, confess to us freely
Has not a certain
Franz Fillonk with red hair
Been living here for a year?
A provocateur, who night after night
Scares the border guards . . .

And Biermann answers yes, that it is true, but that he does not know what to do with the fellow and his outrageous songs:

Had I not only recently read
Kurella's paper
On Kafka and the Bat
I would have been lost . . .

(This is a reference to the paper given by the representative of the DDR ministry of culture, Alfred Kurella, who took part in the 1964 Kafka conference in Prague, at which the East German delegation was the only one still unwilling to accept Kafka as suitable reading matter for the general public.)

The Villon ballad provided the title to the volume of Biermann's poems and songs which was published by Klaus Wagenbach in Berlin in October 1965, called *Die Drahtharfe*. It reveals an attitude to the situation in Berlin that provides an alternative to the use of the Wall by either side for propaganda purposes—that of laughter. He treats the thing as ridiculous—as indeed it is. Through the humour the 'human element' is always visible; Biermann is not ignoring the tragic consequences of the Wall's existence—he was one of the first to voice his criticism—but perhaps he has recognised that this is the only way in which an otherwise intolerable situation can be treated. He has written several songs about the Wall, as for instance the 'Ballad of White Sophie'—the girl who escaped with Papa and Mama over the Wall. If only she had spent the night with him, he sighs, she might not have gone. The escape is not quite successful—the father is caught. 'If only the comrades had got her as well. . . .'

IT was in 1961 that the image of Biermann as *enfant terrible* began to take shape; and this was partly a result of the disciplinary measures taken against him by over-anxious functionaries, who perhaps felt themselves personally insulted by his songs. Another result of the *Auftrittsverbot* was that Biermann had all the more time in which to write more songs. He wrote 'Vorfrühling' (Early Spring) at this time—a sombre poem, expressing the longing for the light and warmth that must eventually come after the long winter, the joy of the first days of spring, but gives warning that 'the first warm days are not yet victory. The nights are still cold; flowers that come out too soon may die. . . .' But there are many simple love songs such as the beautiful poem, set to music, called 'Die Sonnenpferde' (The Horses of the

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Sun)—a brief vision of a boy and girl lying in the sun 'after the matinee performance'; the girl's hand over the boy's eyes, 'like a circus tent', with the sun shining through the gaps between her fingers. She does not see the sun horses drinking up his tears.

In a different vein there is the very simple poem 'Herr Brecht' (1961), in which Brecht is seen walking down the road from the Huguenot cemetery towards his theatre, three years after his death. On the way he meets one fat man, two fat women, and a boy. These, he thinks, must be the hard-working people at the Brecht Archives. 'What', he thinks to himself, 'aren't you finished with that rubbish yet?' 'And he smiles his insolent modest smile and is content.' And the less flattering poem to Frau Brecht (1962), set to a rollicking rhythm, with the refrain: 'if the hen sits on the eggs too long, the eggs will go bad' (referring to the tendency of Brecht's widow to sit on Brecht's manuscripts, allowing only a privileged few to get at them).

There are many poems about Berlin: the student's Berlin, the thrush singing in the courtyard of the Humboldt University, when suddenly a crowd of people gathered, quite spontaneously, and all began talking together about what to do for Germany, for Europe, for peace—shortly before the Summit Conference; Berlin seen from the roof tops; '*Berlin, du deutsche, deutsche Frau*'. Biermann is clearly fascinated by the city, and belongs to it; he has made himself the poet of Berlin, the singer of Berlin, in all her moods. There is the mock romantic patriotism of the song to '*Mein Vaterland*'—'my fatherland, my fatherland, with one hand of fire and the other of snow. When we embrace, there comes a pain in my heart . . . In the East there are my friends, in the West there is the Wall'. In 1962 came the poem that could be taken as a theme song for Biermann the troubadour, who sings about contemporary events, and sings about what the people are thinking, 'The Ballad of the drain-layer Fredi Rohsmeisl from Buckow', which tells the story of a young man who danced the twist when it was forbidden, and ends up with twelve weeks in prison for counter-revolutionary activities.

Er ist für den Sozialismus
Und für den neuen Staat
Aber den Staat in Buckow
Den hat er gründlich satt.
(He is for socialism
and for the new state
but he is fed up to the teeth
with the state in Buckow.)

This expresses what so many young people in the DDR feel: they are for socialism, but become alienated and disillusioned by the stupidity of repressive measures taken against them. In the same year Biermann wrote the sad, bitter poem 'To the old comrades'—'Comrades, look at me, with your tired eyes, I am not satisfied with the times that you

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are handing on to me. You speak in old-fashioned words about the bloody victories of our class. Full of envy I listen to the accounts of your sufferings, of the joy in the battle at the barricades, but I myself am *not* happy: I am dissatisfied with the new order. You stand there disappointed . . . at such ingratitude . . . The present, the sweet goal of those bitter years, is for me only the bitter beginning, is crying for change . . .'

This open anger, this bitter indignation, makes Biermann a virtually unique figure in the DDR. He alone appears to have the courage to write about such feelings, which must be common to many. Sometimes he lets himself go in a violent outburst of anger, as in '*Rücksichtslose Schimpferei*' (roughly translatable as Reckless Abuse) 'I I I am full of hatred, am full of hardness . . . I don't wan't to see anyone! Don't stand there! Don't stare! The collective has gone crooked. I am the single one. The collective has isolated itself from me. Don't stare at me so understandingly! O, I know, you are waiting . . . certain that I will swim into your net of self-criticism . . .'

In a less passionate, more sardonic mood, the 'Ballad of the Man', written in 1963, is about the man who steps into some muck; as there is no water around with which to wash his foot clean, he hacks it off with his axe; but in his haste he hacks off the clean foot; in fury he hacks off the other foot as well:

Es hackte die Partei
sich ab so manchen Fuss
so manchen guten Fuss
abhackte die Partei.
(*Thus the Party hacked off*
many a good foot . . .)

These poems were of course not published; for there was no means of publication open to Biermann in the DDR. But in 1964 there came a mild cultural thaw and he seemed to be forgiven. Allowed to perform once more, he soon became the popular guest star at the satirical cabaret 'Die Distel' in East Berlin, and in December of that year the *enfant terrible* of the DDR was sent to the Western Front—he had a tremendously successful tour of performances in West Germany. It was said that no communist had enjoyed such success since the visit of Yevtushenko. He was celebrated and praised by all quarters, no doubt for a variety of motives. Even *Die Welt* claimed that his poetry belonged to the best of contemporary literature, in the East or in the West. This torrent of western approval did not make Biermann more popular with his own cultural authorities, but it did impress upon them that he was well-known. In the spring of 1965 he joined the West Berlin cabaretist, Wolfgang Neuss, in a concert, following the Nuclear Disarmament march to Frankfurt. But in May of that year, owing to an indiscretion of Neuss, who published a private letter of Biermann's in his satirical paper *Neuss Deutschland* without Biermann's knowledge or permission, sentence was passed once more.

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Biermann was forbidden to give any more performances in the DDR, he was not allowed to leave the country, and all invitations from societies in the DDR and from abroad were intercepted and turned down by the authorities. The East German record company 'Eterna' had made a record of songs by the pop singer Manfred Krug, which contained six songs by Biermann. The record is not allowed to be sold.

THOSE who are behind the persecution of Biermann will not have been pleased, then, when in October 1965 his first book of poems and songs was published (in West Berlin), as well as a record of his joint performance with Neuss in front of a large and warmly appreciative West German audience. But by no means all the members of the Central Committee and the cultural functionaries are against Biermann. Alfred Kurella is known to have supported him. In November, simultaneously with the triumph of the reactionaries in introducing a more rigid line all along the cultural front, a systematic campaign against Biermann was initiated. At a meeting between Ulbricht and writers, Anna Seghers and Christa Wolf opposed the re-introduction of the Stalinist line. A meeting of the Writers Union was postponed and changed to take place in Leipzig, where there is a more militant Stalinist party group. The Leipzig district party leadership came out against 'ideological co-existence', against agreement to differ on cultural matters, and attacked Biermann. A long polemical article followed in *Neues Deutschland*, in which Biermann was accused of anarchism, political perversion, and irresponsibility; scepticism, the article said, prevented him from understanding the humanism of their society; he was repeating the mistakes of the philosophy of middle-class individualism. He had even gone so far as to compose malicious verses against the 'anti-fascist protective wall and our border guards'. Though he had done some good work in the past, recently his work had been entirely negative. The only hope was for him to make a radical about-turn (the net of self-criticism Biermann alluded to in his earlier poem).

At the party plenum, when the spokesman for the Politbureau, Honecker, led the attack on writers, film producers, etc., it was Biermann who represented for him all those detrimental forces that must be fought against: 'What the enemy demands of the DDR's cultural workers is no longer the renunciation of socialism . . . but merely uncertainty about the correctness of our path towards socialism.' He accused Biermann of undermining 'the fighting alliance' between the old comrades and the younger generation. The extent to which the DDR is now isolating itself through the rigidity of its cultural policies is revealed in Kurella's emphasis on 'the need to resist revisionist tendencies amongst our allies in the socialist and communist camps.' Throughout December *Neues Deutschland* and other papers carried attacks on Biermann; they accused him of 'undermining the patriotic awareness of our youth', of lacking a positive attitude

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to the socialist German state—he was even accused of betraying West German progressive forces (this was promptly denied by Peter Weiss and Heinrich Böll in *Die Zeit*, 17 December).

Many East German writers have refused to associate themselves with the attitude of the eleventh plenum; there has been much heated discussion; the cultural minister Benzien has been replaced by Klaus Gysi of the Aufbau Verlag. It is possible that the party leaders are beginning to realise that they have been too extreme in their attempts to suppress the public expression of critical attitudes in cultural form.

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THE WRITER IN EAST GERMANY

M. Reich-Ranicki

IN the years 1965–66 writers in the Federal Republic have concerned themselves more than ever with politics, while in the DDR politicians have been similarly concerned with writers.

Thus in the West, for instance, writers such as Guenter Grass and Siegfried Lenz have interrupted their fiction and drama activities to speak at election meetings. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, the lyric poet, has since 1965 been publishing the magazine *Kursbuch*, largely concerned with political questions. And in December 1965 the eleventh plenary session of the central committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) took place in East Berlin. It was intended to deal mainly with economic problems, but most speakers—certainly not without emotion or perseverance—dealt with questions of literature and art. No name appeared so frequently in the speeches and discussions as that of the young poet Wolf Biermann, who lives in the DDR.

In both Germanys writers have been reviled publicly in the past year. In the East, several writers working there were charged with scepticism, liberalism, and a hypercritical attitude—and in the DDR these are dangerous descriptions. In the West, on the other hand, they have another insulting term that they like to use for writers—Intellectual. The word 'emigrant', too, used as a rule for those who were in exile between 1933 and 1945, has a negative sound in the Federal Republic.

When at the end of 1965 and beginning of 1966 several writers in the DDR were being attacked and discriminated against, they were zealously defended in the Federal Republic even by those prominent newspapers which in their leading articles are in the habit of stirring up their readers against West German intellectuals and especially against writers. When in the 1965 election campaign Chancellor Erhard compared the two writers Guenter Grass and Rolf Hochhuth to dogs of a not very pleasing breed, it was not only in the Federal Republic but also in the representative DDR newspaper that disgust was aroused by this 'zoological' label. But in the same DDR paper, *Neues Deutschland*, could shortly thereafter be read that the DDR author Wolf Biermann 'barks'. When, last autumn in Duesseldorf, thirty young people publicly burned books in the presence of a clergyman and with the permission of the police, among them works by Vladimir Nabokov and Guenter Grass, this action, regarded as symptomatic, was violently commented on—in West as well as in East Germany. The East Berlin press proudly stressed that this could never have happened in the DDR, and this, in fact, is correct, because books by Vladimir Nabokov and Guenter Grass may not even be

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printed in the DDR. But it is undeniable that present-day Germany loves and praises rebellious writers—on the understanding, of course, that their activities take place in the other half of the country. In both, local writers are suspect. But the actual consequences of this mistrust can no more be compared than can the roles which these writers actually play in the society in which they live.

'Every age', writes the storyteller and essayist Stefan Heym, who lives in the DDR, 'has its spokesmen, who express the fears and hopes of the people. In olden times these were the prophets. Today, in the era of the atom and of revolutions . . . writers and scientists seem to have taken on this function. Society has come to recognise this fact; in the technically advanced countries writers and scientists belong to the most honoured and most persecuted category of people.'

Because of the article from which this quotation is taken, Heym has become one of the most persecuted writers of the DDR. Born in 1913, he had, being Jewish, to emigrate in 1933. In 1945 he returned to Germany as a US officer, held leading posts in the press of the US zone, but was sent back to the USA because of pro-communist leanings. During the Korean war he gave up his American citizenship and since 1952 he has lived in the DDR. He is mainly known as the author of the war novel, *The Crusaders*.

Heym is one of those communists who have drawn the consequences of the experiences of the Stalin era. His novel about the events of 17 June 1953 has not received permission for publication, as was officially admitted by the SED; in the party's opinion the book (not published in the West either) contains 'a completely false representation of events'. At the end of 1964, at a writers' conference in East Berlin, Heym gave an impromptu speech in which he reproached the literature of the DDR with being mendacious and not, in fact, ready to settle accounts with the Stalin era.

He first offered the article 'The boredom of Minsk', which led to the open breach between the SED and Heym, to the East Berlin weekly *Sonntag* and then, when it was rejected, had it published in August 1965 in a Slovak magazine. Shortly after it was published by *Lettres Francaises*, *Rinascita*, and in German by *Die Zeit* (Hamburg). Considered in the light of conditions in the DDR, it is, in fact, an unusually brave, even foolhardy article. It is largely a protest against the taboos which hamper the writer 'who wishes to give a true picture of the people and of his times and its conflicts. It is as though one wanted to take a snapshot and someone held a threatening finger directly in front of the camera lens. The owner of the finger must be told to remove it if we are to get a picture rather than a shadow. . . . At present a whole number of socialist fingers are raised in front of socialist lenses and we have a whole assortment of socialist taboos'. It is essential 'to remove the fingers from in front of our lenses and the taboos from our temples'. Towards the end of the article we read: 'We expect our colleagues in the West to raise their voices

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against tyranny and for the rights of the people. Do we raise ours every time the basic principles are violated for the sake of which the revolution took place? We expect our colleagues in the West, when necessary to renounce honours, comforts, and life itself for so unrewarding a thing as truth. What have we renounced when it became necessary?'

AT the plenary session of the SED central committee in December 1965 Stefan Heym, Robert Havemann, the scientist and philosopher, and Wolf Biermann, the poet and singer of ballads, were the target of virulent attacks by many speakers. Heym was accused of being an enemy of the working class and of serving capitalism. Since then not a single line by him has appeared in the DDR. He was no longer permitted to go to West Berlin or to the Federal Republic for discussions and readings.

Even more intense and pointed than the campaign against Stefan Heym was that against Wolf Biermann.* In December 1965 the journal of the central committee of the SED considered the Biermann case important enough to be discussed for weeks in almost all its issues. He was accused of being an 'adherent of spontaneity', of 'scepticism' and of an 'anarchistic philosophy'. He was both politically and sexually perverted. He was 'violently destroying his bonds with the people and with the party' and was trying 'to undermine patriotic consciousness'.

Oddly, for some one so severely and frequently attacked, Biermann is hardly known as a writer in the DDR. No work of reference gives his name; there is no edition—not even a modest selection—of his poems and songs. In newspapers and magazines, too, only very little of his has been published. His play *Berliner Brautgang* was banned after the dress rehearsal. Gramophone records of his songs were prepared, but were never permitted to be cut. From the beginning the SED obstructed his public appearances and frequently prohibited them; since the summer of 1965 they have completely stopped. A large section of the DDR public has come to know the poet Wolf Biermann only through the press attacks and the quotations they contain.

Here, too, as in the case of Heym, a publication outside the DDR was the cause of the trouble. In November 1965 a small West Berlin firm brought out a booklet with thirty-three poems by young Wolf Biermann, of whom it was known that in the DDR he was held in unofficial esteem as a singer of ballads and satirical songs, to the great displeasure of the party. His work shows strong traces of French influence, but is also in the German tradition of Muehsam, Tucholsky, and Mehring. Critics in the Federal Republic spoke well

* See the article on Biermann in the present issue.

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of the little book, but almost always stressed the political and contemporary meaning of the verses rather than their poetic value. The publication in West Berlin of Biermann's poems provided a suitable pretext for the SED, but the real reasons for the attack on him are far more important. There is shrewd insight behind the hysterical and frenzied campaign, for certain circles and officials in the DDR have good reason to fear Biermann's impertinent songs.

In certain ways he is precisely the young author for whom SED culture politicians yearn. His curriculum vitae corresponds to the required biographical pattern: born 1936, son of a workman and communist who was murdered by the nazis for anti-fascist activities; joined a communist youth group in Hamburg as a teenager and in 1953, seventeen years old, turned his back on the Federal Republic. He studied philosophy at the university of East Berlin, was assistant stage manager of Brecht's Berlin Ensemble for two years, was accepted as a candidate into the SED.

Biermann was taught that a young socialist author must above all write about the present, about the life of the workers in the DDR, and must never lose sight of political points of view while looking at reality; and also that the poet of a workers' and peasants' state must speak directly to the masses and be intelligible to all, even to the less educated comrades. He was warned against formalism and other decadent aesthetic tendencies in the rotting world of robber imperialism.

The young man proved his ability to learn. He wrote of workaday life in the DDR and of the rise of socialism; his poetry is critical of society, it never lacks pointed political and moral stresses. There is not a trace of the esoteric; the decadent art of the West holds no interest for him. He really does speak to the masses: what he wants is clear at once to everyone. In short, Biermann is the answer to what the SED says it wants. And that is why he is feared by the party. He puts into words in the simplest rhymes the feelings and thoughts of innumerable inhabitants of the DDR. In the poem 'To the old comrades' (1962) he says with disconcerting openness: 'I'm dissatisfied with the new order', and 'The present screams . . . for change'. He wrote verses about the class struggles, those 'newer ones which, if they have yielded no field of corpses, still create a desert of sorrow'.

In spring 1963 Biermann was expelled from the party, but he refused to bow down: 'I am supposed to sing to you of happiness, of a new age, but your ears are deafened by speeches. Create more happiness in reality, and you will not need so many substitutes in my words. . . . The poet is no bag of sugar!' And nothing could prevent him from addressing these words to the old communists: 'Those who once faced machine guns bravely are afraid of my guitar. Panic spreads when I open my mouth. . . .' And again: 'Would you rather

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die of thirst than drink the bitter juice of my truth? Men, remove those chains of fear from your breast.'

Biermann is not sulking in a corner; he does not want to know of 'internal emigration', of whatever kind it may be. But what disappointed the functionaries most was that, despite all their tricks, he refused to become an anti-communist. Then the case would have been simple for the party. Because, after all, it is not the pagans or believers in other religions who threaten a faith, not even the apostates; the real danger comes from the doubters in one's own ranks.

THOSE who in December 1965 reviled and slandered Biermann, Heym, Havemann, Bieler and other writers and film artists of the DDR were by no means concerned only with literature or simply with art. In fact, their sole intention was to fight against the progressives within the party. They use the word 'culture' but mean liberalism. They say 'writers' but mean the dissatisfied intellectuals. They say 'Biermann' but mean youth.

It is the fact that these terms have a certain justification which illustrates one of the differences between Stalin's time and present-day conditions. Fifteen years ago all well-known writers living in the DDR supported—despite this or that reservation—the efforts of the SED. The regime's opponents were already in the Federal Republic. Today almost all writers of the DDR who can be said to have at least some talent, are in some way in opposition, although this should never be mistaken for anti-communism. It is not that they question the ideological principles of the DDR, but they resist, actively or passively, openly or in camouflaged fashion, the pedantic, rigid, and narrow-minded functionaries who fear more independent thinking by party members. And whereas writers during the Stalin era were in the main isolated within society, today they are, in fact, spokesmen for a not unimportant number of intellectuals within the DDR. Thus the bitterness of leading functionaries is understandable and their agitation not irrational.

The chief ideologue, Kurt Hager, gave an emphatic warning against literature which restricts itself to 'the statement of facts and the criticism of shortcomings'. Literary work, he says, would 'remain deaf and sterile without knowledge of the perspective and policy championed by the party.' But these functionaries know that the great majority of writers and artists in the DDR can no longer be won with yesterday's catchphrases.

At the plenum itself the culture politicians received a very clear answer from Christa Wolf, the author of the successful and much-discussed novel *Der geteilte Himmel*, and candidate member of the central committee. Her attitude would seem to be symptomatic. Christa Wolf had always stressed her total allegiance to the DDR—and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of her declarations of loyalty. But while Hager wanted to force the 'creators of culture'

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to adhere to 'the perspective as mediated by the party', Christa Wolf said: 'Art must also raise questions that are new, which the artist thinks he sees, even if he does not yet see the answers'. While for Hager 'the writers union actually carries the responsibility for the development of socialist literature', Christa Wolf felt it necessary to recall 'that art cannot now, nor could it in the past, cease being subjective, that is, it must reflect the artist's signature, his language, his world of thought'. She did not hesitate to warn her hearers against a relapse into that 'conception of the typical' which 'we have had before and which led to art being able to create nothing but types'.

Writers, artists, and intellectuals have drawn some lessons from the experience of the fifties. In this connection the situation today is different from stalinist times. The functionaries see no alternative but to put massive pressure on the writer—by prohibiting travel, publication, and public appearances, and, above all, by using 'economic levers', i.e. financial sanctions. This is easy enough in a country where practically all publication channels are in the hands of the state, but it is now challenged by the solidarity of those it is directed against.

There are many signs which suggest that this solidarity has long since become fact. For months the press of the DDR published articles and letters welcoming and supporting the tough line taken by the central committee. But not one of them was written by a well-known writer of the DDR, of whom none was willing to support the cultural policy of the central committee, none wanted to utter self-criticism in public, none was prepared to write against Biermann. When, in January 1966, the board of the writers union was to have met in East Berlin to discuss the situation that had arisen, prudence dictated a transfer to Dresden, because of the passive resistance of the writers of East Berlin. There were open protests too. Franz Fuehmann (born 1922) is one of the most prominent writers of the middle generation, and has received several prizes in the DDR. His tales are usually set in the second world war and are also greatly esteemed in the Federal Republic. For many years Fuehmann consistently chose themes recommended by the party for his prose as well as for his poetry. At the beginning of 1966 he decided to leave the board of the writers union of the DDR in protest—as he expressly declared—'against the culture-political line pursued at the eleventh plenum'. His decision made such an impression that it could not be kept out of the press. Similar protests by other known authors were, however, hushed up. It did not, of course, escape the central committee that these were very serious symptoms; hence the appointment of a new minister of culture. Hans Bentzien, the former minister of culture, has no strongly marked personality, and his reputation among the writers and artists of the DDR is not bad—but neither has he the slightest authority, and it was easy for the party to make him their scapegoat and remove him from office. His successor, Klaus Gysi (born 1912), is a man of

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quite a different calibre. He has been a member of the German Communist Party since 1931, and embodies a mixture of qualities seldom encountered in the DDR: he became a functionary while remaining an intellectual; he is devoted to the party but he is intelligent; he obeys Moscow and is flexibile; he combines inexorable consistency with versatility and composure.

The party expects Gysi to carry through its tough culture-political line. But even the party has come to realise that this cannot be accomplished in opposition to the writers and artists of the DDR. Even in the central committee the word has gone about that, though officials and functionaries can be changed around, this is not true of those who write novels or plays. Reluctant as the SED is to tolerate a solid front of writers, it wants to avoid too drastic steps—the DDR has already lost much prestige among West German intellectuals by its actions against Havemann, Heym, and Biermann. Gysi, a tactician and a practical man, who was for many years the head of the largest book publishing firm in the DDR and is used to dealing with writers, is to be the saviour in need.

In fact, the pressure on the writers has created a situation in literary life between the Elbe and the Oder whose features are almost uncannily clear. Never have the lines of division been so obvious. Granted that reality is always differentiated and many-sided, in the DDR as everywhere else; all the same, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the talented are bitterly silent, the half-talented stutter in embarrassment, while the incompetent talk on regardless. A trial of strength is being enacted, dangerous for both sides—for the party as much as for the writers.

The new minister of culture is clearly trying to prevent a further hardening of the fronts. Indeed, he seems to believe that in the interests of the DDR it is essential for writers and artists here and there to be given a little more room to move in. If the DDR wishes to attract regard on the international scene, and to continue its flirtation with the intellectuals of the Federal Republic, then it must act accordingly, above all in respect to the writers at home.

In this connection the 'Regulations for the protection of copyright' issued in February 1966 are interesting. Until now DDR authors who were unable or did not wish to have their work published in their own country, and offered it to West German publishing houses or newspapers, did so on their own responsibility. The DDR authorities tolerated this in many instances though without enthusiasm. But under the new regulations not a single line by a DDR author may now be published in the West without prior permission from the authorities.

This amounts to a confession by the party that all its efforts to prevent contacts of DDR writers with West German publishing houses and newspapers had failed. All their arts of persuasion and paternal suggestions, their warnings and threats, internal sanctions and indirect

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offers of bribes, have been in vain. So the party has had to resort to its last weapon, compulsion. On the other hand, the regulations envisage only relatively mild punishment, and are in any case framed in such a way that they can also be interpreted liberally. In any case the Copyright Office is only an additional censorship authority in the DDR—an instrument of which the party can always make use when it seems opportune. Other measures and documents of the spring of 1966 clearly show, however, that the party wishes to end the present conflict—without, of course, being ready to give more freedom.

No less characteristic is the 'Basis for Discussion' published in June 1966 in the East Berlin weekly *Sonntag*, which was drawn up by the writers union and is addressed to 'all writers and all friends of literature in the DDR'. The document picks up the main points and theses of the eleventh plenum but the attitude it reflects has clearly changed, in that defensive elements are now in the foreground.

It would be misleading, the union suggests, to believe 'that literature exercises its practical effect in society mainly through its critical function'. Rather, 'criticism as an impulse and expression of party-mindedness can never by itself serve as a valid basis of life in a socialist society'. Unfortunately, 'some modern bourgeois ideological conceptions, attitudes, and sentiments' had penetrated literary circles in the DDR. 'Every effort to introduce the features of man as portrayed in bourgeois decadent art into the literature of a socialist society, runs contrary to its inner law and is reactionary. . . . This applies to the glorifying or uncritical representation of man as an isolated, self-sufficient, powerless being delivered up to anonymous powers and tormented by *Angst*, . . . This applies to the praise of animalistic sexuality, to the representation of the brutal, the cruel, and the harsh.' Writing of this kind was incompatible with socialist realism. It was also harmful to entertain the idea that 'in the transition period from capitalism to communism, people today are condemned for the sake of a bright ideal future, to suffer hardship, to live in the here and now without happiness and human fulfilment'. The influence of Kafka, Joyce, and Beckett, now noticeable in DDR literature, is deplored. The union protests against 'ideas and feelings of alienation in socialism', against that feeling, expressed in several literary works, 'of the surrender of the individual to a mechanism of inscrutable and incomprehensible powers, or to powers which for solely pragmatic reasons will use or discard the individual'. There can be no 'nonconformist trend' in the literature of the DDR.

The opposition among writers and intellectuals of the DDR is alluded to in a typical remark towards the end of the document. The representatives of the Marxist-Leninist ideology must differentiate themselves sharply from the non-Marxists who give themselves out as Marxists or communists, but they must do so 'without being themselves interested in aggravating the conflict'. Compared with the speeches in December 1965, this formulation sounds reasonably pacific,

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without however indicating any retreat. The union also repeats in its 'Basis for Discussion' one of the usual DDR definitions of 'artistic freedom': 'Our concept of artistic freedom has above all this positive element, that the writer should harmonise his doing and thinking with what is historically and objectively necessary'. But as it is only the party which can decide what is historically and objectively necessary, only the writer who does what the party demands of him can be deemed free. Comment is superfluous.

While this document in effect maintains a defensive attitude, the SED on other occasions has tried hard to push a certain book as, if not actually exemplary, still good enough to be recommended energetically to the public. One such book was the novel *Die Aula*, by Hermann Kant, which appeared in autumn 1965 in the DDR and in spring 1966 in the Federal Republic. Kant (born 1926), was then known mainly as a journalist. The scene of *Die Aula* is the year 1962; but the main action takes place among students of proletarian origin in the years 1949–52. The book consists largely of short tales, anecdotes, humorous sketches, jokes, jests, and banter. They show the vitality of Kant the writer: he has many and at times even original ideas, he shows himself to be a delightful gossip, a slick storyteller, an amusing portraitist, a jester and a wit. He is out to convince the reader that he looks independently and critically at life in the DDR. And in fact he does permit his first-person storyteller to display a touch of scepticism, a trace of sadness. He may react ironically to much, deride much. Not only does he parody schoolboy jargon and the teachers' way of speaking, but also the German spoken by party functionaries. He takes dogmatists and sectarians to task—they meant well but—in the first years of the DDR, of course!—did badly at times. If people fled the DDR in those days, then this was always the fault of a few subordinate functionaries. The run-of-the-mill justification for all that is criticised here is: infantile disorders of the new system.

In the scenes which take place in 1962, criticism of conditions has become very modest indeed: in East Berlin for a little while no onions can be obtained, the writers of the DDR are vain, etc. If serious questions emerge at times, they are immediately smothered. Kant transforms problems into naive anecdotes. White hot iron is shaped into pretty little souvenirs. What has happened is either concealed and ignored, or made inoffensive and cosy. Practical jokes set the pattern, the nostalgic memories of happy schooldays predominate—the DDR turns out to be a land of smiles.

On the other hand, the book is very different from many similar novels that toe the party line. It is more intelligent and funnier, and therefore at least fairly suitable as light reading matter. Furthermore, Kant frequently and not unskilfully uses some modern writing techniques which are still considered daring in the DDR, such as internal monologues, dual perspectives, chains of association, and flashbacks. Official critics in the DDR are especially proud of the use of these

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techniques in a book so impeccably loyal to the party line. As this pride is frequently and clearly expressed, it can be assumed that the party will be ready to make concessions in this respect in the great trial of strength which is now taking place between it and DDR writers. In other words, the party will probably approve the copying, within limits, of the formal techniques developed by modern Western literature if these are used for a true party-line representation of conditions in the DDR.

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